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M. PERFILYEV

**Soviet
democracy
and
bourgeois
sovietology**



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ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND THE BOOK

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Marat Perfilyev has devoted many years to the study of the organisation of Soviet society. In the present work, the author makes a critical analysis of the most important theories proposed by bourgeois sovietologists and points out the ways in which Soviet reality is currently being presented in a false light by the leading ideologists of the anti-communist centres of the West, particularly the USA.

The book contains abundant factual material on Soviet reality which serves to refute the inventions of bourgeois propaganda.

М. Н. ПЕРФИЛЬЕВ

СОВЕТСКАЯ ДЕМОКРАТИЯ И БУРЖУАЗНАЯ
«СОВЕТОЛОГИЯ»

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PREFACE

There is a bitter struggle in the world today between two ideologies—communist and bourgeois. This conflict is the reflection in man's consciousness of the historical process now taking place in the world—the transition from capitalism to socialism. In this new epoch, the revolutionary world outlook of the proletariat has taken firm hold throughout the world. The bourgeoisie is no longer capable of offering the kinds of ideas which appeal to the great masses of people and, consequently, must resort with ever greater frequency to an oblique defence of the world of capitalism. They compensate for their dearth of argument with inventions about the nature of socialism and particularly about the Soviet Union, hoping thereby to dissuade those who have become disillusioned with bourgeois democracy from taking steps which might jeopardise the capitalist political system.

One of the main targets of bourgeois criticism of the Soviet Union is the Soviet political system. By *the Soviet political system*, we refer to the system of socialist democracy in the USSR which reflects the interests and the will of the people and consists of political institutions (the Soviet Government, the Communist Party, mass organisations) and their inter-relationships.

Bourgeois criticism of the Soviet political system is not an independent political or ideological trend. It combines both the conservative and liberal lines

that are alike *in content* and differ only *in form*, i.e., in *method* of falsification and *technique* of presentation. However different their criticism may be in form, conservatives and liberals stand together in their opposition to progressive forces, to genuine communism.

Bourgeois criticism uses the method of superimposing Soviet reality, which is something radically different from capitalism, onto certain models of capitalist organisation, primarily those which are particularly odious to the people. Thus, socialist democracy, which by its very nature is something entirely new, is portrayed as being some kind of degraded bourgeois democracy. And the models which the Western ideologists employ actually reflect the authoritarian systems of capitalism which have arisen as a result of the crisis in its traditional democracy.

A device used widely in bourgeois criticism is that of synthesising certain aspects and factors in the development of Soviet and Western political systems. The purpose of such synthesis was outlined in *Political Power: USA/USSR* by leading bourgeois ideologists Brzezinski and Huntington: namely, to do everything possible to "protect the existing character of a society and to promote its growth along established, undisturbed paths".¹ This approach is used by those who would have us believe that Soviet and bourgeois systems are not essentially different in content, but only in the outward forms of democracy. The aim is to discredit the forms of socialist democracy in the USSR and to dull the class consciousness of the working people in capitalist countries.

Bourgeois ideologists often put their stake on certain difficulties and shortcomings in Soviet construction. They generalise on these difficulties and

¹ Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. and Huntington, Samuel P., *Political Power: USA/USSR*, New York, 1964, p. 71.

shortcomings, try to convince their readers that such problems cannot be resolved under Soviet conditions, and offer proposals as to how to improve the efficiency of the Soviet political system—proposals which, in the final analysis, beg revision of Marxist theory on socialist democracy and misinform the public about the progress actually being made in Soviet construction.

Criticism of this nature is typical of that coming from the following sources: Harvard University's Russian Research Centre, Columbia University's Research Institute on Communist Affairs, and South Carolina University's Centre for Research on Problems of Strategy and Tactics of International Communism; the pages of *The American Political Science Review*, *Slavic Review*, *Communist Affairs*, *Foreign Affairs*, *The Journal of Politics*, *Problems of Communism*, and *The Russian Review*; and publishers D. Van Nostrand and Frederick A. Praeger. We are speaking here of works by bourgeois ideologists Raymond A. Bauer, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Leopold Labedz, Walter Laqueur, Alfred G. Meyer, Adam B. Ulam, John Hazard, Sidney Hook, Harold Zink, Leonard Shapiro and others. Bourgeois ideologists have been quite prolific and a sizeable proportion of their output has been devoted to the "overall" study of the Soviet political system.

Meanwhile, Soviet philosophers and specialists in law (S. L. Zivs, O. F. Ivanenko, B. S. Mankovsky, Y. B. Peskov, V. S. Semyonov, V. A. Tumanov, B. A. Shabad and others) have been doing significant work in recent years exposing the bourgeois bias and the inconsistency of various Western theories relating to the nature and role of the Soviet state and mass organisations. Other Soviet writers (A. P. Butenko, V. Y. Guliev, V. N. Yegorov, Y. D. Modrzhinskaya, A. G. Mozokhina, V. V. Mshveniyeradze, Y. P. Sitkovsky, V. A. Chep-

rakov and P. A. Chuvikov) have described the methods and devices used by bourgeois ideologists and the ways in which the picture of the Soviet political system is distorted.

The author of the present work has attempted to make a critical examination of several basic theories of current sovietology on the character and organisation of the Soviet political system, the links in the system and their inter-relationships, and factors pertaining to the development of the system as a whole. Special attention is given to the premises, devices and methods used by bourgeois critics in their attempts to confuse public thinking about Soviet reality. The present work, consists of a critical examination of the works, published within the last decade, by leading ideologists in anti-communist centres of the West, primarily in the United States.

Chapter 1

A CRITIQUE OF BOURGEOIS THEORIES ON THE NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF ORGANISATION OF THE SOVET POLITICAL SYSTEM

Bourgeois democracy proclaims democratic rights but *does not guarantee* them in practice for the working people. True democracy under capitalism exists "only for the rich", and "is beyond the reach of the poor!"¹ Under the conditions of the general capitalist crisis, the bourgeoisie seeks to destroy or to curtail to the limit whatever democracy does exist, and workers' political organisations are either restricted or completely outlawed.

Soviet democracy, on the other hand, from its very inception has not only proclaimed, *but guaranteed* political freedom and social rights to all working people. Even during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, democracy existed "for the poor, for nine-tenths of the population" and was limited "only in the *suppression* of bourgeois resistance".² Under present conditions, as the nation is moving toward communism, the Soviet political system functions in the interests and according to the will of the whole people.

Under these conditions, the primary goal of modern bourgeois theories on the nature and principles of

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Complete Works*, 5th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 181.

² Ibid.

organisation of the Soviet political system is to bolster up the main Western propaganda thesis about the "free world" of capitalism and to discredit the Soviet political system.

Distorted Interpretations of the Soviet Political System

The Soviet political system guarantees both political freedoms (freedom of speech, press and assembly and the right to elect and be elected) and social rights (the right to work, the right to rest, the right to free education and medical services, the right to material security in old age, illness or disability, equal rights regardless of race, nationality, or sex in all areas of political, economic and cultural life). These rights and freedoms are explicitly spelled out in the Soviet Constitution. The chief aim of bourgeois criticism is to plant doubts that these rights and freedoms are in fact enjoyed by the people. This line of attack can be seen on both the theoretical and factual aspects of criticism by such authors as Iring Fetscher, Alex Inkeles, Kent Geiger, Harold Zink, Kenneth Colegrove and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Wide currency is given in the West to theories that political rights and social freedoms are not actually guaranteed at all and that claims about constitutional foundations in Soviet society are pure fiction. The authors of such theories cannot, of course, deny that these democratic principles are, indeed, outlined in the Soviet Constitution, and are forced to admit that the Constitution "really does look appealing". They admit that the Soviet Constitution is "an all-inclusive summary of the basic rights of man, augmented by a series of highly concrete rights, such as the right to work, to rest, to education, etc...". However, they add, "the domination-submission pattern in the Soviet

Union is such that it is impossible to speak of any kind of democracy 'from below'".¹

Just how do the bourgeois ideologists perceive the "fiction" of Soviet society's constitutional foundations? It all boils down, it turns out, to the fact that the Soviet Constitution is *partisan* in character. We find this kind of formulation in works by Zink, Colegrove, Brzezinski, Inkeles and Geiger, and summed up succinctly by Alex Nove in his contribution to a volume entitled *Soviet Society. A Book of Readings*.² In his section entitled "The Constitution, Governmental Organisation and Political Practice", Nove states that it is in partisanship and partisanship alone that we must search for "the key to all Soviet constitutional practice and the explanation of much of the theory".

Partisanship, in the view of such critics, means that the rights and freedoms provided for in the Soviet Constitution "become the privilege of Party members". Proceeding from this conception of things, Colegrove asserts that the Party "usurps" that which "belongs" to the whole society. "Citizens in communist countries do not have ... liberties and rights. Political power in these countries is held only by the Communist Party."³ In addition, they point to another "defect" allegedly stemming from this same principle. Brzezinski, for example, holds that the Party under the existing system "is unhindered in its exercise of power".⁴

¹ Iring Fetscher, *Von Marx zur Sowjetideologie*, Frankfurt am Main, 1959, S. 129.

² *Soviet Society. A Book of Readings*, edited by Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger, published in 1961 (Boston, Mass.), is regarded in the West as an encyclopaedic reference work on the Soviet Union.

³ Kenneth Colegrove, *Democracy Versus Communism*, New Jersey, 1957, p. 66.

⁴ Z. K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*, London, 1962, p. 38.

The critics compare the Soviet constitutional system with the bourgeois system. They understand that they cannot hide the defects of "free world" democracy in which curtailment of the people's already limited social rights and political freedoms has become the norm; consequently, they adopt indirect methods of defending capitalism. Some authors state simply that "ideal government systems do not exist, and cannot exist".¹ However, they recommend that those who are disappointed with democracy in the capitalist world refrain from taking action. The bourgeois constitution, says one, contains certain "negative features"; the existing constitutional system "needs perfecting". But it "is capable of perfection", while this "cannot be said" of the Soviet constitutional system.² The constitutional system of the West, the explanations go on, is "non-partisan"; a constitution "is the very foundation of the state, providing for its government, specifying its authority and guiding its actions",³ while in Soviet society, "the power system ... is determined only by the Party".⁴ In summary, the defenders of the bourgeois system warn those who themselves "do not perceive the differences between the free world and the totalitarian world" to refrain from opposing capitalism if they "want to defend freedom".⁵

Zink and others sharing his point of view, try to convince the reader that the constitution is always an abstract good, determining the basis of the existing regime,⁶ and that a political party is but "some

element or segment of the people, especially the voters, who are drawn together in support of more or less definite public programmes".¹ However, the intention here is to emasculate the class essence inherent in the concepts "constitution" and "party" and to define them in such a way as would, on the one hand, enable the bourgeois ideologists to distort the position and role of the Soviet Constitution and the Communist Party in Soviet society, and, on the other hand, enable them to conceal the anti-popular nature of bourgeois constitutions and parties. The very fact that opposing classes do exist shows that any interpretation of constitution as an "abstract good" is a "sanctioned, legalised lie of constitutional states: *the state is the concern of the people or the people, the concern of the state*".² The question as to the nature of a constitution does not depend on acknowledging or not acknowledging that it is partisan. A constitution in a class society is *always partisan*. All existing constitutions reflect the nature of *social relations*.

Wherever there is class antagonism, a party functions as the *vanguard* of one particular *class*, and the constitution is the *legal form determining the existing regime according to the will of the dominating class*. When there is socio-political and ideological unity, the party becomes the voice of the people's will; that is, the will of the working class, the collective-farm peasantry and the intelligentsia. The constitution then becomes the legal form determining the socialist structure in accordance with the *will of the people*.

An examination of bourgeois constitutions in action will reveal that "there is not a single state, however democratic, which has no loopholes or reservations in

¹ Theodor Arnold, *Kommunistische Propaganda und ihre Abwehr*, Flawil, 1961, S. 20.

² I. Fetscher, op. cit., p. 156.

³ Harold Zink, *Modern Governments*, New Jersey, 1958, p. 556.

⁴ I. Fetscher op. cit., p. 129.

⁵ Th. Arnold, op. cit., p. 18.

⁶ See H. Zink, op. cit., p. 556.

¹ Ibid., p. 571.

² K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, 2nd Russ. ed., Vol. I, p. 293.

its constitution guaranteeing the bourgeoisie the possibility of dispatching troops against the workers, of proclaiming martial law, and so forth, in case of a 'violation of public order', and actually in case the exploited class 'violates' its position of slavery and tries to behave in a non-slavish manner."¹ Bourgeois electoral systems contain a variety of voting qualifications which, in effect, prevent many workers from participating in elections and bar them from representative institutions. There are property-holding requirements; educational, residence, sex and race qualifications; denial of suffrage to service men; and high age requirements which deny voting rights to the revolutionarily inclined youth of the country.

The Western press holds the United States up as a model of bourgeois democracy. "In the United States," capitalist ideologists assert, "liberty has reached a very high point in history".² Let us examine this "liberty". According to capitalism's ideologists, the US Government represents the interests of the whole people; the US Constitution is defined as law, enacted and approved by the people; and the Government is defined as the executive organ empowered to implement the law. At inauguration, the President solemnly swears that he will to the best of his ability "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States". But, in actual fact, the Government of the United States represents not the people, but the monopolistic circles. Five out of ten presidential cabinet members are as a rule directly associated with monopoly capital; the remainder are bourgeois politicians—former state governors, diplomats, insurance company managers, etc.

In an article entitled "The Businessman in Government", published in *Fortune* magazine, the Eisen-

hower Administration was described as "a business Administration in the area at the top where the major decisions are made".¹ This description was also applied to the Truman Administration (1952) in which 36 representatives of monopoly capital held top positions in eight government departments. The number grew to 83 in the same eight departments during the Eisenhower Administration (1954).

It is interesting to note that almost 200 years after the US Constitution was ratified, the country still only *hopes* "to make real the equal opportunity"² promised to its citizens. We can estimate how successfully this problem is being solved by the extent to which "liberty" is enjoyed by non-whites in the United States. The American magazine *US News and World Report* in an article entitled "Truth About Negro Progress in US" quoted some US Census Bureau statistics which showed that the *average income of non-white wage-earners* (Negroes, Indians, Japanese, Chinese, Philipinos, Hawaiians, Aleuts, Eskimos—comprising 11.4 per cent of the population) is 40 per cent *less* than the average income of *white* wage-earners. There is *unequal* opportunity for *Negroes and whites in choice of jobs*. On a national scale, the *percentage of unemployed Negroes* is approximately *double* that of unemployed *whites*. *Job segregation exists even in the northern states*, although as the article points out, "it is somewhat less than in the South, and incomes, too, are generally higher".³ In evaluating these data it should be borne in mind that they were gathered tendentiously.

Where, then, is the "equality before the law" which American ideologists refer to, hoping thereby to "strengthen faith in and commitment to democratic

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 244.

² K. Colegrove, op. cit., p. 29.

¹ *Fortune*, No. 7, 1954, p. 70.

² *The New York Times*, Dec. 27, 1964.

³ *US News and World Report*, Dec. 13, 1965.

ideas and processes"?¹ A century after the "emancipation" of the Negroes, John F. Kennedy in one of his last messages to Congress urged that "the right to vote in a free American election, must not be denied to any citizen on grounds of his race or colour".² Lyndon B. Johnson, in signing the Voting Rights Law, expressed his hopes that "in this generation that promise [that the Negroes will achieve full equality—M. P.] will be kept".³

The true picture of the American brand of "liberty" became evident in the government's actions against the Communist Party of the USA. In accordance with the McCarran Act, attempts are being made to force the Communist Party to register as a foreign agent engaging in sabotage and espionage. And this is being done despite the fact that the Communist Party of the USA is an indigenous American workers' political organisation, fighting for the direct and basic interests of the American workers, farmers, Negro people and all others who labour both physically and mentally, and fight against capitalist exploitation and oppression. Yet the bourgeois press calls the arbitrary registration law a "manifestation of democratic freedoms". The working people, however, look upon this "freedom of action" as a departure from the democratic rights of the people and as a violation of the Constitution and its Bill of Rights. The McCarran Act reintroduced, for the first time since the 17th century, a system of laws, if it can be so called, directed not only against individual citizens but also against the minority parties, the parties of opposition, on the basis of which the victims cannot make use of

¹ David Mallery, *Teaching About Communism. A Definition of the Problem and a Description of Some Practices*, Boston, 1962, p. 51.

² *The New York Times*, Jan. 15, 1963.

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 7, 1965.

the protections and rights granted by the Constitution.

The *fiction* of bourgeois constitutions, the Constitution of the United States among them, stems from the *divergence between law and reality*, for the point is "that the fundamental laws of the state in general, and the laws governing elections to and the powers of the representative institutions, etc., express the actual relation of forces in the class struggle. A constitution is fictitious when law and reality diverge; it is not fictitious when they coincide."¹ Under capitalist conditions, the constitution can only be *bourgeois*, and this means that it is partisan. Although the bourgeois constitution is formally presented as non-partisan law, the will of the exploiting class is nonetheless fully secured in it. The fiction disappears whenever the will of this minority, comprising one to four per cent of the population, is established legally as the law of the land. The nature of bourgeois partisanship, raised to the level of law, may be judged by such phenomena as nazism in Germany.

In Soviet society, both the legal and the practical aspects of the Constitution are determined by the fact that the Communist Party is the leading and guiding force in the Soviet system's political organisation.

What does this mean?

A resolution of the 8th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), held in March 1919, stated that "the Party must implement its decisions through Soviet organs *within the framework of the Soviet Constitution*" and that "the Party strives to *guide* the activities of the Soviets, but not to replace them".² The Party implements its programme in the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 336.

² *The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and CC Plenary Meetings*, Gospolitizdat, 1954, p. 446.

Soviets *not by confusing* Party and government functions, not by exercising some kind of *guardianship* over the Soviets, nor by *granting privileges* to Party members, but by the concrete, selfless, day-to-day work of its members within the Soviets and by nominating the staunchest and most dedicated of them as candidates for election to Soviet posts.

Soviet experience has fully proved the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist tenet on the decisive role of the Communist Party in founding and developing a socialist society; it has shown that success in organising and leading a whole people toward a socialist victory can be achieved only by a party which consistently implements class, proletarian policy, is armed with progressive revolutionary theory and is united and closely bound with the masses. "The building of socialism and its further development rests on the support, participation and initiative of the broadest masses inspired and led by the working class. The Communist Party is the vanguard of socialist society as a whole,"¹ says the Main Document of the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, held in Moscow.

According to CPSU Rules, Party leadership is accomplished through *Party groups* of the Soviets, the executive committees and the primary Party organisations of the executive committee apparatus. Party groups are formed at congresses, conferences and meetings called by Soviet organisations; they are also formed within the elective organs of these organisations whenever such organs contain three or more Party members. The function of these groups is to promote the all-round influence of the Party and implementation of its policy among non-Party members, strengthen Party and governmental discipline, fight bureaucracy, and check up on the implementation

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969, Prague, 1969, p. 22.*

of Party and Soviet decisions. Also among the questions dealt with by the Party groups are selection and assignment of personnel and the activity of the Communist deputies in implementing the decisions of Party and Soviet agencies. The essential feature of Party leadership within the framework of the Soviet Constitution is that Party groups function *through Soviet organisations*, not outside them, *through Communists* working in the Soviets and *through mass organisations* of the working people.

All this means that power in the Soviet Union, in full accordance with the Constitution of the USSR, is not in the hands of exploiters, not in the hands of parasitic elements, but in the hands of the working people of the town and countryside through their Soviets of the Working People's Deputies. This provision of the Soviet Constitution is most strictly adhered to.

While socialism was still being built, when the people were not yet fully united by a community of basic interests, the Soviet Constitution of 1919 expressed the will of those whom the bourgeoisie and the landowners had exploited for tens and hundreds of years—the workers and peasants. As brought out at the 7th All-Russia Congress of Soviets in December 1919, it was impossible, at that time, to have full equality, friendship and fraternal alliance with supporters of the overthrown bourgeoisie and landowners. During that period, the Party rested on the alliance of the working class and the working peasantry, with the working class as the leading force. But once the whole people had been united by a community of basic interests, the Soviet Constitution came to express the will of all classes and social groups in the country. "All power in the USSR", as stated in Article 3 of the 1936 Constitution, "is vested in the working people of town and country as represented by Soviets of Working People's Deputies". Under these new conditions,

the Communist Party is the vanguard of the progressive, most politically conscious part of the working class, the collective-farm peasantry and the intelligentsia in the USSR, and relies on their socio-political and ideological unity.

The Eighth Supreme Soviet of the USSR, elected in 1970, consists of 1,517 deputies, including 763 workers and collective farmers (50.3 per cent), more than one-third engineers, technicians, agronomists and zoo-technicians. Of the 1,517 deputies, 463 (30.3 per cent) are women. All nationalities of the USSR are represented there. All in all, there is not a single deputy in the Eighth Supreme Soviet (as was true of the Seventh Supreme Soviet, as well) who does not belong to the working class, the collective-farm peasantry or the intelligentsia.

Workers and peasants make up the following percentages of other organs: Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics—48.8 per cent; Supreme Soviets of the Autonomous Republics—43.2 per cent. The breakdown of the latter by republic is as follows (March 1969): Russian Federation—61.3 per cent; Ukrainian SSR—71.8 per cent; Byelorussian SSR—61.6 per cent; Uzbek SSR—66.4 per cent; Kazakh SSR—61.1 per cent; Georgian SSR—65.5 per cent; Azerbaijan SSR—68.6 per cent; Lithuanian SSR—63.0 per cent; Moldavian SSR—67.7 per cent; Latvian SSR—63.6 per cent; Kirghiz SSR—67.3 per cent; Tajik SSR—67.0 per cent; Armenian SSR—67.4 per cent; Turkmen SSR—66.9 per cent; Estonian SSR—61.6 per cent. The balance of the deputies are enterprise managers, shop superintendents and shop foremen; state-farm managers, foremen and specialists; engineers, technicians and other specialists; principals and teachers of elementary and secondary schools; doctors, doctors' assistants and other medical personnel; research workers; college teachers, etc.

The high ratio of worker and collective-farmer representation in all Soviets, from the Supreme Soviet

of the USSR to the local Soviets, is a stable index of the development of the Soviet (council) system. Table 1 shows the percentage of worker and collective-farmer deputies in local Soviets over the past forty-two years.

Table 1

Year	Workers	Peasants
1927	19.6	55.8
1936	11.2	57.3
1961	23.8	38.0
1963	26.9	35.2
1965	28.8	33.3
1967	29.6	31.3
1969	35.0	29.3

Note: Percentages for the first two years are based on RSFSR figures; for 1961-67 — on figures for the USSR as a whole.

It can be seen from the table that the worker and collective-farmer representation in the local Soviets has been *stable*, that it is a *leading* and *determining* link in the system of local organs of power. The gradual reduction in the collective-farmer ratio reflects, in the first place, the transformation of the country from a backward nation into an industrial power, which resulted in an absolute increase in the working-class population. In the second place, it reflects an increase in the leading role of the working class.

The viability of the Soviet Constitution, that is, the unity of its juridical and factual sides, stems from the socio-political and ideological *unity* of the Soviet society.

By "exposing" the partisan nature of the Soviet Constitution, bourgeois ideologists hope, in vain to be sure, to undermine the sympathies that the broad

masses of the people in the West have toward the Soviet political system and to establish the thesis about the "free world" of capitalism firmly in their consciousness. The broad masses, under the leadership of their Communist or Workers' Parties, or parties of labour are not against constitutional partisanship *as such*, but *against enactment into law of the will of bourgeois parties*. What the people want is to really enjoy the social rights and political freedoms supposedly guaranteed them in the bourgeois constitution. The working people in capitalist countries are waging a struggle against the bourgeois partisanship of their constitution, a partisanship which manifests itself in the dictatorship of the minority over the majority, in the freedom for the bourgeoisie to exploit the working people and in the violation of the already restricted rights of the broad popular masses. They naturally come out first of all against any *legal* fixation of bourgeois partisanship in the constitution. It is well known that the establishment of an open terrorist dictatorship is always connected with a policy of isolating and destroying working-class parties, dividing the proletarian forces and crushing them part by part, and then doing away with all other democratic parties and organisations, turning the people into a blind instrument of capital. The struggle of the broad masses in the defence of rights and freedoms proclaimed in bourgeois constitutions is, at the same time, a struggle for "a transition from formal, bourgeois democracy to genuine democracy, to democracy for working people."¹ In this struggle they become convinced that in the "universal democracy" of the bourgeois ideologists, there is in actual fact no place *for the working people*. What the bourgeois ideologists really have in mind is *bourgeois democracy* operating

¹ *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, p. 74.

within the framework of the capitalist system, and when they criticise constitutional partisanship, they do not argue against *bourgeois partisanship*, but against the movement of the broad masses to *establish as law the will of those who labour*. Communist and Workers' Parties and parties of labour, representing and working in the interests of the broad masses of working people, are often deprived of the opportunity of even presenting their point of view in capitalist countries. At the same time, parties of monopoly capital adhering to fascist ideology are allowed to take part in the formation of the organs of power. Thus, in West Germany, where the Communist Party was forced underground, the so-called National Democratic Party of Germany—the successor of Hitler's National Socialist Party—participates in elections and in the formation of local governments.

The so-called merits of the bourgeois constitutional system (a system which, they say, provides for government, specifies its authority and guides its actions) are a long way from offering an alternative to the Soviet political system. It is well known that "legislative power does not create the law—it only discloses and formulates it".¹ The constitutional system of the capitalist countries provides for government and specifies the authority according to the *will of the bourgeoisie*; it is a system, therefore, geared to the safeguarding of their interests.

Theories about the Soviet electoral system give an example of one of the directions bourgeois criticism takes in its factual aspect. Bourgeois ideologists, such as Lapenna, Ballis, Zink, Fetscher and Scott, try to find such "flaws" in the Soviet electoral system ("It is more than obvious," they say, "that neither now . . . does power belong nor earlier . . . did power belong to

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, 2nd Russ. ed., Vol. I, p. 285.

the 'working people of town and countryside'")¹ as might give them grounds to speak about the advantages of the bourgeois constitutional system.

These critics focus their attention on the bloc of Communists and non-Party people. The absence of contesting forces in the pre-election campaigns and the nomination of candidates, according to Wolfe and Ballis, results from the pressure exerted by the Party on mass organisations and production collectives and the distortion of their will by the Party.²

But what is the basis for making such an assertion? An elementary requirement even for bourgeois sociology is to substantiate what is accepted or proffered as truth with facts. There are a number of factors lying behind the existence of a Communist and non-Party bloc in the USSR. They include the *motives of pre-election public statements* by mass organisations, the appeals of production collectives for Communist and non-Party unity in preparing for and carrying out the elections of deputies, and the *level of pre-election activity* of these organisations and collectives. The motives reflect the degree to which the members of the mass organisations and production collectives are united, while the level of pre-election activity is a measure of the degree of satisfaction with this unity. The Communist and non-Party bloc in Soviet society rests on what the election rights of Communists and non-Party people are, and on how they use these rights. To understand what is meant by the Communist and non-Party bloc, it is important to take into account the *relationship*

¹ Ivo Lapenna, "Party and State in the Programme", *The USSR and the Future*, New York, 1963, pp. 152-53.

² William B. Ballis, Bertram L. Wolfe, "Communist Totalitarianism: Keys of the Soviet System", *Slavic Review*, *American Quarterly of Soviet and East European Studies*, No. 4, 1962, pp. 57-59.

between the candidates, whether Party or non-Party, and the *collectives which delegate them*, that is, the voters. In other words, we must take into account the social, political and ideological unity of candidates and voters. Bourgeois ideologists ignore looking into the factors which actually determine the Communist and non-Party bloc. Their assertions are based on the proposition that a "stable democratic system requires sources of cleavage so that there will be a struggle over ruling positions, challenges to parties in power, and shifts of parties in office..."¹ But in this case, even from the point of view of bourgeois sociologists, the criticism of the Communist and non-Party bloc in Soviet society is without foundation. "It is not science," say Goode and Hatt, leading US sociologists, "if it merely begins with axioms, or 'self-evident' propositions, and ends with deductions from these axioms."² Incidentally, bourgeois assertions are based on axioms developed under the conditions of capitalist society. When applied to Soviet society, they are neither scientific nor even plain common sense.

In the Soviet Union, the pre-election statements of the mass organisations and production collectives are *consonant* with the pre-election appeals of the Communist Party. The appeals of the Central Committee of the CPSU to all voters, which are published in connection with elections, for example, to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, are perceived by the mass organisations and production collectives as appeals expressing their *basic* interests. The Party tells the people not only about achievements, but also about shortcomings and difficulties.

The Party's May 1970 appeal, for example, states that "... the Party assesses the existing state of affairs

¹ S. M. Lipset, "Political Sociology", *Sociology Today, Problems and Prospects*, New York, 1960, p. 113.

² William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, *Methods in Social Research*, New York, 1952, p. 7.

soberly, and clearly sees both the scope of our accomplishments and the impending tasks and existing shortcomings." Another reason the Party appeals are so perceived is that they point to concrete ways of correcting shortcomings, of overcoming difficulties and increasing the well-being of all classes and strata of the population.

From the first days of Soviet power, the mass organisations and production collectives have, year in and year out, taken an active part in pre-election campaigns, in the organisation of election committees and in ballot counting and control. The Party Programme, adopted in March 1919, pointed out that "in place of a formal declaration of rights and freedoms, the proletarian party places them, first of all and most of all, at the actual disposal of those classes of the population which were oppressed by capitalism, i.e., the proletariat and peasantry" and that "for this purpose Soviet power expropriates from the bourgeoisie all production premises, printing presses, stocks of paper, etc., placing them at the full disposal of the working people and their organisations".¹

There have never been instances of extending either the active or the passive election rights of Communists to the detriment of non-Party people. Belonging to the Communist Party does not give its members "any privileges, but only places more serious responsibility on them".² All citizens, Party and non-Party members alike and in equal measure, are guaranteed the freedom to exercise their right to elect and be elected. Both Party and non-Party candidates represent, on the one hand, the *production collectives* nominating them, and, on the other, the *interests of the whole people*. In the first instance, they are bound

¹ The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and CC Plenary Meetings, Part 1, p. 414.

² Ibid., p. 447.

by the mandate of those who have delegated them. In the second, the mandate is the expression of the social, political and ideological unity of Soviet society.

Under capitalism, where there are classes with incompatible interests, a *number* of pre-election class platforms emerge, provided a democratic form of government is preserved, and this presupposes a struggle *for power* and changes in parties in power. The monopolies strive to destroy or to reduce to the limit the democratic rights of the broad masses. The Communist and Workers' Parties, in turn, are waging a selfless struggle, doing everything to defend now, without waiting until socialism triumphs, the interests of the working class and the people, improve their living conditions and extend the democratic rights and freedoms of the people.

Appeals made by bourgeois ideologists for integration, for unity of action by different classes within the "free world" are made with the aim of splitting and subverting the solidarity of the working class and of breaking down the unity of mass organisations and production collectives in their efforts to protect and extend their rights and freedoms. The unity for which the bourgeois ideologists appeal presupposes the retention of the *bourgeois* system. The proletariat, through its parties, is categorically against this kind of unity. And if the bourgeois parties in a number of instances succeed in splitting the solidarity of the working class, they do so only by means of suppression, deception and bribery. The "accord" to which the bourgeois ideologists of the West have been trying to draw attention lately, must in essence satisfy the same aims—to make possible "the peaceful 'play' of power, the adherence by the 'outs' to decisions made by the 'ins', and the recognition by the 'ins' of the rights of the 'outs'".¹

¹ S. M. Lipsset, op. cit., p. 92.

In the Soviet Union there are no antagonistic classes. The workers, the collective-farm peasantry and the intelligentsia are united by common basic interests. These interests are reflected in the policy of the Communist Party and the policy is put into practice by the progressive, most politically conscious segments of all social groups. The Party's devotion to the interests of the people has won their full confidence in it. At present, the Party is the vanguard of the people. The confidence which the people feel in the Party is expressed in Article 126 of the Constitution: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is "the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to build communist society and is the leading core of all organisations of the working people, both government and non-government".¹ "The Communist and non-Party bloc of candidates is made up of industrial workers, state-farm workers, collective farmers, scientists, doctors, teachers, writers, engineers, Party workers, trade union workers and other representatives of the intelligentsia and office workers. Their unity, their bloc, is a result of the will of the mass organisations and production collectives to charge them with the implementation of the *basic* interests of the people. Under these circumstances, struggle between cliques and groups is eliminated. A single pre-election platform is therefore a *natural* phenomenon under the conditions of Soviet society, and it is a platform that maximally reflects the will and basic interests of the whole people.

Bourgeois ideologists attempt to describe the leading role of the Party in nominating candidates as part of "the function of Party pressure on mass social and industrial workers' organisations" which is supposed to take place in Soviet society. The Party organisations, they say, "prepare lists of those whom it was

¹ *The Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR*, Moscow, 1965, p. 99.

desired to elect . . ." and they wish to elect only Communists. The fact that there are non-Party candidates is ignored. The Party, they say, includes in its lists the faithful supporters¹ which, in this connection, do not represent the interests of the non-Party masses.

In capitalist countries the election campaign is used by the bourgeois parties to assert the interests of the bourgeoisie in a representative system of government. Class antagonism leads to a situation in which the election campaign becomes not a process for selecting candidates, but a vehicle for struggle between candidates. The establishment of a political monopoly of a bourgeois party or parties in the election campaign (and only a bourgeois party can hold political monopoly under the conditions of capitalism), leads to the curtailment of bourgeois democracy and the establishment of authoritarian methods of government. In Soviet society, the political system is based on the socio-political and ideological unity of the people and the election campaign is, for the Communist Party, a process in which the efforts of the broad masses in implementing their interests are unified. The leading role of the Party in nominating candidates precludes manifestations of anti-socialist influences, various kinds of personal ambition, political intrigue and post-seeking. In their definition of the Communist Party's role in the election campaign in Soviet society the bourgeois ideologists proceed from the conditions extant in capitalist society, from an appraisal of the characteristic role of bourgeois political parties. They never mention the fact that the Communist Party is the party of the working class, collective-farm peasantry and working intelligentsia, a party which is supported by a people united by a community of basic interests. It becomes obvious that the bourgeois ideologists purposely give a distorted view of the role the

¹ Harold Zink, *op. cit.*, p. 588.

Communist Party of the Soviet Union plays in the nomination of candidates.

An acquaintance with the activities of any district Party committee will provide an accurate picture of the Party's role in election campaigns. We will find, first of all, that the committees try to achieve maximal representation in the local Soviets of all social groups in the district. At the same time, they strive to guide the nomination process so that the most *progressive* and the most *politically conscious* representatives of the working people are chosen—those who have shown that they are *capable* of fulfilling the will of the voters. A good example by which the results of Party committee work may be judged is the make-up of the Vasileostrovsky and Moskovsky District Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the city of Leningrad from 1961 to 1969.¹ The District Soviet, consisting of 250 deputies, includes representatives from all the *basic* demographic and social *categories of working people*. It includes representatives from more than 70 per cent of the district's enterprises and institutions. More than 40 per cent of the deputies are women. The ages of the deputies range from 20 to over 60. Almost 8 per cent of the deputies are in the 20-30 year age bracket; about 75 per cent are 30-50 years of age. All of the basic categories by educational background are also represented. Over 50 per cent of the deputies have a higher education, about 4 per cent have an incomplete higher education, more than 10 per cent have a specialised secondary education and the balance have either a full or incomplete secondary education. Party members make up approximately 55 per cent of all deputies, and members of the Young Communist League (Komsomol)—about 4 per cent.

¹ Data is based on a quantitative analysis of the registration forms of the deputies to these Soviets for 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967 and 1969.

By place of work of the deputies, the Soviet has the following characteristics (per cent of total number of deputies):

Table 2

Place of work of the deputies	Year				
	1961	1963	1965	1967	1969
District Party and Komsomol Committees . .	3.2	3.2	3.6	4.0	3.2
District Soviets	5.3	6.4	4.9	5.6	5.6
Administrative organs (courts, procurator's office, militia) . . .	2.4	1.6	2.4	1.2	1.2
Plants, factories	56.7	56.5	48.2	46.4	52.4
Construction	6.3	6.4	10.6	6.4	10.4
Transport, communications	8.6	8.0	9.4	8.0	9.6
Trade and public catering establishments .	2.8	3.2	4.9	6.0	4.0
Health services	3.2	4.4	4.0	5.6	2.8
Institutions of higher learning and schools	3.6	3.2	3.6	5.2	2.0
Research institutes . .	5.9	5.2	5.2	9.6	7.6
Housing and community services	1.2	1.5	2.8	1.6	0.8
Army	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4

The Soviet includes all the basic social categories in its structure. (See Table 3.)

The deputies to the Soviet are *front-rank* workers; they are *active spokesmen for the interests* of the production collectives and electors who put them into office. Nearly 53 per cent of the deputies are holders of national awards (Orders and/or medals).

The Constitution of the USSR not only declares that the working people have the right to nominate candidates and elect those in whom they have con-

Table 3

Job of deputy	Year				
	1961	1963	1965	1967	1969
Leading worker in the system of Party, Soviet or Komsomol apparatuses	8.2	9.6	10.0	10.4	10.0
Rank-and-file worker in the system of Party, Soviet or Komsomol apparatuses	2.4	0.4	0.4	1.2	—
Manager of enterprise (establishment) or its subdivision	19.8	18.9	22.6	19.2	18.4
Engineer, technician or specialist with higher or specialised secondary education	13.6	14.1	12.1	14.4	11.6
Teamleader, assistant foreman without specialised secondary education	9.3	6.9	7.3	7.2	4.8
Industrial worker	39.0	42.8	43.3	43.6	52.8
Office worker	4.1	3.1	1.6	1.6	1.2
Research worker, college teacher	3.2	3.0	2.7	1.6	0.8
Member of Armed Forces	0.4	1.2	—	0.8	0.4

fidence, but it guarantees them the opportunity to do so. Article 135 of the Constitution of the USSR states that "all citizens of the USSR who have reached the age of eighteen have the right to vote in the election of deputies. . . . Every citizen of the USSR who has reached the age of twenty-three is eligible for election to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. . . ." The right to nominate candidates "is secured to mass organisations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organisations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organisations and cultural societies"

(Article 141). In accordance with Article 125, these rights are secured by providing the working people and their organisations with the conditions necessary for their fulfilment. The democratic process of nominating candidates depends first of all on how directly the interests of the working people are reflected. In Soviet society, this is achieved through the system of *nominating candidates at working people's meetings*. Nominations are presented to the meeting by mass organisations of the various enterprises, institutions, collective farms, etc., after a *preliminary* study of the opinion of the given collective. This is done in order to put up for consideration the kind of nominee who possesses not the *imagined* but *actual* support of the collective. Anybody at the meeting can, if he feels it necessary, *reject a nominee and propose another*. This is just another way in which the interests of the working people are given full consideration.

Non-Party candidates do, in fact, support the Party. They do, because all Soviet people—Communists and non-Party people alike—work hand in hand toward one great goal—the building of communist society. Communists are the contemporaries, friends, brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers of non-Party people. Non-Party people see in the Communists tireless, capable, industrious people, devoted to their country and the building of communism.

Bourgeois ideologists, as for example Scott, Fetscher and Duverger, try to cast doubt on the democratism of the principles of the Soviet electoral system as laid down in the Soviet Constitution, the Regulation on the Election to the USSR Supreme Soviet, and other legal acts. Some assail these principles as being so much "window-dressing";¹

¹ Derek J. Scott, *Russian Political Institutions*, London, 1958, p. 97; Maurice Duverger, *Sociologie politique*, Paris, 1966, p. 357.

others, because there are no "lists of competing candidates"¹.

What do the bourgeois ideologists have in mind when they speak of "window-dressing"? As a rule they refer to the one-party system: in one-party systems, they say, the party is "obliged only to create the appearance of electoral and parliamentary procedures".² But let us turn to the facts. *Under conditions of class antagonism*, where bourgeois democracy "proclaims freedom and equality, equality irrespective of whether a person owns anything or not; it proclaims freedom for private owners to dispose of land and capital and freedom for those who have neither, to sell their workers' hands to the capitalist",³ *the one-party factor* (under capitalist conditions, a one-party system can be only a bourgeois party system) is indeed *incompatible with equality and freedom for the broad masses of working people*. Under these conditions, the electoral and parliamentary principles and procedures lose even the illusion of reality from the point of view of the interests of the broad masses of people. It is quite different *under the conditions of socio-political and ideological unity of the society*. Here, the *one-party factor is a consequence of equality and freedom already possessed by the broad masses*. In this case, the principles of the electoral system and the party system strengthen and broaden the social co-operation of friendly classes and social groups.

In October 1917, the proletarian revolution in Russia destroyed the capitalist system hated by the working people. History's first socialist country was born and the process of creating a new world began. In December 1919, at the 7th All-Russia Congress of

¹ I. Fetscher, op. cit., pp. 132-34.

² M. Duverger, op. cit., p. 358.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 249.

Soviets, it was underscored that "no other country has as yet given as much in such a short time for real freedom and real equality, no other country has, in such a short time, given the working people freedom from the main class that oppresses them, the class of landowners and capitalists, and no other country has granted such equality in respect of the chief means of subsistence, the land".¹ Now all citizens of the Soviet Union participate in elections on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot.

All the necessary conditions have been established in Soviet society to enable the voters to *fulfil their duty* as citizens and to *exercise without impediment their right to determine the composition of the organs of power*. In the USSR, as is known, citizens cannot be deprived of the right to vote even by a court of law. In 1958, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ruled that due to the socio-political and ideological unity of the society, it was possible to "discontinue using loss of suffrage by trial as a criminal penalty". It also agreed that "all persons who have been sentenced to loss of suffrage be freed from this penalty".

The absence of such institutions as "proposing several competing lists" does not lead to a loss of the Soviet system's democratic achievements, nor to a loss of the voter's opportunity to select,² as I. Fetscher would have us believe, but to the strengthening and development of its democratic principles in the interests of every voter.

Putting up several competing lists is, under capitalist conditions, an unavoidable consequence of the desire of opposing classes "to make *political reality* their real existence".³ And though such an institution, from the point of view of the interests of

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 250.

² I. Fetscher, op. cit., p. 132.

³ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, 2nd Russ. ed., Vol. 1, p. 357.

the working people, is a formality, it is a democratic element which answers their need to resolve the *established contradiction* between "the state and the citizen-society within the state".¹ In the Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties, held in Moscow in November 1960, it was noted that "relying on the majority of the people and resolutely rebuffing the opportunist elements incapable of relinquishing the policy of compromise with the capitalists and landowners, the working class can defeat the reactionary, anti-popular forces, secure a firm majority in parliament, transform parliament from an instrument serving the class interests of the bourgeois into an instrument serving the working people".² Unity among the mass organisations may be achieved through joint action in the struggle for "the preservation and extension of democratic rights, the improvement of living conditions and the extension of the working people's social rights."³

Suffrage—both active and passive—is the *actual* possession of *every* citizen in the Soviet Union regardless of what class he belongs to. The results of elections bear witness to this. Thus on July 14, 1966, 99.94 per cent of the voters took part in the election of deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; 99.76 per cent voted for candidates to the Soviet of the Union, and to the Soviet of Nationalities, by Union Republics—99.8 per cent, by Autonomous Republics—99.58 per cent, by Autonomous Regions—99.67 per cent, and by National Areas—99.36 per cent.

On June 14, 1970, in the election to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 99.96 per cent of the total number of persons in the voters' lists went to the polls. The Communist and non-Party bloc candidates

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, 2nd Russ. ed., Vol. 1, p. 295.

² *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, p. 74.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

for the election to the Soviet of the Union polled 99.74 per cent of the votes, and the candidates for the election to the Soviet of Nationalities polled 99.79 per cent. Competing lists *would not* provide Soviet citizens with any *greater opportunity* to realise their suffrage. The deputies would still be representatives of the workers, the collective-farm peasantry, the intelligentsia and other employees, all dedicated to the cause of building communism. However, the factor of competition *would weaken* the conscious efforts of the society in selecting the best people, for it *would create* the possibility of various kinds of personal ambition, political intrigue, struggle for posts, etc., to crop up in the course of election campaigns.

The most important feature of an electoral system is its class character. The bourgeois electoral system always guarantees the representatives of capital a majority in parliament. The sovereignty of the people in the "free world", with all the "achievements of Western democracy" is pure fiction. The Soviet electoral system, on the other hand, guarantees genuine popular sovereignty by virtue of the fact that the organs of power are made up of workers, collective-farm peasants and members of the intelligentsia. Further improvement in the Soviet electoral system will be in the direction of raising the level of the people's *activity* in following its principles.

Bourgeois ideologists are critical of the fact that Soviet elections take place in a "stimulating" atmosphere. "Elections," says D. J. Scott, "are ... conducted ... in a holiday atmosphere of music and flags and portraits of the leaders".¹ Is there anything wrong in this? As for creating a "stimulating" atmosphere, we might mention that, though the Western world, too, has been quite successful in this, the countries of capital can only dream about getting a

¹ Derek J. Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

voter turn-out anywhere near that found in the Soviet Union. The point is that the Soviet citizen is voting for the triumph of democracy, for the good life which Soviet power has made possible, and he prepares for this in an atmosphere of high national morale. But the voter in capitalist countries, the USA for example, has to vote for people who actually represent the interests of the exploiting class. The entire mechanics of the elections there are run by the bourgeois Democratic and Republican parties. We can judge how "the party machine controls" by the statements of its own apologists. R. Osborn, for example, confesses that "in a machine-run city", poll watchers "soon tire of the monotonous dishonesty they are forced to observe".¹

Bourgeois "prophets" take it upon themselves to predict the future of the Soviet electoral system. They speak of the "unrealisability" of perfecting the forms of popular representation,² about the "illusion" of developing the system's democratic principles.³ The prophets proceed from the proposition that will precedes law and that it asserts itself in the place of law. As a basis for their "prophesising" they take not the actual tendencies in the development of the Soviet electoral system, but what they would like to see in its development.

In the Soviet Union, the forms of popular representation are constantly being perfected and the democratic principles of the electoral system developed. Proof of this is the wide and thorough discussion at meetings and in the press of the personal and work qualifications of the candidates, the turnover in the deputy composition of the Soviets at

¹ Robert Osborn, "The Role of Social Institutions". *The Future of Communist Society*, New York, 1962, p. 89.

² Ivo Lapenna, op. cit., pp. 152-57; *The New York Times*, Jan. 7, 1962.

³ W. Laquer and L. Labedz, Introduction to *The Future of Communist Society*, New York, 1962.

each election, and the practice of the Soviets and their deputies to make a regular accounting of their activities to the voters. The voters not only have the right to recall deputies who have not justified the trust placed in them, but they actually exercise this right. Other principles which are being more and more fully developed are: public, free and thorough Soviet session discussions of important questions of state administration and economic and cultural construction; the regular accounting at Soviet sessions by all executive organs from top to bottom; the checking-up on the work of these organs and control over their activity; the systematic discussion of deputies' inquiries by the Soviets; and the criticism of shortcomings in the work of the Soviets and economic and other organisations. Factual materials illustrating the above-mentioned tendencies have been freely and regularly published on the pages of the magazine *Soviets of Working People's Deputies*.

The sovietologists point to the bourgeois electoral system as the standard for the development of democracy, of a so-called democracy "for all".¹ In practice, however, development goes along the lines of giving maximal protection to the interests of the exploiting classes and distorting the will of the working people. Legal barriers which help to secure the interests of the exploiting class are constantly reinforced. New political parties have to meet stiffer requirements to appear on the ballot and there are legal provisions curtailing the activities of Workers' and Communist Parties. The fundamental law of the Federal Republic of Germany contains the stipulation that anyone who uses the freedom of speech, the press, assembly, unions and societies in the struggle against the foundations of free democratic order may be deprived of these basic rights. In general, we can

¹ Theodor Arnold, op. cit., p. 20.

observe constant expansion in the system of election manoeuvres and corruption made possible by the particular election laws in each capitalist country.

In their critique of the social rights of the working people in the USSR, bourgeois sovietologists devote considerable space to the national sovereignty of the Union Republics. Characteristic in this respect are the works of Zink, Révész, Kolarz, Hazard, Shuckman and Colegrove. Particular attention in these theories is devoted to the economic, political and cultural development of the peoples of the USSR. The critics, as a rule, deal with those sides of Soviet life where nationality features, national mores and customs, are most strongly in evidence, where there are possible nationalistic and chauvinistic vestiges inherited from tsarist Russia, once notorious as the "prison of peoples". Bourgeois sovietologists relate to such problems the *inter-relationships between the Russian and the other peoples of the USSR and questions of the actual equality of the Union Republics*.

The line of attack used in bourgeois criticism in general is quite clearly formulated in Zink's work *Modern Governments*. He proposes to demonstrate the alleged non-correspondence between *de jure* and *de facto* sides of national sovereignty in the USSR.¹ In building their theories, Zink and his colleagues rely basically on the fact that the readers in their countries are uninformed. This gives the theory-makers a free hand in using concepts which reflect the development of multi-national bourgeois states (where, everyone knows, national oppression is a component part of nationality relations) when they speak of the relationships between the Russian and the other peoples in the USSR.

Let us examine a number of bourgeois conceptions about the national sovereignty of Union Republics in the Soviet Union.

¹ Harold Zink, op. cit., p. 367.

A leading place in the sovietologists' criticism is given to the *problems of the economic development of the peoples of the USSR*. Just how they approach these problems can be judged by the work of László Révész, entitled *Ideology and Practice in the Domestic and Foreign Policies of the Soviet Union*.

Révész tries to find contradiction between Soviet theory on national sovereignty—in which economic independence is treated as the most important attribute of national sovereignty—and Soviet practice, that is, the actual history of economic development in the Union Republics. He writes: "Even before the formation on December 30, 1922, of the Soviet Union, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic of the time took away economic independence from the 'independent' republics—the former outlying areas of tsarist Russia." From then on, Révész continues, "development unavoidably leads to a full 'internationalisation' of economic ... life". He also sees as infringement on independence the methods used in developing the economics of the Republics, as for example centralised planning. "... Within the framework of a single plan," he says, "there is no place for an independent national economy."

What does the term "*economic independence*" mean in Soviet science? In the first place, there is the *legal aspect—the legal equality* of nations (peoples) in the development of their productive forces, in the division of labour and in their internal affairs. Secondly, and this is of prime importance, there is the *actual equality* of nations (peoples) in their economic development. When applied to the Union Republics, this means the following. First of all, the weaker, in an economic sense, Republics, with the help of the Russian and other more developed Republics, overcome the actual inequalities inherited from tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie. Further, in the course of their free development, they create a multi-faceted

industry, a large mechanised agriculture, and national cadres for all branches of the economy. And, finally, the Union Republics participate on an equal footing in the solution of problems of the over-all development of the Union economy—the rational distribution of production, planned exploitation of natural resources, and socialist division of labour among the Republics. Révész, however, equates economic independence with isolated existence and thus substitutes for a Marxist understanding of economic independence a bourgeois interpretation based on private ownership and class inequality.

The young Soviet national Republics, because of their economic backwardness, were in no condition to make full use of the rights and opportunities brought about by the October Revolution. Legal equality in itself does not guarantee actual equality. It was noted in a resolution of the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union "On the Immediate Tasks of the Party in the National Question" (1921), that about 25 million of the predominantly Turkic population (Turkistan, the larger part of Azerbaijan, Daghestan, Tatars, Bashkirs, Kirghizes and others) did not have, or almost did not have, their own industrial proletariat, and remained in most cases on a livestock-breeding and patriarchal-tribal (or semi-patriarchal, semi-feudal) level of existence.¹ *If, at that time, they were to have separated from the Soviet federation, their colonial and semi-colonial condition would have been stabilised, for the only thing capitalism could offer them was subordination to the "Great" powers, financially, economically and militarily. Aid from the Russian Federative Republic and other industrially developed Soviet Republics (for*

¹ *The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and CC Plenary Meetings, Moscow, 1954, Part I, p. 559.*

example, the Ukraine) was necessary to these peoples in order to overcome their economic inequality and for their over-all development.

Now let us turn to the actual history of the development of the national economies of the Union Republics.

Data on the production of the most important industrial products in Russia and her outlying territories in 1913, which reflect the highest level of the Russian Empire's economy before the devastation brought about by the First World War, clearly show the actual inequality of the Union Republics at about the time of their formation (Table 4). It is sufficient

Table 4¹

Republic	Number of types of industrial product	
	Group "A" (production of means of production)	Group "B" (production of consumer goods)
RSFSR	15	12
Ukrainian SSR	11	8
Byelorussian SSR	5	4
Uzbek SSR . .	2	3
Kazakh SSR .	3	6
Georgian SSR	2	3
Azerbaijan SSR	3	7
Moldavian SSR	1	6
Kirghiz SSR .	1	2
Tajik SSR . .	2	2
Armenian SSR	1	3
Turkmen SSR	2	4

¹ Table 4 is based on data on the production of major industrial items in 1913, (*The Land of Soviets over 50 Years. A collection of statistical materials, Statistika Publishers, 1967*).

to say that metallurgy in Kazakhstan, so rich in deposits of non-ferrous metals, was practically non-existent, if one does not count the insignificant number of enterprises belonging to foreign capitalists. In the Autonomous Republic of Komi—the republic richest in timbre and coal—there was not a single timbre mill, not a single kilometre of railway, and not a single ton of coal was being mined. The main cotton base of the country—the regions of Central Asia—had virtually no textile industry of its own.

To achieve *actual equality*, the Republics lacking their own industry and national working class had to raise themselves *to a level of economic development equal to that of the most advanced Republic—the Russian Federation*. Support for this development could and did come from the material and technological basis and the working class of the Russian and other industrially developed Republics.

The central industrial regions of the country and individual enterprises took the industry of the outlying regions under their wing, providing machinery and skilled workers. Meanwhile, cadres of workers and specialists were trained for the national Republics at enterprises in Russia, the Ukraine and other Union Republics. The economically backward Republics were given significant financial aid. Until the mid-1930s, expenses were considerably higher than income in the national economy of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The Soviet Government, therefore, drew on accumulations in the central regions of the country, and redistributed its budget funds in the form of subsidies. Thus, the budget of Tajikistan in the First Five-Year Plan (1928-32) was 417 million rubles, of which 290 million was released to it by the Union Government. In one four-year period (from 1925 to 1929) the Union Government assigned 106 million rubles to the Uzbek SSR. In the Turkmen SSR, the Union subsidy in separate years amounted to as much

as 73 per cent of the annual expenditure part of the Republic's budget.

What were the results of this kind of aid received from other Union Republics, the RSFSR in particular? *Characteristic for each of the Republics was industrialisation*, involving both an increase in the absolute number of key industrial products being produced and the growth of the contribution of such production to the total output of the Union.

The nationalities policy of the Soviet state promoted rapid rates of economic growth of the nations and nationalities formerly deprived of equal rights. While the gross output of heavy industry in the RSFSR (within the current boundaries) increased 74 times over the years of Soviet power, it increased 114 times in Kazakhstan, 119 times in Buryatia, 129 times in Yakutia, 138 times in Kirghizia, 159 times in the Komi Republic, 258 times in Tataria, 352 times in Bashkiria, 1,494 times in Kabardinian-Balkar Autonomous Republic. At present, the Republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan alone mine considerably more coal, produce much more electric energy, machine tools, mineral fertilisers, cement and textiles than all of pre-revolutionary Russia.

Each Republic developed its own cadres of workers and specialists for the developing branches of its economy. Let us take, for example, the cadres of the Kazakh Republic. In the not too distant past its indigenous population engaged primarily in livestock-breeding. At present, the Republic has a skilled working class and its own scientists and engineers. A sociological study made in 1963 in the city of Karaganda at the mines of the leading enterprise of the Republic and the Union—the Karagandaugol complex—gives a good idea of the changes that have taken place. According to a population census, 41.1 per cent of the Kazakhs work in industry, transport and construction. Data gathered

at one of the mines of the complex provide us with a general picture of the working class:

Table 5¹

Basic job category of subterranean workers	Worker distribution (per cent)	
	Workers of all nationalities	Workers of indigenous nationality
Foremen and team-leaders	4.1	7.7
Combine operators	2.1	1.9
Combine operators' assistants	16.6	22.0
Cutters	12.3	10.8
Timberers	9.0	6.8
Blasting experts . .	2.7	6.1
Electrical and mining fitters	12.2	9.2
Electric locomotive operators	2.9	3.9
Mining machinery and plant operators	3.0	3.4

We see that the distribution of professional-skilled Kazakh workers is the same as the over-all distribution.

In 1931, there was not a single Kazakh engineer or technician in the Karaganda Basin. In 1935, Kazakh personnel made up 4.3 per cent and in 1962, 12.9 per cent of the total number of engineers and technicians in the coal industry. The figures for the whole complex in 1962 indicate that 2.7 per cent of the engineering-technical personnel were enterprise managers,

directors or chief engineers, and 16.2 per cent were shop foremen. Of the total Kazakh personnel, 3.7 per cent were in the former and 17.4 per cent in the latter job category.¹

Even the bourgeois press has no alternative but to report on the economic achievements of the Union Republics. In an article entitled "Soviet Uzbeks Are Depicted as Industrial Society", Prof. U. Medlin of Michigan University notes that "the transformation of the Uzbeks, a Central Asian people, from medievalism into an industrial society may set an example for other regions in the world". Before industrialisation, the professor notes, "there were no truly qualified technicians among the Uzbeks, beyond the skilled handicraftsmen", but "by 1960, there were over 75,000 people in the technical sciences", and the "growth of Uzbek production in coal, oil, electric power, natural gas, and, of course, industrial fibres has been next to phenomenal".²

Now let us examine L. Révész's statement about the tendency in the USSR toward economic unification of nationalities and about internationalisation as a tendency that allegedly infringes on the economic rights of peoples. Here again we encounter a switch in points of departure. The fact is that the tendency toward internationalisation of the means of production and exchange, toward the liquidation of national isolation and toward economic unification of peoples arose and was already developing under capitalism. Internationalisation begun under capitalism continues now under socialism. However, under capitalism it was accomplished through coercion, through colonialisation, national oppression and enslavement, whereas,

¹ Ibid., p. 56.

² *The New York Times*, April 3, 1966, p. 21. Other authors have also written about the achievements in the economic development of the Union Republics. See, for example, D. J. Scott, *The Soviet World*, Chicago, 1966.

¹ Table 5 is taken from an article by R. A. Kleshcheva, "On Changes in the Professional Image of Soviet Workers", *Problemy Filosofii (Problems of Philosophy)*, No. 7, 1964, p. 55.

under socialism, this process works *on the basis of equal co-operation between peoples*. There is no single definition of internationalisation that can be applied to both systems without ignoring the basic differences in the nature of nationality relations in capitalist and socialist societies. Judging from his statements, Révész proceeds from a definition of internationalisation applicable to capitalism and applies it to Soviet reality. This definition is understandable to the reader in the capitalist world and provides Révész with an opportunity, by making use of reader's bias toward bourgeois internationalisation, to gamble on public opinion.

"... Within the framework of a single plan, there is no place for an independent national economy", Révész states. But one has only to refer to the facts of Soviet reality to see how obviously groundless such an assertion is.

Where there is national equality and reciprocal aid, an economic development plan for the whole country becomes for the individual nations *a means of achieving actual equality and serves as a most important index of the consolidation and extension of their economic rights*. The current (1966-70) five-year plan for the development of the economy of the USSR, which incorporates the national interests of all Republics, is again geared to these very tasks. It provides for priority development of those branches of the economy for which local conditions are most suitable. All Soviet Republics complement one another economically, and each develops its own economy not only according to its own national resources and internal needs, but also taking into consideration the development of the economy of the entire Union. For Révész there exists but a single-track assessment of a plan to develop the national economy, and it reflects, whether he wants it or not, the conditions of a bourgeois society.

Bourgeois ideologists also centre on the *problem of political development* in the USSR. They try to prove that the peoples of the USSR are in fact deprived of the right to choose their political system, that they are deprived of self-determination. Bourgeois ideologists insist that the Union Republics are fictitious states. The argument most widely used is that not one of the Republics has yet used its right of free secession from the USSR. Thus, in the *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus*, edited by J. M. Bochenski and G. Niemeyer, we find in the chapter "The Nation" (author W. Kolarz) the following statement: "Article 17 [referring to Article 17 of the Constitution of the USSR-M.P.] guarantees each Union Republic the 'right of free secession from the USSR', but so far not a single Republic has taken advantage of this right."¹ From the point of view of Kolarz and the editors of the *Handbuch* this seems incredible.

From what points of departure do the bourgeois ideologists proceed? In the first place, we see that *they view national statehood as an isolated system*. Secondly, *federation is assessed not as a union of equal state entities formed to guarantee the free development of national associations, but as a step toward the break-up of such associations*. Both concepts are traditional and stable for bourgeois social science and for the bourgeois reader, for under capitalism the purpose of federation is *not to help solve nationality problems, but to support the national privileges of the more powerful nation, to create nationality discord* and distract the broad masses from the class struggle.

The October Revolution overthrew the power of those most directly responsible for nationality oppres-

¹ Walter Kolarz, *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus*, München, 1958, S. 266. Also see John Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government*, 3rd ed., Chicago-London, 1964, p. 85.

sion—the *landowners* and *capitalists*, and placed the *proletariat in power*. The military and economic co-operation among the peoples who had freed themselves from the oppression of tsarism culminated in the political unification of peoples with equal rights into a single multi-national Soviet state. The higher organs of state power of the Union were set up to fully reflect not only the common needs, but also the individual needs of the separate nationalities. Along with the central organs which represented the Union population as a whole regardless of nationality, a special organ was established giving representation to the nationalities on an equal basis. The individual Republics were given equal rights and responsibilities both with respect to their mutual relations with each other and with respect to the central power. The executive organs of power were created in such a way that actual participation in them of representatives from the Republics and the satisfaction of the needs of the peoples of the Union were guaranteed. The Republics received broad financial, specifically budgetary, rights in conducting state-administrative, cultural and economic affairs. The organs of power in the national Republics and Regions were manned primarily by local people who knew the language, life, customs and mores of their people. Special laws were passed for prosecuting and punishing violations of nationality rights and particularly the rights of national minorities. As socialism was being built in the USSR, *the obstacles, inherited from bourgeois-landowner Russia, that stood in the way of organising a stable multi-national state, i.e., the vestiges of Great-Power chauvinism, actual inequality of the Union nationalities and manifestations of nationalism, receded into the past*. With the appearance of the new social system, *new concepts of national statehood and federation, in principle different from bourgeois concepts, took shape*.

Now, let us examine the factual aspect of the bourgeois criticism that "not a single Republic has taken advantage of its right of free secession from the USSR".

The concept of a *nation's right to self-determination*, that is, its right to free choice of social and political system, which is the basis of the Soviet Union's nationality policy, *includes the provision that "each Union Republic has the right of free secession from the USSR", but does not consist exclusively of this*. On an equal footing are such features as *voluntary membership of a Republic in the USSR and choice of the concrete form of statehood considered by the Republic to be the most suitable*. Consequently, the bourgeois ideologists' interpretation of a nation's right to self-determination is highly subjective and one-sided.

Over the years of Soviet power, all the nations which had in the past inhabited Russia *have exercised their right to self-determination*. Some nations (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and Estonia) exercised this right to form *independent states*, and the Soviet state recognised their independence unconditionally. Other nations (Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the nations of the Trans-caucasian Federation made up of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) exercised their right to self-determination by creating, *in 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*. The formation of the Union was characterised not by the secession of nations; but by the acceptance into the Union of newly-organised national Soviet Republics. In 1940, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved the applications of the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian Republics, which had established Soviet power, to join the Union. Nearly all the nationalities going into the make-up of the USSR made use of this right to self-determination to achieve national statehood. The only exceptions were some numerically

small nationalities in Daghestan, in the Far North and elsewhere, consisting of from several hundred to several thousand people.

The national statehood of the Union Soviet Republics is undergoing constant development. This, too, is an index of their exercising the right to self-determination. A very flexible system of federation operates within the framework of the Union. It provides nations and nationalities with opportunities for developing and strengthening their Soviet statehood according to their local conditions. *The scope of opportunities for the Union Republics to exercise the rights they have is increasing.* The democratic principles of local legislative and executive organs are undergoing development and, as a result, the life pattern and psychology of the indigenous population is being taken more and more into account in the activities of these institutions. The rights of the Union Republics to make decisions on important problems related to the building of communism are being steadily extended. Among such problems are: planning the national economy; the budget; legislation; management of industry, agriculture and capital construction; problems of culture and science; administration of justice; administrative-territorial organisation; etc. There is a gradual development of national statehood not only of the Union Republics, but also of the Autonomous Republics and the National Areas.

The right of the Union Republics to self-determination is realised also in the *principle of mutual trust and voluntary consent on which the Union rests.* The Republics are represented in all of the all-Union organs of power and administration. No Republic has the right to priority within the Union; no Republic holds a special position in the Union. According to Article 46 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

convenes extraordinary sessions at its discretion or on the demand of one of the Union Republics.

A favourite tack of bourgeois critics when they are on the subject of national sovereignty is to cite the fact that the Constitution of the USSR does not have "any explanations about how the Republics are to use the right to secede from the USSR".¹ They proceed from the premise that federalism of necessity involves a conflict of interests between the federation and its members. In their opinion, the members of a federation must protect themselves from illegal acts by federal organs and they see safety from such actions in legislative guarantees. But legislative standards do not create or change social relations. In other words, in order for legislative guarantees to be effective, they must be supported by practical guarantees.

National statehood in the Soviet Union Republics was formed on the basis of the overthrow of the power of capital and the united efforts of the masses in defending their interests during the Civil War and the armed intervention by international capital. Having won legal national equality, the Republics were able to overcome factual inequality. With the fraternal aid of the more developed Soviet Republics, they rebuilt their war-devastated productive forces, surpassing pre-war levels manyfold, and made tremendous improvements in the cultural life of the broad masses. This is how the rights provided for in the Constitution were guaranteed in practice.

As for explanations about how the Union Republics may apply the sovereign rights they have, including the right to secession, the legal guarantees are fixed in constituent acts of the USSR and in the

¹ Walter Kolarz, op. cit., p. 266. Also see Ann Shukman, "The Muslim Republics of the USSR", *Royal Central Asian Journal*, April 1960, Part II, pp. 106-16.

Constitutions of the USSR and the Union Republics. In accordance with the Agreement on the Formation of the USSR, these rights remain in force until such time as they are changed or rescinded with the consent of the Union Republics. The Republics can state their attitude to these rights or to any changes in them in any way they may consider advisable.

Just as tendentious is bourgeois criticism of the *development of the culture and languages of the peoples of the USSR*. The sovietologists try to attribute the drawing together of the cultures of the Soviet peoples to a policy of forced assimilation allegedly being pursued by Russian civilisation.¹ However, such an interpretation is a misrepresentation of the actual process taking place in Soviet society.

For capitalism, the drawing together of national cultures is always realised through *forced assimilation*. Capitalism knows two historical tendencies in the nationality question: *first*, an awakening of national life and national movements, struggle against all national oppression, and the establishment of national states, and, *secondly*, an increase in the intercourse among nations, the creation of an international unity of capital, economic life in general, politics, science, etc. The breakdown of national barriers, accomplished by means of force, cannot but warp cultural intercourse among nations. The culture of oppressed nations and small peoples lagging in their development because of social and national oppression, is stifled by the culture of the dominating developed nations. Interaction and particularly co-operation among nations and their cultures touches only an exceedingly narrow strata of the population.

¹ See, for example, Geoffrey Wheeler, "Race Relations in Soviet Muslim Asia", *Royal Central Asian Journal*, April 1960; Part II, p. 100; K. Colegrove, *Democracy Versus Communism*, New Jersey, 1967, pp. 339-64.

In Soviet society, in complete accord with the teaching of Marxism-Leninism which calls for, "firstly, the equality of nations and languages and the impermissibility of all *privileges* in this respect..." and "secondly, the principle of internationalism and uncompromising struggle against contamination of the proletariat with bourgeois nationalism, even of the most refined kind",¹ every kind of national coercion, oppression or inequality is fully and unequivocally condemned.

This is seen most clearly in the cultural development of those socialist nations which had by-passed the capitalist stage. Data characterising the increase in the number of people studying in general education schools, specialised secondary educational institutions and higher educational institutions in the Kazakh SSR and the Republics of Central Asia over the years of Soviet power are indicative in this respect.

Enrolment in general education schools of all kinds at the beginning of the school year (in per cent compared to the number studying in the academic year 1940/41) is given in Table 6.²

Table 6

Republic	1914/15	1940/41	1950/51	1960/61	1968/69
Kazakh . .	9.1	100.0	117.5	155.7	267.8
Kirghiz . .	2.1	100.0	102.7	119.2	216.5
Tajik . . .	0.13	100.0	102.2	124.9	221.9
Turkmen . .	2.8	100.0	88.9	110.7	202.8
Uzbek . . .	1.3	100.0	101.6	119.5	225.1

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 27.

² Table 6 is based on data from the following sources: *The National Economy of the USSR, 1961*. Statistical Yearbook, Gosstatizdat, 1962, pp. 684-85; *The National Economy of the USSR, 1968*. Statistical Yearbook, Gosstatizdat, 1969, p. 675.

In absolute numbers, 105,000 people were studying in general education schools in Kazakhstan during the 1914/15 academic year, while in 1968/69 the figure was 3,066,000, that is, an increase of 29.2-fold. In the Kirghiz Republic, enrolment in the same years increased from 7,000 to 723,000 over the years compared, or 103.3-fold. In the Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek Republics, the numbers rose, respectively, from 400 to 699,000 (1,748-fold); from 7,000 to 511,000 (73-fold); from 17,500 to 2,983,000 (170-fold).¹

Enrolment in specialised secondary schools at the beginning of the school year (in per cent, compared to the number studying in 1940/41) is given in Table 7.²

Table 7

Republic	1914/15	1940/41	1950/51	1960/61	1967/68	1968/69
Kazakh	1.0	100.0	138.2	284.2	674.2	676.5
Kirghiz	—	100.0	176.8	286.8	636.7	655.0
Tajik	—	100.0	183.3	200.8	505.1	554.2
Turkmen	—	100.0	98.8	159.9	337.6	360.0
Uzbek	0.4	100.0	160.4	212.2	551.4	591.2

There were 300 students in Kazakhstan and 100 students in Uzbekistan in the 1914/15 academic year. In 1968/69 enrolment had risen to 205,000 in the Kazakh Republic and to 148,400 in the Uzbek Republic. In the former, the increase was 683-fold and in the latter, 1,484-fold. In Kirghizia, Tajikistan and Turkmenia there were no students studying in special-

¹ Ibid.

² Table 7 is based on data from the following sources: *The National Economy of the USSR, 1961*. Statistical Yearbook, p. 692; *The National Economy of the USSR, 1965*. Statistical Yearbook, p. 692; *USSR in Figures, 1967*. Short Statistical Collection, p. 129.

ised secondary schools in 1914/15. In 1968/69 they had, respectively, the following enrolment in specialised secondary educational institutions (in thousands): 39.3, 32.7 and 27.7.¹

In 1914/15 there was not a single higher educational institution on the territories of the present Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek Republics. In 1968/69, these Republics had 43, 9, 7, 5 and 38, respectively. A clear picture of the enrolment growth in higher educational institutions is provided by Table 8, where the figures are computed taking enrolment during 1940/41 as 100.

Table 8²

Republic	1940/41	1950/51	1960/61	1967/68	1968/69
Kazakh	100.0	300.1	743.0	1,693.3	1,811.5
Kirghiz	100.0	277.4	561.0	1,309.7	1,416.1
Tajik	100.0	309.0	870.0	1,647.8	1,778.3
Turkmen	100.0	220.0	437.0	820.0	910.0
Uzbek	100.0	221.0	530.0	1,071.7	1,173.3

The data presented become particularly impressive when compared to the population increases in these Republics between 1913 and 1968: on the territory of the Kazakh SSR, population increased 2.3-fold; in the Kirghiz SSR—3.3-fold; the Tajik SSR—2.6-fold; the Turkmen SSR—1.9-fold and the Uzbek SSR—2.6-fold.³

The peoples of the Central Asian Republics are absorbing the experience of world and Russian culture

¹ Ibid.

² Table 8 is based on data from the following sources: *The National Economy of the USSR, 1965*. Statistical Yearbook, p. 691; *The National Economy of the USSR, 1968*. Statistical Yearbook, p. 683.

³ *USSR in Figures, 1967*. Short Statistical Collection, p. 7.

at accelerating tempos. In the Turkmen, Tajik and Kirghiz Republics, for example, 60-70 per cent of all books published annually are translated literature.

To national coercion, oppression and inequality in capitalist countries, the Soviet Union counterposes *drawing together of nations through their individual all-round development*. This is the basis on which levels of cultural development are equalised and the transition from national to universal cultural forms is accomplished.

Such development is impossible without a struggle with the old in the culture of each nation, without overcoming national isolation and narrow-mindedness. But this kind of struggle stimulates the spiritual and cultural growth of the population.

In foreign criticism, attempts are made to interpret the use of the Russian language as the means of international communication as suppression of the languages of the other nations which make up the Soviet society. "The Great Russian group," says the author of one such theory, Harold Zink, "far overshadows the others, and it naturally tends to look down on them. . . . The Russian language is given priority over any other."¹ Zink and others like him confuse the question of language equality with the question of the social function of language.

Under capitalism, where the languages of oppressed peoples are excluded from political and cultural life, the use of one language as the means of international communication is, indeed, tantamount to imposing it. But under the conditions of Soviet society, all the languages of the peoples of the USSR are equal social entities. The credo of the Soviet state's policy in this sphere is that "coercion (the cudgel) will have only one result: it will hinder the great and

mighty Russian language from spreading to other national groups, and, most important of all, it will sharpen antagonism, cause friction in a million new forms, increase resentment, . . . etc."¹ *All national languages have enjoyed unhampered development under Soviet power*. According to data of the All-Union Book Chamber, belles-lettres and textbooks for general education schools are even published in the languages of such peoples as the Tabassarans, the Chukchi, and the Nanai which number, according to the 1959 All-Union Population Census, from 8,000 to 34,000 people.²

The question of equality of languages should not be confused with the question of the equality of their social function. Some languages fulfil the function of inter-national communication and others do not. Under conditions of language equality, distribution of functions is achieved without compulsion or coercion.

Due to historical developments, the Russian language has become the *language of inter-national communication among the peoples of the USSR*. No other language could have fulfilled this function as successfully under the conditions of Soviet society. The Russian language is the literary language of a people that makes up over half the population of the USSR. It serves as one of the basic sources of enrichment and growth of the literary languages of other peoples. At the same time, it itself is enriched through borrowings from other languages. In political and cultural life, however, it occupies an equal place among the languages of the country. In fulfilling the functions of inter-national communication, the Russian language has in no way impeded the development of

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 73.

² *Results of the All-Union Population Census for 1959. USSR (Summary Volume)*, Gosstatizdat, 1962, pp. 184-86.

¹ Harold Zink, op. cit., p. 654.

the national literary languages of the Union Republics. Prior to the establishment of Soviet power, the languages of the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus and other non-Russian nationalities were excluded from the sphere of social relations, whereas under Soviet power, the social functions of the national languages are continually being increased. All correspondence and affairs of local organs, all basic public activities are conducted in the languages of the Union Republics. Within the Republics, education is conducted in the native language. The languages of the peoples of the USSR are used in book and newspaper publications, the development of the theatre arts and the training of national cadres. After the establishment of Soviet power, more than 40 languages spoken by peoples of the Autonomous Republics and Regions, such as the Bashkir, Udmurt, Avarian, Adygeian and others, *became literary languages* for the first time in their histories. These languages are now used in radio, the theatre and television, as well as in published literature.

The history of the multi-national Soviet state shows that every citizen of the USSR is free to speak any language he wishes and to raise and educate his children in any language he wishes; that the national languages develop without privilege, restriction or compulsion; and that learning the Russian language along with the native language is voluntary. And history has confirmed the correctness of Lenin's words that the "Russian language" does not "need anyone having to study it *by sheer compulsion*".¹

The backward outskirts of tsarist Russia have been transformed into full and equal socialist Republics, not in a matter of centuries, but within the lifetime of one generation. And the peoples of Soviet Central Asia came to socialism by-passing capitalism, that is, they

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 72.

skipped a whole historical epoch. This is one of the reasons that the Soviet national Republics have attracted so much attention throughout the world.

Bourgeois ideologists cling to their theories on the national sovereignty of the Union Republics in the hope of dissuading the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America from studying and using the experience gained by the Soviet Republics of Central Asia. They hope to attract the peoples of these countries with the "values" of bourgeois or creative, as it is sometimes called, federalism, specifically, the federalism of the USA which is held up as a model of perfection.¹ But for a true picture of this "perfection", one has only to refer to the pages of the US bourgeois press. For example, in an article entitled "Creative Federalism and the Great Society", Max Ways writes: "Government can do little for Negroes as a group without hurting (psychologically, if not materially) many whites, most directly affected by such measures as school desegregation."² In other words, in order not to disturb the whites, the US Government restricts itself as to how far it "will go in taking the cherished advantages from one group in the course of helping another group".

Bias in the Evaluation of the Principles of Organisation of the Soviet Political System

Party unity, democratic centralism and other principles of the Soviet political system are designed to promote the greatest possible participation of working people in the political and social life of Soviet society. Bourgeois ideologists, for example, Brzezinski, Ulam,

¹ Harold Zink, *op. cit.*, p. 566.

² *Fortune*, No. 1, 1966, p. 123.

Leonhard, Zink and Pelling, try to discredit this proposition; they assert that these principles are incompatible with democracy.

When Western ideologists come to the question of the one-party system in Soviet society, they always postulate that a multi-party system is the *one and only democratic form*. And when they speak of a multi-party system, they have in mind, of course, the *bourgeois* multi-party system. They say that a multi-party system, and only a multi-party system, can guarantee full representation and protect the interests of all classes because the latter have a choice among parties and an alternative government in reserve. The Soviet political system, they say, is "totalitarian",¹ and the single-party structure is direct evidence of this! Furthermore, they maintain that it will remain "totalitarian" so long as the society persists in holding to the one-party system.²

This, of course, is pure speculation. One of the methods by which a bourgeois dictatorship stays in power is that of *partial concessions and reforms*. In this case, the monopoly capital dictatorship is implemented through *two-party* or *multi-party* systems. The main (although not the only) arena for party activity is parliament. The two-party system is found primarily in countries where English is spoken. The bourgeoisie use the system as an impediment to the establishment and growth of working-class parties. The two-party system functions differently in different countries. In the USA, for example, there is a "division of power" between the two bourgeois parties. In Great Britain, power is, as a rule, exercised by the party winning the parliamentary elections (Conservative or Labour).

¹ Z. K. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 57.

² See, for example, A. B. Ulam, "The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism", *World Politics* No. 3, 1960, p. 409.

There are usually no fundamental contradictions between the ruling parties. In the countries of Continental Europe, the deep differentiation of the society into two basic classes and the bitter class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the working class have been accompanied by a greater degree of fragmentation of the capitalist class, a larger stratum of petty bourgeoisie and more intensive political and organisational development of the working class than in the USA or Great Britain. This has given rise to the formation of a *multi-party system*.

When capital is unable to hold on to power by parliamentary means, it discards the multi-party or two-party system and concentrates power in the hands of one of its parties. For the people, this means the establishment of totalitarianism.

At the present time, the party systems in capitalist countries are undergoing certain changes. There a *process of consolidation* is taking place, wherein the bourgeoisie tend to concentrate their strength in *one basic party*. This process can be observed in countries with multi-party and two-party systems. The boundaries between these two systems are disappearing. The bourgeoisie are attempting to convert their dominant parties into constant and unalterable holders of governmental power and thus assign to other bourgeois and reformist parties the role of the perpetual opposition. Instead of a continuous changing of roles between opposition and ruling parties, these roles tend to become fixed. This, and the coalescence of the ruling party with the state machinery, indicates that the bourgeois multi-party system is, in fact, directed against the establishment or increased activity of independent working-class parties and is paving the way to fascism. Capitalist ideologists often corroborate this conclusion themselves. By their own admission, "...agreeing upon most fundamentals and arguing mostly about incidentals; often diminishes the incentive

to vote because many citizens see no connection between their interests and the outcome".¹

Democracy in a party system cannot be *abstract*; it is *always class-determined*. From the point of view of the interests of the common people, what we find in capitalist society is "a democracy that is curtailed, wretched, false, a democracy only for the rich, for the minority".² The transition from capitalism to socialism, however, makes democracy available to the overwhelming majority of the people. A multi-party system exists in a number of socialist countries (in the German Democratic Republic, for example), with the working-class and Marxist parties playing a leading and guiding role in socialist construction. With all the differences among these parties, they have one common goal—*concern for the interests of the working people* in the course of building socialism. Herein lies the fundamental difference between the multi-party system in socialist countries and the multi-party system in bourgeois countries. Similarly, the *forms of the party system* are class-determined. In the period of transition from capitalism to socialism "parties which are out to build socialism may share power on an equal footing and with equal opportunities".³ When socio-political and ideological unity of the society is being achieved, *integration of the interests* of all classes and social groups is a *natural* consequence, as is the *establishment of a one-party system*.

Bourgeois ideologists always attempt to interpret phenomena characteristic of Soviet society in terms of conditions inherent in bourgeois society. Their interpretation of the one-party system in the USSR is a case in point. Nevertheless, it is well known that when a

society is in transition from one socio-economic system to another, the content underlying these systems changes. Under capitalism, where the basic content of political life consists of class struggle, and where it is impossible to speak of any integration of interests, the struggle of parties is natural, being the "most purposeful, most comprehensive, and specific expression of the political struggle of classes".¹ In Soviet society, the interests of the working people form the content of its one-party system. The rise and development of a one-party system here was determined by several factors. First of all, there were the *historical conditions* under which the October Revolution of 1917 took place. The Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies turned over all power to the Bolshevik Party "without any revolution, simply by a decision of the Soviets."² The Mensheviks³ and the Socialist-Revolutionaries⁴, the basic parties of the coalition Provisional Govern-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 79.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 26, p. 303.

³ *Menshevism*—a highly opportunistic trend of Russian Social-Democracy hostile to Marxism-Leninism.

The Mensheviks appeared at the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in 1903 as a petty-bourgeois opportunist group. In 1912, the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the RSDLP drove the Mensheviks from its ranks.

After the overthrow of tsarism in February 1917, the Mensheviks called on the working class to co-operate with the bourgeoisie and gave full support to the Provisional Government.

⁴ Members of a petty-bourgeois party in Russia established in 1902. During the October Revolution, Socialist-Revolutionaries, representing the interests of the petty bourgeoisie of town and countryside, got support mainly from the kulaks. In December 1917, a split occurred in the party, as a result of which an independent party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries was formed. Trying to preserve their influence among the peasantry, they promised co-operation with the Bolsheviks, but soon embarked on open struggle against Soviet power which led to their downfall.

¹ William Goodman, *The Two-Party System in the United States*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1956, p. 552.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 463.

³ *France nouvelle*, 4 mai, 1966, p. 5.

ment on the eve of the October Revolution, turned out to be in collusion with the enemies of the Revolution—the bourgeoisie and supporters of the monarchist system. It was due to this that “the majority at the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies were delegates belonging to the Bolshevik Party”.¹ A few hours before the formation of the new government and the presentation of its membership roster to the Congress on October 25, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party approached the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries with a proposal to join the government. The refusal of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries made it necessary for the Bolsheviks to present to the Congress a “purely Bolshevik list of people’s commissars”,² which was thereupon approved by the Congress. In November 1917, the Bolshevik Party again offered the representatives of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries the opportunity of entering into the make-up of the Council of People’s Commissars. Fearing that they might completely lose the already shaken confidence of the peasantry, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries decided to join the government. But their participation boiled down to opposition to the Soviet Government’s revolutionary course. Failing to implement their petty-bourgeois policy, they resigned in March 1918, and shortly thereafter, in July, organised mutinies in Moscow and some other cities, aimed at overthrowing Soviet power.³ The mutinies were put down in a matter of a few hours. In this struggle, in which the very fate of the socialist revolution was at stake, the Bolshevik Party became the only revolutionary party enjoying the confidence of the workers and the people as a whole.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 303.

² *Ibid.*, p. 304.

³ See *Ibid.*, Vol. 27, pp. 534-35.

Furthermore, the one-party system in Soviet society is conditioned, on the one hand, by the socio-political and ideological *unity of the society*, and, on the other hand, by the *devotion* of the Communist Party to the *vital interests of the people* and the *confidence* which the *people* have in it.

What is most often criticised by bourgeois ideologists is democratic centralism—the principle on which the organisation and functioning of the Soviet political system is based. This criticism is levelled along two lines. In the first place, the sovietologists assert that centralisation (discipline, the decisions of higher organs being binding on lower organs) precludes initiative “from below”. On this basis they contend that the principle of democratic centralism “entails not so much democracy as authoritarian power”.¹ In the second place, they hold that the element of democracy (for example the election of all ruling organs from bottom to top) is incompatible with any kind of initiative “from the top”.² Democracy, says Henry Pelling, means independence and freedom of various associations in conducting their own affairs and in their participation in the activities of higher institutions.³ Any democracy existing in Soviet society occurs, according to Pelling, “...not as a result of ‘democratic centralism’, but as a result of the ‘violation of the practices of democratic centralism’”.⁴

What is the *essence* of the principle of democratic centralism? What *factors* determine its establishment and development in society? Democratic centralism, as a principle determining the organisation and

¹ Harold Zink, *op. cit.*, pp. 567-68.

² Wolfgang von Leonhard, “Sowjetideologie Heute”, II, *Die Politische Lehren*, Frankfurt am Main u. Hamburg, 1962, S. 48; Henry Pelling, *The British Communist Party. A Historical Profile*, London, 1958, pp. 169-77.

³ Henry Pelling, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁴ *Ibid.*

functioning of a political system, can be implemented *only under the conditions of a socialist society*. The objective necessity for applying this principle comes from the need to reinforce the ideological unity of the proletariat and, later, of all social groups "by the material unity of organisation, which welds millions of workers into an army of the working class".¹ Democratic centralism, on the one hand, *makes it possible to do away with bureaucratic centralism*, i.e., it offers the "possibility, created for the first time in history, of a full and unhampered development not only of specific local features, but also of local inventiveness, local initiative, of diverse ways, methods and means of progress to the common goal", and, on the other hand, *to do away with anarchy*, that is, "to ensure absolute harmony and unity in the functioning of such economic undertakings as the railways, postal and telegraph services, other means of transport, and so forth".² It makes it possible to take into consideration the *dialectics of the relationships between leaders and subordinates*, that is, the relationships between their unity and distinction. Because of their different positions, the former view social phenomena and processes mainly "from the top", and the latter, "from the bottom". Ignoring this could lead, in the first instance, to denial of the necessity for leadership, to anarchic laxity, and, in the second instance, to disregard for criticism from below, to alienation from the masses.

In bourgeois society a *system of bureaucratic centralism* has developed and functions contrary to the democratic aspirations of the working masses. Historically, it is connected with the rise and development of capitalism. The system took shape during the abolition of feudalism with its social disunity. In their

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, p. 425.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 27, p. 208.

analysis of the role of the bourgeoisie in history, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels pointed out that "it has agglomerated population, centralised means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands".¹ Political centralisation was the necessary consequence of this activity. As a result, "independent, or but loosely connected provinces with separate interests, laws, governments and customs duties, became lumped together into *one* nation, with *one* government, *one* code of laws, *one* national class interest, *one* frontier and *one* custom tariff".² As bourgeois society developed, political centralisation became stronger. Thus, the bourgeois state, which in the middle of the 19th century could be characterised as a "committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie",³ became a "committee for managing the affairs of the monopolistic bourgeoisie".⁴

In Soviet society, *centralism presupposes the extensive development* of democracy. Lenin contrasted "conscious, democratic, proletarian centralism to bourgeois, military, bureaucratic centralism" and pointed out that the *unity of the various sides of democratic centralism* in Soviet society *depended on the liquidation of capitalist conditions*. "Now if the proletariat and the poor peasants," he wrote, "take state power into their own hands and organise themselves quite freely in communes, and *unite* the action of all the communes in striking at capital, in crushing the resistance of the capitalists, and in transferring the pri-

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* in one volume, Moscow, 1968, p. 39.

² *Ibid.*

³ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* in two volumes, Moscow, 1958, Vol. I, p. 36.

⁴ *22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Stenographic Record, Gospolitizdat, 1962, Vol. III, p. 246.

vately owned railways, factories, land and so on to the *entire* nation, to the whole of society, won't that be centralism? Won't that be consistent democratic centralism and, moreover, proletarian centralism?"¹

The dialectics of the relation between democracy and centralism in Soviet society has been examined in detail in Soviet literature. Democracy is a principle which guarantees maximal development of initiative by local political organs, extension of the powers enjoyed by the Union Republics, and ever greater creative activity of the masses. For a political system to function correctly it must have centralised leadership—it must have a united leadership and well-established discipline. Without centralised leadership democracy can degenerate into anarchy. But centralism does not exist apart from democracy, for the Soviet system relies on the initiative of its lower links and the creative activity of the masses. Otherwise, it would be threatened with degeneration into armchair administration, government by fiat, and individual bossing completely alien to the nature of Soviet society. Correctly applied, centralism does not suppress democracy; on the contrary, it guarantees its actual development. Centralism in Soviet society is not military, that is, it does not rely on the power of command; it is not administrative, that is, it is not based on unconditional subordination of the masses to a leader; it is, rather, democratic centralism based on the activity and independent action of the masses, on the acknowledgement of their decisive role in society. The political organisation of Soviet society is a graphic example of the effectiveness of democratic centralism. On the one hand, the system develops with the active participation of all citizens in the running of the state and, on the other hand, with increasing public control of its activities, the strengthening of

discipline in all links of the state apparatus, and with increasing responsibility of every citizen for strict and timely implementation of the decisions and laws of Soviet power.

In essence, then, bourgeois criticism of democratic centralism in Soviet society simply does not accord with reality. Centralism excludes initiative "from below" only under conditions prevailing in *bourgeois society* where the bourgeoisie aspire to alienate the political system from the working masses. Under conditions prevailing in *bourgeois society*, initiative "from above" means weakening the political positions of the working masses and imposing the will of the bourgeoisie. In their criticism, bourgeois ideologists proceed from the conditions prevailing in capitalist society where democracy and centralism are indeed incompatible in terms of the organisation and functioning of a political system from the point of view of the labouring masses. The principle of democratic centralism applies only to Soviet society, to fundamentally different conditions. The conclusions proffered by the sovietologists stem from their desire to whitewash bureaucratic centralism and its tendency towards authoritarian power, and to discredit and give false interpretation to the organisation and functioning of the Soviet political system.

Disinformation on the Soviet Political System

The ideologists of capitalism—for example, Inkeles, Bauer, Scott, Fetscher and Friedman—assert that within the framework of the political system of the USSR, working people's organisations are denied opportunity to defend and implement the interests of Soviet citizens. Those organisations, they say, are "instruments" of the Soviet state, needed

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, pp. 429-30.

by it to accomplish its surveillance over the society.¹

The connection between the state and the working people's organisations is most often characterised by the critics as a closed "system of co-operation". Even the broadening of the scope of activities of these organisations is interpreted as a growing subordination of the will of the working people to government dictate. Noting, for example, that the trade unions of the USSR "have taken over certain functions which formerly fell within the scope of state organs", such as "the administration of social security and sanatoria, participation in the preparation of industrial and financial planning, the working out of production quotas, the distribution of housing and the appointment of economic executives",² bourgeois ideologists draw the patently absurd conclusion that, having assumed these functions, the trade unions have become more fully a part of the system of state compulsion. They maintain that the "system of co-operation", as it develops, leads to the "loss" of any kind of freedom by mass organisations, inasmuch as the task of the latter "consists of 'being vigilant' with regard to any negligence and lack of discipline in production".³ The system, they say, makes it possible to turn executive power "into a dominant and relatively unrestrained source of political leadership".

The bourgeois critics contrast the "system of co-operation" with the so-called system of antagonism. The latter, they hold, is characteristic of Western countries where there are a "number of independent groups which control each other".⁴

The system of antagonism, writes I. Fetscher,

¹ Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*, Cambridge, 1959, pp. 384-89.

² I. Fetscher, op. cit., p. 151.

³ *Conditions de travail en URSS*, Paris, 1961, p. IX.

⁴ I. Fetscher, op. cit., p. 156.

though it involves an "unstable balance, always threatening to list in one direction or the other", contains, however, "the possibility of providing something like freedom". In the system of co-operation, he says, "this possibility disappears".¹

It is difficult not to agree that a system of co-operation, when it is based on antagonism in a capitalist society, signifies, as Marx put it, the further *advance of hypocrisy*. When working people's organisations enter into co-operation with an imperialist state they betray the interests of the masses. This betrayal cannot be accomplished openly, but assumes veiled forms. And these are the very forms (but not their essence) which Western ideologists describe under the heading of a so-called system of co-operation.

What does the system of antagonism, so loudly hailed by the apologists of bourgeois democracy, actually consist of? Let us examine it, using as our example the *relations between the bourgeois government and the trade unions*—the example which the ideologists of capitalism themselves most often use in supporting their arguments.

Trade unions were formed and continue to exist in capitalist countries because the workers there have to *fight for higher wages and shorter working hours* and to *improve their working and living conditions*. In this struggle, they unavoidably enter into conflict with the bourgeois state. Despite attempts by some union leaders to co-operate with the government, the *trade unions are essentially organisations designed to defend the interests of the working class*, and no matter what form their struggle may take, it *reveals the absence of unity* in the relations between the unions and the government. Even in countries which the bourgeois press extols as the "most democratic", there are

¹ Ibid.

laws restricting the trade union movement. In the USA, for example, the trade union movement has been shackled with such legal chains as the Taft-Hartley Act, the Landrum-Griffin Act, the 1954 Communist activity control act, known as the Thought Control Act, and the Right to Work Laws (adopted in 19 states), etc.

The Taft-Hartley Act, passed in 1947, which limits the right of trade unions to strike, prohibits Communists from serving as officers of trade unions, and denies a trade union the right of entering into collective bargaining in the event that its officers are suspected of being Communist Party members. This provision is designed essentially to eliminate all trade unions led by democratic forces, and has virtually passed the death sentence on all trade unions which permit any persons holding thoughts or beliefs unacceptable to the state to serve as officers. According to the Taft-Hartley Act, a trade union officer who wants to register his organisation with the Labour Relations Board must submit, in writing and under oath, an affidavit to the effect that he is not a Communist and does not subscribe to communist ideas. The penalty for filing a false affidavit is up to ten years imprisonment.

The Landrum-Griffin Act restricts the right to strike, boycott, picket and organise unorganised workers. The most far-reaching provisions of the law, however, are contained in the clauses which, under the guise of protecting trade unions from corruption and bureaucracy and safeguarding the rights of workers, establish the reactionary "right to membership". All this points to the fact that the Government actually determines the rights of trade unions and regulates trade union life. Violation of any of the provisions of this law is punishable by imprisonment or fine. For the first time in the history of the American labour movement, a government body—the Department of

Labour—has appeared, vis-à-vis the trade unions, in the role of policeman with the task of seeing that the law is enforced.¹

Under capitalism, the relations between the state and the trade unions are being steadily reduced to covert *authoritarianism*. They have nothing in common with the picture, drawn by bourgeois ideologists, of interaction among a "number of independent groups which control each other". The "system of antagonism", so highly praised by Western theorists, in practice excludes *democracy* for the workers. Its purpose is to support illusions of democracy while keeping the pressure on the masses.

Now let us examine, again using trade unions as our example, what *co-operation between the Soviet Government and the working people's organisations* consists of.

After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, all government *power* in Russia was transferred into the hands of the *working people*. From that time on, the *position and role of the trade unions* in the political organisation of the society also underwent radical changes. The trade union, once an organisation of the oppressed class, became "an organisation of the ruling, dominant, governing class", an organisation designed to draw in and to train—a "school of communism", as Lenin called it. The trade unions have become a school of communism because they *help the workers acquire the skills of production and state administration* and understand state problems and tasks. Relations of *co-operation* and *mutual assistance* between the Soviet state and the trade unions *continue to develop*.

Thus, one of the functions of trade unions, which unite over 86 million workers and other employees

¹ For more detail, see George Morris, *American Labor. Which Way?*, New York, 1961, pp. 45-47.

in their ranks, is to prepare working people for leadership and social self-government. As an example, we can point to the work of the *standing production conferences* which are elected at general meetings of the workers and function at enterprises and construction sites all over the country. Workers and other employees elected to these conferences make decisions on questions related to production and touching on the interests of the state and every worker—on such questions as increased productivity, reduction of production costs, and labour standardisation. At general meetings of workers, the standing production conferences hear reports by factory or construction managers on current work and economic results. So that the questions submitted to the production conference may be given thorough study, the administration is obliged to acquaint the conference members with the factual state of affairs and make necessary reference materials available to them. The administration must assist in carrying out the decisions and proposals adopted by the conference and give progress reports at the regular conference meetings.

Co-operation and mutual aid between the Soviet state and the trade unions is most clearly seen in the area of *protecting* the material and cultural interests of workers and other employees. Soviet trade unions—and in this they count heavily on the backing of the government—protect their members against *misuse of power* by individual administrators.

Bureaucracy as a vestige of the old society has not entirely disappeared, but the Soviet state has no such bureaucratic apparatus as exists in the countries of capital.

The huge bureaucratic apparatus which formed the skeleton of the highly undemocratic bourgeois state machine of Russia before the October Revolution and which was connected by millions of threads with the landowners and the bourgeoisie, was destroyed in

the period between October 1917 and January 1918. Measures were adopted to prevent employees of the new state apparatus from turning into bureaucrats. However, Soviet society has not yet achieved the stage where “there is control and supervision by all”.¹ Departmental overzealousness and bureaucratic practices on the part of some administrators bring about a certain amount of conflict of interests between them and the great body of workers united in trade unions. The trade unions fight bureaucracy, but their activities along this line serve to strengthen the state apparatus rather than weaken it, for their struggle is not against the Soviet state, but against bureaucratic distortions which are alien to it.

It is important to note another side of Soviet trade union activity. The society has not yet divested itself of the possibility that social discipline might be violated by certain workers; private ownership psychology still exists in some people. The protection of the workers and other employees from such people is at the same time protection of the state by the workers. The trade unions in no way “pander to the prejudices and backwardness of the masses, but steadily”, as foreseen by Lenin, “raise them to a higher and higher level”.² In fulfilling this function, the trade unions receive “all the state assistance”.³

The relations between the Soviet state and other mass organisations, as for example the youth organisations and the co-operatives, are essentially the same as those which have developed between the state and the trade unions. Thus, the relations between the Soviet state and the Young Communist League (the Komsomol) are such that youth are able to participate in the activities of all links of the state appara-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 481.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 33, p. 193.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 30, p. 500.

tus. The Komsomol takes part in working up, discussing and fulfilling plans for economic development; it sponsors various kinds of initiatives for economy and thrift; it encourages all young workers to acquire technical skills and knowledge; it participates in discussions on draft laws of the Soviet state and in the management of state affairs. This process is reflected in the activity of primary Komsomol units at enterprises and construction sites, in the work of concluding collective agreements and checking on their fulfilment, in the preparation of normative legal acts which are promulgated by the state agencies in conjunction with the Komsomol, and in the submission of questions for governmental decision. The Komsomol is widely represented in the Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their administrative organs. From four to over eleven per cent of the deputies to the local Soviets in all the Union Republics are Komsomol members. The young deputies take an active part in preparing for and conducting the sessions and in the work of standing committees and deputy groups of Soviets. This kind of wide participation of young people in the activities of all links in the state apparatus is the best guarantee that the interests of the country's youth are always taken into account. In a number of instances, with the consent of the Komsomol, the state charges it with control over the execution by state agencies of legislation pertaining to youth. In general, the support which the state gives to the Komsomol creates the kind of conditions under which the Komsomol may most fruitfully deal with the problems before it.

Co-operation between the state and the mass organisations is possible only under conditions of a system which has eliminated all the ugly evils inherent in capitalism. Under capitalism, this kind of co-operation would lead to the infringement of the interests of the workers and, for this reason, the latter

oppose co-operation between their organisations and the bourgeois state.

* * *

Through their theories on the Soviet political system, bourgeois ideologists hope to convince those who have become disillusioned with bourgeois democracy that the corruption in their party and state apparatuses, the arbitrary actions of the authorities and the courts, about which even they cannot be silent, are insufficient grounds for concluding that theirs is a decaying, class system.¹ But the very way in which the question is put, to say nothing of the nature of the arguments used, reveals that bourgeois ideology is in serious crisis and its theorists are unable to come up with any saving ideas.

¹ See Theodor Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

A CRITIQUE OF BOURGEOIS THEORIES ON THE SOVIET STATE

The question of the origin, essence and development of the state in human society has always been the subject of sharp ideological controversy. In their theories on the state bourgeois ideologists try to conceal the class nature of the bourgeois state and represent it as one that actually does "promote the general welfare". Nonetheless, "a bourgeois republic, even the most democratic . . . inevitably remains in practice—by virtue of the fact that the land and other means of production are privately owned—a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, a mechanism through which a handful of capitalists exploit the great majority of the people".¹ The Soviet state, on the other hand, from its very inception has been *power in the hands of working people, led by the working class and its Marxist-Leninist Party*. "Soviet democracy has transformed the mass organisations of the classes oppressed by capitalism—the proletarians and the poor peasant-semi-proletarians, i.e., the overwhelming majority of the population—into the single and permanent base for the whole state apparatus, local and central, from top to bottom."² Lenin pointed out that this was "exactly a case of 'quantity being transformed into quality'":

¹ From the Programme of the RCP(B), adopted at the Eighth Congress of the Party. *The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and CC Plenary Meetings*, Part I, Gospolitizdat, 1954, p. 413.

² Ibid.

democracy, introduced as fully and consistently as is at all conceivable, is transformed from bourgeois into proletarian democracy; from the state (=a special force for the suppression of a particular class) into something which is no longer the state proper".¹ Now that socialism has been firmly established in the USSR and it is no longer necessary for the state to suppress resistance coming from the exploiting classes, the functions that are being developed are those of economic organisation and cultural education. The Soviet state now expresses the *will and interests of the whole people*—the working class, the collective-farm peasantry and the intelligentsia. It is quite understandable that this disturbs the bourgeois ideologists, for they know that as the working masses of the "free world" become more and more familiar with the origin, essence and development of the Soviet state, they receive invaluable guidelines for organising their own public activity.

The chief aims of bourgeois criticism of the Soviet state are to distort Marxist-Leninist teachings on the socialist state, to plant doubts that the role of the Soviet state is genuinely democratic and creative, and to spotlight any deviations from Marxist-Leninist theory that might occur in Soviet practice. They speak of the scientific nature of their criticism, but in practice they avoid making an objective study of the socialist state and fail to disclose the real nature of its development.

Pseudo-Marxist Theory vs. Marxist Theory on the State

As mentioned above, one of the basic directions in Western criticism of the Soviet state is distortion of Marxist-Leninist theory on the state in general and

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 419.

the socialist state in particular. Good examples of this tack can be found in the works of Niemeyer, Scott, Zink, Tucker and Fetscher.

These writers usually present the Soviet state as an "apparatus of repression in the hands of the ruling élite, who strive to perpetuate their dominance"; they maintain that the Soviet state is a "strictly repressive mechanism" which exercises repression "in general" and is "always the agency of one class"; and they support their descriptions with references to Marx.¹

In Marxist-Leninist theory, the state, in the proper sense of the word, is a *special apparatus for the suppression of one class by another and, moreover, suppression of the majority by the minority*. Without such an apparatus, the exploiters cannot legalise or consolidate the repressive "order" they have established, nor minimise the collision of classes.²

The Soviet state, however, from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, is not at all a state in the proper sense of the word; it is a state of a transitional type, a "semi-state".³ Its status as a "semi-state" is based on its *socialist essence*, on its being a *new type of state* which expresses the interests of the majority—the majority which previously had been suppressed and exploited by the minority.

The basic function of this new type of state is not suppression, but creation, which naturally must rest primarily on persuasion and education.

It is true that coercion still is one of the functions of the Soviet state. Not all members of the

society have yet become accustomed to observing elementary rules of social intercourse—rules that have been known for centuries and repeated for thousands of years—"without the special apparatus for coercion called the state".¹ We have not yet fully passed from formal to actual equality, to a point where people are not only accustomed to observing the fundamental rules of social intercourse and work voluntarily according to their ability, but everyone also participates in the running of the state. In this sense, the Soviet state still retains "vestiges of the old in the new", vestiges of the bourgeois state without the bourgeoisie.

However, the coercion used by the Soviet state is not the same as the coercion characteristic of a bourgeois state. We should not confuse the form of a state, or the form of law, with the social relations which they express. Bourgeois law recognises the means of production to be the private property of separate individuals; socialism makes them public property, and in this it completely breaks with bourgeois law. When Marx spoke of the vestiges of "bourgeois law" which are unavoidable under socialism, he had in mind the legal form left over from the old society. But this should not be confused with the essence of the social relations which it expresses. The Soviet state permits a "number of exceptions to freedom", not in regard to working people, but only in regard to exploiters and those wilfully impeding the building of a communist society. Its ultimate goal is not to consolidate a system of repression; on the contrary, it is to eliminate "all organised and systematic violence, all use of violence against people in general".²

When bourgeois ideologists (Scott or Zink, for example) write about the Soviet state, they dwell on

¹ See, for example, Gerhart Niemeyer, "Politische Grund-lehren." *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus*, Freiburg-München, 1958, SS. 87-90; Robert Tucker, "The CPSU Draft Program: A Credo of Conservatism", *Problems of Communism* No. 5, 1961, pp. 3-4; L. Révész, *Ideologie und Praxis in der Sowjetischen Innen- und Aussenpolitik*, Mainz, 1966, SS. 10-13.

² See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 329-331.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 397.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 462.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 25, p. 456.

detailed descriptions of the *links*, as they call them, in the "conventional state machinery",¹ they go into questions of the *formation* and *jurisdiction* of representative and administrative organs, and they compare and contrast in detail the various aspects of state administration or structure.² But they remain remarkably silent about the *very essence* of the Soviet state, i.e., those *characteristics* which make it a "semi-state". Propositions that truly reflect the level of the Soviet state's development, but which do not jibe with their own postulations, are declared false or qualified as "departures from Marxism". For example, well-known bourgeois sovietologist, Robert C. Tucker, makes this categorical statement: "The new formula ('state of the whole people'), does, of course, contradict the Marxist view of the state as a strictly repressive mechanism that is *always* the agency of one class and that will vanish as soon as class division and antagonism have been brought to an end after world-wide communist revolution. But this contradiction has long been implicit in the Soviet doctrine of the *Soviet* type of state as an institution that combines class-repressive with various non-repressive functions, such as those of economic administration and cultural construction. The new formula simply makes explicit and official a long-standing departure of Soviet political doctrine from Marxist theory."³

No matter how much or how often bourgeois propagandists say that the socialist type of state is a "departure from Marxist theory", they are not freed from the obligation of looking into its essence. *First*, Marxism *never equates* the form of a state with its

¹ Derek J. Scott, *Russian Political Institutions*, London, 1958, p. 90.

² Harold Zink, *Modern Governments*, New Jersey, 1958, pp. 602-15.

³ Robert Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

essence, although, as Marx put it graphically, state power, which "is not suspended in mid air"¹ impresses "its stamp" upon the state's structure and administration.² *Secondly*, Marxism has always proceeded from the proposition that it is the *essence and not the form of a state that determines its type*. On this basis, the bourgeois ideologists would have to accept the Marxist view that it would be incongruous for a state that exists during the revolutionary transformation of a capitalist society into a communist society to be an exploiting type of state. To accept this view would mean acknowledging the *creative role* of the Soviet state and its *essence* as a state of the *whole people*.

The Soviet state—a *comprehensive political organisation of the people, led by the working class and expressing the interests and will of the people* in the process of building communism—is *not to be equated* to the "free people's state" which was propagandised by the German Social-Democrats of the 1870s and repeatedly criticised in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. The Soviet state *rests on* the socio-political and ideological *unity* of the society, whereas the idea of a "free people's state" *was based on a concept of "the people" which did not reflect a single whole* and concealed the sharp class contradictions of an antagonistic society. The Soviet state is the result of a *revolutionary transformation of society* through a dictatorship of the proletariat. It represents, first, the negation of any kind of bourgeois democracy, and, secondly, presumes the unavailability of establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat in order to eliminate antagonistic classes and the causes which give rise to them. The catchword "free people's state" "amounted to something more than prettifying bour-

¹ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, p. 333.

² *Ibid.*, p. 253.

geois democracy"; it also showed a *failure to understand* that "wage slavery is the lot of the people even in the most democratic bourgeois republic".¹ The process of the development of the Soviet state makes its eventual *withering away* inevitable. The German Social-Democratic slogan, "free people's state", asserts the permanence of the bourgeois state and conceals the fact that any state, in the proper sense of the word, "is *not* free and *not* a people's state".²

Nonetheless, bourgeois ideologists not only fail to examine, but go out of their way to avoid examining the social base of the Soviet state and the tasks which determine its activity and development. By eclectically joining together separate Marxist propositions on the state—as an "organ of class domination", a "force for the suppression of one class by another", etc.—they create the impression that Marxism defines the state as a "strictly repressive mechanism" fulfilling its "sinister role in modern society", and *always* reflecting the interests of one class. But this kind of eclecticism, based on an unprincipled combining of heterogeneous, incompatible elements, can only deceive by its sham objectivity and "broad outlook". It does not and cannot give a full understanding of the phenomena or processes under observation. *The semblance of objectivity* disappears as soon as we stop thinking of the state as some kind of independent entity possessing its own "*intellectual, ethical and libertarian bases*",³ and begin to understand it as the product of society and as being conditioned by its level of development,⁴ i.e., when we go over to a Marxist-Leninist understanding of the state.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 398.

² Ibid.

³ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. II, p. 32.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 312-19.

To contend that *any state* is a *strictly repressive mechanism* is to distort Marxism. A state in the transitional period from capitalism to communism—a state which expropriates private capitalist property, centralises "all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of the proletariat", introduces a system of universal public and free education and organises any number of other similar undertakings¹—cannot but have an apparatus to carry out its economic-organisational and cultural-educational activity. An apparatus of this kind and with these aims is obviously *not* strictly *coercive*, even while class antagonism is being eliminated, and as soon as class antagonism is eliminated, it completely loses its repressive character. Lenin was already able to state in 1918, that "at the present time the task of suppressing resistance has, in the main, been completed, and the task now confronting us is that of administering the state".² He saw the outstanding characteristic of this management in the fact that "it deals pre-eminently with economics rather than with politics", that is, problems of "organising accountancy in and control over production and distribution" and the raising of labour productivity.³ When there is no one to suppress, no one in the sense of a class, in the sense of a systematic struggle with a particular sector of the population, a special machine for suppression becomes totally unnecessary. The society can deal with the possible and unavoidable excesses of individuals "as simply and as readily as any crowd of civilised people, even in modern society, interferes to put a stop to a scuffle or to prevent a woman from being assaulted".⁴ In recognising the *objective necessity* for a state apparatus to carry out economic-organisational

¹ Ibid., Vol. I, p. 53.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 42, p. 70.

³ Ibid., p. 71.

⁴ Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 464.

and cultural-educational activities, the classics of Marxism-Leninism certainly *did not see it as a strictly repressive mechanism*; on the contrary, *they saw in it elements of something new*, elements which were destined to grow, to develop and become stronger, despite the dying apparatus of the old state.¹

Marxist theory on the state makes no assertion about the *sinister role of all states*, or about *coercion in general*. In the first place, Marx and Engels spoke of the *sinister role of the bourgeois state*, which stands opposed to the working masses and promotes "naked, shameless, direct, brutal"² exploitation, promotes the development of public prostitution,³ the turning of children into "simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour"⁴, and the maintenance of hostile relations among nations.⁵ Marx gave a full description of the sinister role of the bourgeois state in *Capital*⁶. In the second place, Marx and Engels never spoke of the *unavoidability of coercion by the state in general*. In speaking, for example, of the state's peremptory interference with the right of ownership and with bourgeois relations of production during the transition from capitalism to communism, they did not equate this with coercion in general; on the contrary, they stressed that the proletariat employs coercion not in general, but with the aim of abrogating bourgeois relations of production and destroying "the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms".⁷

The Soviet state exists in order to abolish the vestiges of exploitation—the privations and poverty of

the masses—and to cope with the tasks of creating a new society. The Soviet state did away with the dominance of private ownership and has actualised the socialist principle, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work"; however, neither the production forces nor the productivity of labour have yet reached the level that would make distribution "according to need" possible. There still exists the necessity for "the strictest control by society and by the state over the measure of labour and the measure of consumption".¹ Nor has the question of all members of the society adhering to the basic rules of social intercourse been fully solved; it has not yet become habitual for people to voluntarily "work according to their ability".² The need for the Soviet state is also determined by *external conditions*—it is needed to counteract the capitalist system and the forces of war.

Because of the level of their development and the specifics of their organisation, *none of the mass organisations* of working people can take the place of the state. The Soviet state unites all the working people of the country, expresses their common will and carries out its administrative role *directly*. No single mass organisation acts, nor can it act, as the *manager of national property*. The Communist Party plays its leading role in Soviet society both directly and through the state and the system of mass organisations. The Party provides leadership for all the people, but unites in its ranks only the most politically conscious of them.

In contrast to mass organisations, the Soviet state not only governs *all the citizens* of the Soviet Union, but it does so along all lines—economic, political and ideological. From this stems the obligatory nature of

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 408-09.

² K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. I, p. 36.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁶ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Moscow, 1965, Vol. I, pp. 734-41.

⁷ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 54.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 470.

² *Ibid.*, p. 469.

the acts it promulgates, and its special role in the protection of the interests of Soviet society.

It is again distortion to say that Marxism-Leninism considers the state to be *always the organ of one class*. In *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx did indeed say that, in the transition period, the state "can be nothing but *the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*". However, drawing on the experience of the Paris Commune, Marx recognised the necessity of a dictatorship of the proletariat *only during the period of revolutionary transition* from capitalism to socialism. He considered it fruitless to make a prognosis of the nature of the state in a communist society in the absence of scientific facts, for it "does not get a flea-hop nearer to the problem".¹ Engels viewed a state which has expropriated the means of production for the benefit of the whole society not as a state "in the proper sense of the word", but rather as the "representative of society as a whole".²

In 1920, in the initial period of the Soviet era, Lenin stressed that "ours is not actually a workers' state but a workers' and peasants' state".³ The main feature in a dictatorship of the proletariat, he said, is the alliance of the working class and the working peasantry. Lenin called this alliance *the foundation of the whole Soviet revolution*, the whole Soviet Republic.⁴ What is the significance of the fact that the Soviet state was a worker-peasant state from the first years of its existence? It means that even then the Soviet state was a comprehensive political organisation of working people, led by the working class and expressing their will and basic interests in the process of building a new communist society.

¹ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 32.

² F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1969, p. 333.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 24.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Complete Works*, 5th Russ. ed., Vol. 44, p. 487.

The building of socialism and its full and final victory in the USSR has led to a further consolidation of socialist statehood. The state of the whole people is a new stage in the development of socialist statehood. It is "the main instrument in the building of communism".¹ When the Programme of the CPSU proclaims that the Soviet state now expresses the interests and will of the whole people, it does so in full accordance with reality. The social basis of the Soviet state has expanded, but it remains a state of the socialist type and has not lost its class nature.

The tasks of a state that is building communism include not only creating the material and technical basis of communism, transforming socialist relations into communist relations, raising the people's standard of living, re-educating the masses in the spirit of conscious discipline, developing fraternal co-operation with other socialist countries, but they also involve exercising control over the measures of labour and consumption, protecting the rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens, handling questions of socialist law and order and socialist ownership, providing dependable guarantees for the defence and security of the country, championing the cause of world peace and the maintenance of normal relations with all countries. The Soviet state expresses the interests and will of the whole people because there are no exploiting classes in the country; but it does not express the interests and will of still existing parasitic elements, and, with respect to them, displays its class nature.

It should be noted that the proposition on broadening the social base of the new type of state had been set forth by Marx and Engels as early as 1848, in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, where they

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, "Lenin's Cause Lives on and Triumphs", *Kommunist*, N 7, 1970, p. 20.

pointed out that the working class is the first in history not to set up as its task the retention of "its own supremacy as a class".¹

What Lies Behind Bourgeois Theories on the Soviet State?

Bourgeois ideologists (for example, Zink, Osborn, Meyer, Hazard and Scott) attempt to support their "research" into Marxist-Leninist theory on the socialist state with empirical data allegedly reflecting the essence and role of the contemporary Soviet state. They focus attention on facts about the *organisation and function* of the Soviet state, but always on such facts that *do not reveal* the bond between the state and the people or the specifics of the state's activity in the society. They cite the sources they use—topical satire, critical articles and cartoons in the daily and periodical press on manifestations of bureaucracy, unsolved problems and the difficulties encountered in Soviet construction—but they say nothing about just how representative the data they use is. They should know (as pointed out by outstanding English statistician and member of the Royal Society, Frank Yates) that "neither haphazard nor casual selection, and still less deliberate selection, can be expected to provide a representative sample".² Moreover, the grouping of the data, the interpretation, and the whole process of research (unsubstantiated, random and unobjective) is aimed, on the one hand, at sowing doubts as to the popular character and creative activity of the Soviet state and, on the other, at creating the illusion that the capitalist state brings *prosperity* to the working people.

¹ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. I, p. 54.

² Frank Yates, *Sampling Methods for Censuses and Surveys*, 3rd ed., London, 1960, pp. 1-2.

Just what does the "factual argumentation" of the bourgeois ideologists consist of? Professor Zink, for example, is interested in the number of state employees and the amount of space at the disposal of the state apparatus.¹ That there is a marked tendency towards reduction of administrative-managerial personnel despite the growth of the economy, is ignored by Zink, even though the number of employees in this category was reduced between 1940 and 1958 from 1,837,000 to 1,294,000 people, that is, by 29.5 per cent, while the increase in the overall number of workers and other employees in the national economy was from 33,926,000 to 56,005,000 persons, or 65 per cent. Robert Osborn, "specialising" in Soviet construction, describes the character of the Soviets and the connections between state administrative organs and the people, on the basis of facts which even he admits actually have to do with the organisational work of the standing committees within the local Soviets.² And like his colleague, Professor Zink, he remains silent about the actual processes which characterise the development of the Soviets. The standing committees are an integral part of local as well as Supreme Soviets of Working People's Deputies. Deputies and non-deputy people alike take part in the work of these committees. The committees prepare questions for discussion at the sessions, and work up proposals and draft decisions of the Soviets. In some regions of the Soviet Union, the standing committees make independent decisions on a large number of questions.

The bourgeois ideologists use essentially the same approach in their selection of facts when dealing with the *role* of the Soviet state in the life of the society. They attract attention only to certain sides or

¹ Harold Zink, op. cit., p. 602.

² Robert Osborn, "The Role of Social Institutions", *The Future of Communist Society*, New York, 1962, pp. 80-89.

phenomena in the system of control and coercion used by the Soviet state. Zink, Meyer and Hazard declare that control is constant and view the existence of control by the people as confirming the proposition propagandised in the "free world" that control embraces every phase of Soviet life. All in all, the sovietologists draw a picture of control as surveillance which the Soviet state allegedly maintains over the economic and cultural life of the country, over social groups and even over individuals and their thoughts.¹ Actually, however, the Soviet system of control is determined by the concern of the working people to see to it that the *wealth* that they create is *not squandered*, that the *labour of each* of them *be paid for in accordance with its quantity and quality*. Control, in other words, is *inseparable from management*. The people's direct participation in the management of the affairs of society implies that they also effect control over all the affairs of the society, primarily over the measure of labour and the measure of consumption. The extent of the people's participation is both an index of their *responsibility for the affairs of the society* and an index of their *freedom in the society*, for freedom and responsibility are inseparable. The Soviet system of control is a genuinely popular system in its essence, its goals, its purpose, forms and methods. And yet, for Alfred Meyer, "it is very clear that . . . communism will bring neither equality nor freedom from a great many social controls," nor "the right to privacy."² This leads us to ask Mr. Meyer: Equality for *whom*? Freedom for *whom* and *from whom*? The right to privacy in *whose interests*? Meyer and his colleagues use a yardstick

¹ Harold Zink, op. cit., p. 560; Alfred Meyer, "Twenty Years On", *The Future of Communist Society*, pp. 186-89; John Hazard, "The Function of Law", *The Future of Communist Society*, pp. 72-79.

² Alfred Meyer, op. cit., p. 186.

that can be applied only to the capitalist system. To ignore data which reveal the essence, the goals, purpose, forms and methods of the Soviet system of control means essentially to admit that what one means by equality is *bourgeois equality*, what one means by freedom is *bourgeois freedom*, and what one means by the right to privacy is the *preservation of the bourgeois system*.

In discussing state coercion in Soviet society, the bourgeois ideologists catalogue and draw attention to facts which allegedly reveal the permanence of coercion but that really relate to the struggle against law-breakers.¹ They say nothing, however, about the ever increasing application of methods of persuasion and re-education which characterise the very essence of state coercion in Soviet society and its social orientation. Yet it is common knowledge that state coercion in Soviet society is not practised *in general*, but only insofar as it is necessary to protect socialist ownership, safeguard public order and maintain state and labour discipline. In bourgeois society, state coercion is applied *to classes*, to whole *social groups*, with the aim of protecting the interests of the exploiting classes; in Soviet society it is applied to *separate elements* from various strata of the society—to the swindlers, parasites and hooligans. What is more, coercion is applied in the name of the whole people, in its interests and according to its will.

A biased selection of facts about one side of the Soviet state mechanism or another does not and cannot provide a true picture of its social nature nor of its role in the society.

To determine the social character of the state mechanism it is necessary to examine its essence, including such *principles of its organisation* as, for example, the *participation of the people in the admin-*

¹ John Hazard, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

istration of the state. To do this it is necessary to examine the facts that show that the Soviets, as well as other components of the Soviet state, are a new kind of state apparatus, not divorced from the people, but most closely bound with them.

The Soviets of Working People's Deputies form the foundation of the Soviet state. "This apparatus," Lenin wrote in his pamphlet *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?*, "provides a bond with the people, with the majority of the people, so intimate, so indissoluble, so easily verifiable and renewable, that nothing even remotely like it existed in the previous state apparatus."¹ Confirmation of the correctness of Lenin's foresight lies in the experience of Soviet construction.

Another index of the bond between the Soviets and the people is provided by statistical data on representation by social groups in the deputy composition of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Supreme Soviets of the Union and Autonomous Republics and the local Soviets.

Let us turn to the composition of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which reflects the character and direction of development of the Supreme Soviets of the Union and the Autonomous Republics. The Sixth Supreme Soviet of the USSR, elected March 18, 1962, included 1,443 deputies. Of these, 791 were elected to the Soviet of the Union and 652 to the Soviet of Nationalities. The Seventh Supreme Soviet, elected June 12, 1966, enlarged representation to 1,517 deputies, of which 767 were elected to the Soviet of the Union and 750 to the Soviet of Nationalities. In the Sixth Supreme Soviet, 781 deputies, that is, more than half the total, were, or began their work activity as, workers and peasants. There were 339 workers (23.5 per cent of the total

number of deputies), and 307 collective farmers (21.3 per cent); 390 were women (27 per cent). The Supreme Soviet consisted of representatives of 56 nationalities. A total of 1,007 of the deputies, or 69.8 per cent, were elected to the Supreme Soviet for the first time. The composition of the Seventh and Eighth Supreme Soviets of the USSR is characterised by a subsequent increase in the number of workers and peasants, who made up 46 per cent of the total in 1966 and 50.3 per cent in 1970. The absolute number of women also increased. All of the peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union were represented.

Between 1961 and 1969, the local Soviets were enlarged from 1,822,049 to 2,070,539 deputies, that is, by 148,490 deputies, or 12.2 per cent. The deputies elected in 1961 represented 1.26 per cent of the total number of voters entered in the voters' lists, and 1.34 per cent in 1969.

During this same period, the representation of workers, collective-farm peasantry and women showed a tendency towards increase. In 1961, 1,822,049 deputies were elected to the local Soviets (an increase of 20,386 deputies over the previous election), of which 433,293 were workers and 691,842—collective farmers (61.8 per cent); 741,276 were women (40.7 per cent). In 1963, the total number of deputies to the local Soviets grew by more than 136,500 as compared with 1961, and consisted of 1,958,565 persons. Of these, 527,287 were workers and 688,940 were collective farmers, together accounting for 62.1 per cent of the total number of deputies. There were 815,489 women deputies or 41.6 per cent of the total. The data on the results of the elections to local Soviets in 1965 point to a further strengthening of the bond between the Soviets and the people. Compared with 1963, the total number of deputies grew by 51,975. Worker and peasant representation grew in absolute numbers. The number of women

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 103.

grew by 42,105, to make up 42.7 per cent of the total. In 1967, the local Soviets increased their composition by 34,974 deputies, in 1969, by 25,120 deputies as against 1967, and the proportion of workers increased from 28.8 per cent in 1965, to 29.6 per cent in 1967 and to 35.0 per cent in 1969. Because of a drop in the ratio of collective-farm peasants to the over-all population, the representation of this category in the local Soviets decreased from 33.4 per cent in 1965 to 29.3 per cent in 1969. The proportion of women deputies grew from 42.6 per cent in 1965 to 44.6 per cent in 1969.

Still another index of the bond between the Soviets and the people is the *tendency towards heightened deputy activity* and the systematic drawing in of a constantly growing number of other citizens into the work of administering the affairs of state. In 1961, 1,392,920 deputies were elected to the standing committees of the local Soviets. In 1963, this number increased by 128,021. In 1965, 1,638,958 deputies were members of local Soviet standing committees. Besides the deputies, over three and a half million other citizens took part in the work of these committees. There are also various independent organs of public action (such as the street committees, for example) which operate in conjunction with the local Soviets and help them carry out the tasks facing them.

The Soviets combine legislative and executive power in the person of the elected people's representatives. The Soviets thus have the features of organs of power as well as those of mass organisations. "By virtue of the fact that its personnel is elected and subject to recall at the people's will without any bureaucratic formalities," the Soviet is "far more democratic than any previous apparatus."¹

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 103.

Other links of the Soviet state are also intimately bound with the people. There is a number of state administrative agencies with both executive and administrative functions that are formed by the Soviets and are a component part of them. The people also participate directly in state administration, on a voluntary basis, through special sections of executive committees, through people's inspectorates and voluntary councils at cultural, public health and educational institutions. The courts are elected either directly by the population or by their representative organs of power. The people's judges of district (city) people's courts are elected by the citizens of the district (city) on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot, and the people's assessors of district (city) people's courts are elected at general meetings of workers, other employees and peasants at their place of work or residence and at meetings of servicemen at their military units. The organs of the procurator's office are subordinate to the Supreme Soviet or, during periods between sessions, to its Presidium.

The bonds of the Soviet state with the people are also strengthened through the formation and development of *new state institutions*, close in their organisational form to organs of self-administration. This tendency is seen most clearly in the national economy. A system of *production conferences* and various *committees*, through which the workers and other employees take part in the management of production, operates in industry and construction. To provide an idea of the level of worker participation in production management, we may refer to data gathered at the Orjonikidze Plant in the town of Podolsk, Moscow Region. A survey conducted in 1965 (Table 9), showed that 26.1 per cent of the workers and other employees participate in production management. In this form of management, members of public associa-

Table 9

Public Association	Number of members	Per cent of total number of workers
Standing Production Conference	518	7.4
Public Bureau of Economic Analysis	134	1.9
Public Bureau of Production Quotas	156	2.2
Plant Technical-Economic Council	37	0.5
Council of Innovators	11	0.16
Public Bureau of Design . . .	104	1.5
Scientific-Technological Society	473	6.8
Public Technological Bureau .	25	0.36
Public Personnel Departments and Committees Handling Problems of Employment or Discharge	123	1.7
Public Youth Education Councils	126	1.8
Public Brigades for Implementing the Complex Mechanisation Plan	127	1.8

tions draw up recommendations and proposals and participate in carrying them out. This system helps to reinforce the bonds between the working people and the state and leads to a higher living standard for the people.

Soviet enterprises have done a great deal over the last years to broaden the *democratic principles of management*. An ever increasing circle of people are being drawn into management—workers, engineers, office employees and representatives of Party, trade union and Komsomol organisations. The results are reflected in the Statement on Regulations Governing

the Socialist State Production Enterprise, approved by a decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated October 4, 1965, by decisions of the October 1964 and subsequent plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the Party, and in resolutions and directives of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. By broadening the democratic base of management, by increasing the role of production collectives in the management of enterprises, the Party aims at increasing the state responsibility and freedom of the workers and other employees.

The role of the Soviet state will not be understood if its functions are examined outside of its connection with the creation of the material and technical basis of communism and other basic tasks before it, and outside its connection with the people.

The Soviet state is engaged in broad-scale creative work. It carries out economic-organisational and cultural-educational functions, it effects control of the measure of labour and consumption, protection of socialist property, law and order and the rights and legal interests of its citizens. In the sphere of international relations, the state provides for the defence of the country from external attack; works towards reinforcing and developing friendly relations, fraternal co-operation and mutual assistance with other socialist countries; strives for peace and peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems, etc.

The Soviet state is continually improving its *functional system*, eliminating elements of bureaucratic management and departmental rivalry, and putting the whole process under public control. The most effective means of struggle against bureaucracy is to involve the masses into the administration of the state and raise their general educational and cultural level. The *functions* of those state agencies *whose scope of activity no longer corresponds to the tasks before them* are being updated. An example of such changes are

the measures carried out after the September Plenary Meeting of the CC CPSU (1965) to expand the economic independence of production enterprises; increase economic stimulation; tighten up cost-accounting practices; and improve the organisation of industrial management.

Bourgeois ideologists not only abstract facts which fail to convey information on the essence and social role of the Soviet state, but they avoid everything that in any way points to the essential interconnections within the system and the objective trends in its development. It is useless to search for factual material in their works about the participation of working people in the management of the Soviet state, although they know full well that this phenomenon and its evolution occupy an enormous place in Soviet reality. They keep silent about the fact that the Soviets combine the features of organs of state power with those of mass organisations. They discard facts which show the economic-organisational and cultural-educational activity of the Soviet state. In touching on the functions of control over the measure of labour and consumption, the protection of socialist property, law and order and the rights and legal interests of citizens, bourgeois scholars ignore the facts which characterise the social character of these functions. Yet, they persist in assuring their readers that their approach is scientific!¹ They falsify Marxist-Leninist propositions on the state or simply engage in fabrication, and then maintain that the creation of the material and technical basis of communism, the transformation of socialist relations into communist social relations and the development of the new man are propaganda slogans that conceal

¹ See, for example, Harold Zink, *op. cit.*, pp. 602-20; Derek J. Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-135; Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, pp. 233-54.

the real purposes of the Soviet state and an attempt to "force" renewed faith in "communist dogma". In the opinion of these critics, the real functions of the state, as defined by Marx, are incompatible with those mentioned above.¹ However, such propositions come not from Marx, but from the bourgeois critics themselves—they are falsified propositions of Marxist-Leninist theory on the state in general and on the socialist state, in particular.

Any further "research" into the factual material collected by the bourgeois ideologists consists of making anti-communist interpretations and lauding the values of the "free world". Harold Zink, for example, reports on the number of state employees and the amount of space at the disposal of the state apparatus with the intention of contraposing the Soviet state and the people; to create the myth that the government is really passive even though it involves great expenditure of human energy; and to induce his readers in the Western countries to "give their own systems an excellent rating".² However, because Professor Zink fails to examine the Soviet state in its essence, he is in no position to present a true picture of the "shortcomings" of the Soviet state or the "advantages" of the bourgeois state machinery. Zink's colleague, Robert Osborn, in examining the machinery for solving administrative problems in the Soviets and the organs of state administration, tried to reveal, as he wrote, the "vested interest in confusion"³ in the Soviets and their anti-popular nature, and to justify, by comparison, the vices of bourgeois parliamentarism. But he, too, having failed to examine the essential nature of the Soviets, has given a true picture neither of the Soviets nor of bourgeois parliamentarism.

¹ Harold Zink, *op. cit.*, p. 602.

² *Ibid.*

³ Robert Osborn, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

**On the Withering Away of the
Soviet State (Against
Ideological Speculation)**

When we speak of the withering away of the Soviet state we are speaking of the evolution of socialist statehood and the consequent changes in the Soviet political system. A state, in the proper sense of the word, exists only in a class-antagonistic society. Once a dictatorship of the proletariat is established, transition to a semi-state begins. The essence of this transition is that the proletariat, assuming state power, replaces, according to Lenin's definition, the special coercive force for the suppression of millions of working people by a handful of the rich with "a 'special coercive force' for the suppression of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat (the dictatorship of the proletariat)".¹ The state of the dictatorship of the proletariat grows into a state of the whole people and functions now as the organ expressing the will and interests of the whole people. The state of the whole people, in turn, develops further, transforming the organs of state power into organs of public self-administration. In their theories about the withering away of the Soviet state, the bourgeois ideologists attempt to distort the process of development of socialist statehood in Soviet society. They contend that the Soviet state has no future and that this is confirmed by Marxist-Leninist theory about the withering away of the state and the practice of the Soviet state's development. This topic is covered in works by Kline, Lapenna, Schwarz, Hazard, Fetscher and others.

First of all, they contend that Marxism-Leninism has in mind the withering away of institutions which are determined by the relations prevailing in bourgeois society. A characteristic description is given by George L. Kline in his work, "Philosophy and

Practice": "The metaphor of 'withering away,'" he writes, "presupposes the metaphor of society as a plant with roots and leaves. When the root of the social plant is cut or extracted, the leaves wither. The 'root', of course, is the *Unterbau*, the economic 'base'; the foliage constitutes the *Überbau*, the socio-political and ideological 'superstructure'. Classical Marxist doctrine holds, in effect, that capitalist society—its baneful roots . . . nourish the perverse leaves of 'bourgeois' law, religion, morality. When the socialist revolution cuts the root, the leaves will drop and wither, eventually dying out completely."¹ Kline says further that "Marx put forward the theory of the withering away of the state as a tactical device to forestall the ideological inroads, in the First International, of Bakunin's anarchist doctrine of immediate and total elimination of the state".² The first proposition is a distortion of Marxist theory, and the second, a falsification of the history of its development. When Marxism-Leninism speaks of a state which withers away, it has in mind a *socialist state*, i.e., a *semi-state*. The state withers away, Engels pointed out, when "at last it becomes the real representative of the whole of society". But this is preceded by the destruction by the proletariat of the state as a state (that is, a bourgeois state).³ "The words about the state withering away," Lenin stressed, "refer to the remnants of the *proletarian state after the socialist revolution*. . . . The bourgeois state does not 'wither away', but is 'abolished' by the proletariat in the course of the revolution. What withers away after this revolution is the proletarian state or semi-state."⁴ *Alienation* of the state from the society is characteristic of

¹ George L. Kline, "Philosophy and Practice", *The Future of Communist Society*, p. 63.

² Ibid., p. 65.

³ F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1969, p. 333.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 397.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 397.

bourgeois society and is brought about by the ever increasing antagonism between the bourgeoisie, whose instrument of power is the state, and the masses of working people. What is characteristic of Soviet society is the tendency towards the *fusion* of state power and the society. The entire history of the Soviet state has been conditioned by its mission to abolish classes.

Furthermore, the theory of the "withering away of the state" was not only *directed against the anarchists*. It was primarily a *criticism of the opportunists* who, as early as the 1870s, tried to gloss over the class essence of the bourgeois state. On this basis alone the theory of the withering away of the state was and still is a determining factor in the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeois state.

Another basic proposition of bourgeois criticism is that "withering away" should mean the same thing as 'self-liquidation' or 'liquidation by history'.¹ By "self-liquidation" they mean that "withering away" depends on the will of the rulers, and "liquidation by history" they interpret as the consequence of action by objective, natural forces. In other words, they have in mind here "a causal link between base and superstructure, as well as an order of priority such that changes in the former automatically produce corresponding changes in the latter".² But in either case, they interpret withering away as a *fading away* of the Soviet state, as its *fruitless negation*. Lapenna, for example, basing himself on the proposition that "the withering away of the state . . . is a 'very long process' . . . and the state will remain 'for a very long time after the victory of the first phase of communism'",³ concludes that the Marxist proposition on the

withering away of the state is a mere formality. "Thus, for the time being," he says, "there is no question at all of any weakening of the Soviet state machinery."¹ Schwarz² and Hazard³ use essentially the same approach.

As mentioned before, Marxism-Leninism applies the concept of "withering away" to the *disappearance* of those *features* of a state (which is not a state in the proper sense of the word) which are determined by the *existing class relations* in a society undergoing transition from capitalism to communism. "Law," Marx noted, "can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby."⁴ Lenin spoke of the withering away of the state as a process of broadening democracy. "The more complete the democracy, the nearer the moment when it becomes unnecessary. The more democratic the 'state' . . . the more rapidly *every form* of state begins to wither away."⁵ What does the withering away process actually consist of? The Marxist-Leninist understanding of this question is treated in great detail in Soviet literature. In the first place, the function of military suppression withers away. The sphere in which state coercion is applied shrinks and, consequently, the very need for the agencies which exercise it gradually disappears. In the second place, withering away of the state presupposes that its economic and cultural functions will be transformed from being political to being social functions. The withering away of the state is manifested not in the elimination of economic func-

¹ Ibid.

² Solomon Schwarz, "Is the State Withering Away in the USSR?", *The USSR and the Future*, pp. 163-78.

³ John Hazard, op. cit., pp. 71-79.

⁴ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. II, p. 24.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 474.

¹ George L. Kline, op. cit., p. 65.

² Ibid., p. 64.

³ Ivo Lapenna, "Party and State in the Programme", *The USSR and the Future*, New York, 1963, p. 156.

tions in general, or in that the need for directing the economy disappears, but rather in that these functions lose their political nature. This will become possible when class differences disappear, when the vestiges of capitalism in the economy, and in the consciousness and everyday life of the people have been overcome. In the third place, withering away of the state presumes the drawing in of all the people into production management, into the administration of public affairs, which will lead to the gradual disappearance of any necessity for an apparatus of political power. Bourgeois ideologists attempt to interpret the withering away of the state in an absolute sense, that is, as a fruitless negation. However, such an interpretation is a far cry from Marxism-Leninism. The question cannot be understood in an *absolute* sense. It is not a question of destroying the state completely and then, starting from scratch, somehow organising public self-government. Actually, *only the coercive agencies of the state wither away*. Power remains and will exist even under communism, but it will have lost its political character. Non-coercive components of the state apparatus whose functions remain socially necessary will continue to *grow and develop*. That these links remain and grow stronger does not at all contradict the process of the state's withering away; on the contrary, it is in full accordance with it. The complete withering away of the state would not be tantamount to its turning into nothing, for the concept of "withering away" includes the element of *continuity*. Socialist statehood does not disappear without a trace, but is gradually transformed into public self-government.

The withering away process depends primarily on *objective conditions*, i.e., the *internal and external conditions* which determine the activity and consciousness of the people. Internally, there are the economic relations, which include the relations between classes, family relations, and the relations of everyday social

intercourse. The fact that certain class differences and vestiges of the past still exist during the socialist period makes the state organisation of society necessary. Externally, there are the relations with the capitalist world, the class struggle that is taking place in the international arena, and the system of co-operation and mutual assistance that has been firmly established within the socialist world. There is, to be sure, also a *subjective factor*—the process of the state withering away depends to some extent on the *role of individuals who express policy in the fullest and most concentrated form*. A person's character or position may enable him to influence the fate of social development. "Sometimes their influence," wrote G. V. Plekhanov in his work *On the Question of the Role of the Individual in History*, "is even very significant, but the very possibility of such influence and its scope are determined by the organisation of the society and the co-relation of its forces".¹ The most outstanding and valuable public figures are those who are best able to take the conditions of social development into account. "Any talent *manifested in reality*, that is, any talent which has become a *social force, is the fruit of social relations*."² "Historical issues," Lenin noted, "are decided by vast masses, which, if the few do not suit them, may at times treat them none too politely."³ It is falsification of Marxism-Leninism to say that its approach to the question of the state withering away is voluntaristic—nowhere in Marxism-Leninism is the *subjective factor* made absolute.

Also untenable is the bourgeois contention that Marxism-Leninism is inconsistent in its approach to

¹ G. V. Plekhanov, *Selected Philosophical Works*, Vol. II, Gospolitizdat, 1956, p. 322.

² *Ibid.*, p. 329.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 287.

the withering away question when it examines the causal connections between basis and superstructure. The trouble is that when the critics (George L. Kline, for example) speak of basis, they are referring to bourgeois relations of production (the "roots"), and by superstructure they mean that which is supposed to "wither away"—socialist statehood, socialist law, etc. (the "leaves"). In Marxist theory, however, "basis" and "superstructure" are always *of the same class*. This means that bourgeois superstructure and state are related to bourgeois production relations, and the former, as we have seen, do not wither away, but are abolished by the proletariat. The socialist state reflects the socialist economic system and any changes in the former are directly related to the development of the latter. The bourgeois ideologists distort Marxism-Leninism by attributing to it a one-sided economic explanation of history ("Changes in the basis automatically bring about changes in the superstructure," says Kline), whereas Marxism-Leninism demands that the *interaction between basis and superstructure* always be taken into account.

Bourgeois theories on the development of the Soviet state boil down essentially to an interpretation of their own premises on the withering away of the state. And because their premises have really nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism, their conclusions about the development of the Soviet state do not reflect objective reality.

The critics state that they do not see any real signs of the Soviet state withering away. Schwarz, for example, writes that as yet there is no hint of a "disappearance of any need for administration as prophesied by Lenin".¹ He points out that "a general involvement of the masses in administration evidently does not exclude the presence of certain persons whose

job it is, in addition to other work, to carry out the functions of *technical* management".¹ "Withering away of the state," in his opinion, "has become a mere catchphrase, devoid of any real meaning", and this because "the process of withering away of the state will signify . . . improvement in the work of the state apparatus and increasing control by the people over its activity".² Hazard supports his conclusion that intentions for a gradual withering away of the law have been abandoned by citing the fact that penal legislation still exists in the USSR.³

The Soviet state is not eternal. Marxism-Leninism has long *predicted the inevitability* of its withering away and *indicated the ways* in which it will happen. Engels wrote about the withering away of the socialist type of state.⁴ Lenin pointed to the inevitability of the withering away of the "*proletarian state after the socialist revolution*".⁵ The Party Programme adopted at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU not only confirms the inevitability of the withering away of the state, but outlines the basic course towards transition to public self-government.

The following stages can be distinguished in the development of the Soviet state: the dictatorship of the proletariat, the state of the whole people, and the period of transition from the first to the second. The state of the dictatorship of the proletariat existed during transition from capitalism to socialism when the Soviet state was the instrument of a *class dictatorship*. A state of the whole people—a state representing the *interests and will* of the entire people—is what exists during the period of transition from fully established socialism to communism. Transition from

¹ Ibid., p. 174.

² Ibid.

³ John Hazard, op. cit., p. 79.

⁴ See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1969, p. 333.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 397.

¹ Solomon Schwarz, op. cit., p. 172.

the one to the other began with the abolishment of the exploiting classes in the USSR and the victory of socialism in town and country.

During this transition, the Soviet state underwent certain changes. As long as the exploiting classes existed, it did not extend proletarian democracy to them. Once socialism was established, the *framework of this democracy was broadened*. At the end of the 1930s, all groups and strata of Soviet society were granted the right to vote and be elected. The personnel of state institutions was enlarged and included representatives of the *whole* population. Before the victory of socialism, the Soviet state fully expressed the interests of the working class, while in relation to the peasantry, it expressed their basic interests as workers, but not as owners. Once the peasants organised themselves into co-operatives, the state expressed the basic interests of *all* classes and social groups—the interests of *all* the people. Accordingly, inequality in the rights enjoyed by workers, peasants and the intelligentsia to participate in *every* link of the state apparatus was eliminated. In the period of class struggle, one of the most important functions of the state was the suppression of exploiters, but as the society moved closer to socialism, this function gradually began to recede into the background and, once socialism was built, it *disappeared completely*.

The Soviet state is *evolving* towards its eventual transformation into public self-government. The representative system of the Soviets and the forms and methods of their activity are constantly being improved; the public service activity of the people is constantly increasing; an ever increasing number of citizens take an active part in the administration of the state; and control by the people of state activity is constantly being expanded.

Withering away does not mean the disappearance of the need for administration *in general*; it is rather

the process of educating all members of society to govern *themselves*, to manage production *independently*, and to fulfil the functions of accounting and control *directly*. In Lenin's words, "when *all* have learned to administer and actually do independently administer social production, independently keep accounts and exercise control ... then the door will be thrown wide open for ... the complete withering away of the state".¹

Bourgeois theory argues that the *timetable* for the withering away of the Soviet state *has not been fixed*. Thus, Hazard says that the idea of withering away "is immaterial for the policy-makers..."². But here, too, it is obvious that his conclusion is based on strictly formalistic premises. The timetable depends on *objective conditions*. With respect to internal conditions, the state can wither away only *after* communism *has essentially been built*, i.e., when the following problems are solved: creating the material and technical basis of communism; eliminating the essential differences between town and country and between physical and mental labour; attaining complete unity among the nations; developing traits characteristic of man in a communist society; developing democracy to the fullest possible extent; increasing the role of mass organisations in the administration of the country; involving all citizens in the job of administering public affairs. As for the external conditions, the Soviet state can wither away fully *only* upon the *disappearance of the imperialist camp* and the consequent *elimination of the danger of aggression* on the part of the imperialist states. Until such time, Soviet society is forced to *strengthen* its *army* and its *organs of security*. Such are the objective conditions which the bourgeois ideologists ignore when speaking

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 474.

² John Hazard, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

of a timetable for the withering away of the Soviet state.

* * *

The attempts of the bourgeois ideologists to belittle the strength of socialism and create the illusion of the popular nature of the bourgeois state are suffering failure. The Soviet Union is steadily developing along the lines of involving *all* citizens in the administration of the state and in the management of economic and cultural construction; it is constantly improving the work of the state apparatus and increasing the control by the people of its activity. In the "free world", meanwhile, we see such progressive trends as Communist Parties growing into mass parties; the stirring of the Left-wing elements in Social-Democratic parties and the trade unions affiliated with them; the formation within bourgeois parties of groups and movements opposing the leadership of these parties; and the appearance of parties and organisations which express the interests and views of various strata of the population and which are relatively independent of the influence of the monopolies. The social base of the bourgeois state is shrinking not only among the working people, but even among those whom the bourgeois press considers to be staunch supporters of the "free world".

Chapter 3

A CRITIQUE OF BOURGEOIS THEORIES ABOUT MASS ORGANISATIONS IN SOVIET SOCIETY

A communist society does not develop spontaneously, as have all preceding socio-economic formations; it develops, rather, as the result of the *conscious* and *purposeful* activity of the masses. The factors operating within Soviet society which provide for the participation of all members of society in the administration of social and political affairs are the leading and guiding role of the Communist Party and the active, creative participation of mass organisations in the task of building a communist society. "The Party directs the great creative activity of the Soviet people and gives an organised, systematic and scientific character to its struggle to achieve its final goal—the victory of communism."¹ The trade unions are a school of administration, a school of communism for the masses, and the Komsomol prepares the youth to live, work and manage the affairs of Soviet society.

The experience of building communism in the USSR is of international significance. It points to the ways of securing, and the factors which determine, the participation of the masses *in administering* the social and political affairs of society; it points to the ways providing for, and factors making possible, the development of the social and political *freedom of the individual*.

¹ 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Stenographic Record, Vol. III, Gospolitizdat, 1962, p. 337.

Bourgeois theories about mass organisations in Soviet society are developed with the following objectives: on the one hand, the critics attempt to narrow the concept of "the people" in Soviet society down to a "smaller part of the population".¹ Their aim here is to create a false understanding of the character of the Soviet social system, its role in the society and the prospects for its development. On the other hand, they attempt to show that in bourgeois society, the concept of "the people" is identical with the concept of "population", and this, in their opinion, means that the bourgeois social system is truly a system of the people.

In this chapter we shall examine some of the characteristic methods used by bourgeois ideologists in their attempt to deceive public opinion and create a false understanding of the connections between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the people, the Party's increasing role in Soviet society, and the nature and process of expanding the role of the trade unions and the Komsomol in the solution of state problems.

Against the Slander Aimed at the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

How do bourgeois ideologists conceptualise the connections between the Party and the people in Soviet society? What are the premises and facts from which the sovietologists proceed and what methods do they use in collecting and processing their data?

Let us turn first to the question of the social unity between the Party and the people. By this, we mean that the basic interests of all social groups in the society are reflected in the Party Programme and that the Party is made up of representatives of all

social groups. Thus, the most significant index of social unity between the Party and the people is the Party's quantitative and qualitative composition. Bearing in mind the vanguard role of the Party in Soviet society, this means that the composition of the Party must be sufficiently representative and that it must include the best representatives from all the social groups of the society. In addition to this, the connection between the Party and the people must be continually strengthened; in other words, there must be a constant increase in Party membership.

Bourgeois ideologists concentrate much of their criticism on the composition of the Party. Colegrove, Inkeles, Bauer, Meyer, Schapiro, Schlesinger and others contend that the composition of the Party does not reveal its unity with the Soviet people. They speak about the small number of Party members; they talk about "Party privileges; they accuse the Party of not being open to all those who desire to join¹ and insist that admission is open only to a chosen few and that "professional politicians . . . constitute the inner core of the Communist Party."²

In speaking about the quantitative composition of the Party, bourgeois ideologists, as a rule, limit themselves to comparing the number of Party members with the country's total population for one particular year or another. Data which would characterise the dynamics of Party growth are not cited. Why? Because if these data were used, they would reveal the unity of the Party and the people.

¹ See Kenneth Colegrove, *Democracy Versus Communism*, New Jersey, 1957, p. 66; C. W. Cassinelli, "The Totalitarian Party", *The Journal of Politics* No. 1, 1962, pp. 111-12.

² See Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, pp. 323-36; Alfred Meyer, "Twenty Years On", *The Future of Communist Society*, New York, 1962, p. 189; Leonard Schapiro, "The New Rules of the CPSU", *The USSR and the Future*, New York, 1963, p. 194.

¹ See L. Révész, *Ideologie und Praxis in der Sowjetischen Innen- und Aussenpolitik*, Mainz, 1966, SS. 4-8.

In the pre-revolutionary period Party, in the words of Lenin, had "in the first place to draw a line of demarcation" between itself "and all others, to single out the proletariat *alone* and *exclusively*..."¹ This demarcation was necessary because the "monstrous sufferings of the 'working and exploited masses' did not rouse any popular movement until a 'handful' of factory workers began . . . the class struggle".² During that period, only this handful could guarantee the "conduct, continuation and *extension*" of the struggle.³ Otherwise, the struggle would have been threatened with instability and inconsistency.

This is the Party's past history. After the Party came out from underground, it numbered 80,000 people. Today, with a membership of 14,000,000⁴, the Party stands as the vanguard of the whole Soviet people.

We can judge about the connection of the Communist Party and the people *quantitatively* from the trend in Party membership growth. The following data show this growth over the last 20 years (see Table 10⁵).

In 1959, 6.35 per cent⁶ of the population 18 years or older (the age minimum for acceptance to the Party) were Communists. By 1967, this figure had

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 75.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Figures, Facts, Documents)", *Political Self-Education* No. 7, 1963, pp. 80-81.

⁵ Table 10 is based on data published in *The CPSU in Figures*; *Kommunist* No. 15, 1967, p. 90; L. I. Brezhnev, "Lenin's Cause Lives on and Triumphs", *Kommunist*, No. 7, 1970, p. 23. The membership figure for 1950 is taken as 100 per cent.

⁶ The figure relating Party membership to the population 18 years or older is given according to data on population distribution by age for 1959 (*Results of the All-Union Population Census for 1959, USSR*) and the statistics of CPSU membership for 1959 (*The CPSU in Figures, 1956-61*, p. 44).

Table 10

Year	Growth of CPSU Membership	
	Millions	Per cent
1950	6.34	100.0
1954	6.86	108.3
1958	7.84	123.4
1962	9.89	156.1
1966	12.36	195.0
1970	14.0	220.3

risen to 9 per cent. Today one out of every eleven Soviet citizens in this age category is a member or candidate member of the CPSU.¹

Data characterising changes in CPSU membership in relation to total membership that have taken place under the current system of individual acceptance and careful selection are given in Table 11². The table shows that membership is increasing annually, while rejections and drop-outs, which amounted to an average of 0.34 per cent of the total membership, showed a consistent decline (new admissions to Party membership during this period amounted to an average of 5.4 per cent of the total membership).

There is hardly any need to point out that the bourgeois ideologists have no way of justifying their comparing Party membership figures with total population figures when only those 18 years old or over are eligible for membership in the Party. Yet it is not only their methods of calculation that distort the picture. What is also consciously ignored is the fact that the Party is the vanguard of the people and that

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, "Lenin's Cause Lives on and Triumphs", *Kommunist*, No. 7, 1970, p. 23.

² Table 11 is based on data from *The CPSU in Figures, 1956-61*, pp. 44-45, 47; *The CPSU in Figures, 1961-64*, pp. 8-10.

Table 11

Year	Accepted Number (thousands)	% of total membership	CPSU Membership	
			Rejected Number (thousands)	Dropped % of total membership
1958	395.8	5.05	34.9	0.45
1960	545.2	6.27	23.1	0.27
1962	651.3	6.58	33.6	0.34
1964	740.8	6.72	34.5	0.31

by no means all of those who fully support and share its ideas become Party members.

Party ranks are augmented from among *progressive* workers, collective farmers and the intelligentsia who are engaged *chiefly* in the sphere of material production. Illustrative of this are the selective data on acceptance to CPSU candidacy for 1955, 1960 and 1964 (in per cent) given in Table 12.¹

The data show that more than 45 per cent of those accepted as candidates to CPSU membership are workers. Furthermore, the number of workers accepted relative of the overall number of people accepted continues to grow.² The high percentage of workers among those joining the Party is to be expected, inasmuch as the working class continues to play the leading role in Soviet society and is constantly growing in number. The decrease in the relative number of collective farmers among those accepted in the CPSU is explained by the decrease in the number of people working in agriculture in general and also by the transformation of part of the collective farms into state farms. Of the total number of office and

¹ Table 12 is based on *The CPSU in Figures, 1956-61*, p. 45; *The CPSU in Figures, 1961-64*, p. 9.

² See *The CPSU in Figures, 1961-64*, p. 9; *The CPSU in Figures*, p. 94.

Table 12

Candidates to CPSU Membership	Years		
	1955	1960	1964
Total accepted	100.0	100.0	100.0
Workers	30.4	43.1	45.3
Collective farmers . .	21.3	21.7	15.1
Office and professional workers	46.2	34.3	38.6
(of these, engineers, technicians and other specialists made up the following percentages)	53.6	68.5	71.7
Students and others .	2.1	0.9	1.0

professional workers who made up 38.6 per cent of those accepted as candidate members in 1964, the majority were engineers and technicians, agronomists, doctors, teachers, economists and other specialists. There is a consistent trend toward an increase in the relative number of specialists being admitted to the CPSU.

So much for the quantitative aspect. Turning to the qualitative aspect, what data should properly be used to characterise the composition of the Communist Party? These should be data on the distribution of Communists according to social group, according to occupation, sex, age, nationality and education. In other words, we should use the same kinds of data that we would use to reflect the social and demographic composition of Soviet society as a whole.

Now let us examine the bourgeois arguments concerning the qualitative composition of the Communist Party.

The statements made by bourgeois critics to the effect that the CPSU consists of professional politicians

are never supported with facts. The critics purposely avoid using the readily available data which show that *more than half of the CPSU members* are workers and collective farmers and that, furthermore, this *percentage is steadily growing* (see Table 13¹).

Table 13

CPSU Members	Year			
	1956	1961	1964	1967
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Workers	32.0	35.0	37.3	38.1
Collective farmers . . .	17.1	17.3	16.5	16.0
Office and professional workers and others . .	50.9	47.7	46.2	45.9

The bourgeois ideologists ignore data on the number of Communists working in material production, yet such data are exceedingly important from the point of view of describing the Party. Figures for 1967 show that 73.3 per cent of all Communists worked in material production, 36.6 per cent being workers in industry and construction, 22.2 per cent in agriculture, 9 per cent in transport and communications and 4.4 per cent in trade, public catering, procurement, material and technical supply and sales.² Moreover, the number of Communists working in material production is steadily increasing. If we take this number in 1947 as 100 per cent, then in 1957, it grew by 3.5 per cent and in 1967, by 5.7 per cent. The trend, therefore, is for Communists to move from non-material areas of production (from

¹ Table 13 is based on materials from *The CPSU in Figures, 1956-61*, p. 47; *The CPSU in Figures, 1961-64*, p. 11; and *The CPSU in Figures*, p. 95.

² *The CPSU in Figures*, p. 99.

agencies of state and economic administration and from Party and mass organisations) into branches of material production. From 1947 through 1967, the number of Communists working in the administrative apparatus (taking the number in 1947 as 100) decreased by 51.8 per cent.

Bourgeois ideologists also neglect data which characterise the nationality composition of the Party, the relative number of women in its ranks, and data which point to the rising educational level of Party members.

As a rule, the critics refer only to the category of office and professional workers, or, as they say, administrative workers. But even here they try to falsify the data at hand. It is known that the office and professional workers, which make up 46 per cent of the total Party membership, consist of: 1) managers of organisations, institutions, factories, construction sites and state farms and their subdivisions; 2) agricultural specialists, economists, architects; 3) workers in the fields of science, education, public health, literature and art; 4) workers in trade and public catering; 5) workers in quality control, accounting and other clerical jobs; 6) other employees (communications, communal facilities, etc.). In 1965, 7.8 per cent of all Communists were in the first group, 32.5 per cent in the second, 23.3 per cent in the third, 5.8 per cent in the fourth, 10.8 per cent in the fifth and 19.8 per cent in the sixth.¹ Thus, the majority of Communists in the office workers category are specialists in various fields of knowledge. *Only 7.8 per cent of the Communist office workers are connected with administrative activity and only 10.8 per cent are concerned with the fulfilment of technical functions in the apparatus of political organisations. The proportion of the total Party membership in these two*

¹ *The CPSU in Figures, 1961-64*, p. 11.

groups is decreasing, while the proportion in groups such as scientific workers, engineers, technicians and other similar categories is increasing. Thus, in 1956, organisation, institution and enterprise managers made up 14.1 per cent of the total number of the Communist office workers, and workers in quality control, accounting, etc., made up 13.2 per cent, while workers in science, education, public health, literature and art made up 18.8 per cent and the engineers and technicians and other personnel made up 20.1 per cent.¹

Instead of looking at the whole office worker category, bourgeois ideologists focus on the part having to do with the Soviet and Party apparatus, the part which, in their opinion, personifies the whole Party.² Bourgeois ideologists assert further that the group they examined is far from the interests of the masses. Meyer, for example, speaks about "conflicts ... between rulers and masses..."³ "The ruling élite," he says, "is heterogeneous, comprising industrial executives, military and security officers, leading scientists, opinion makers, and professional politicians."⁴ Yet it is well known that *office and professional employees as a whole came from the midst of workers and peasants, that they stand in the same relation to the means of production as do the working class and the collective-farm peasantry, and that they have common interests with them.* Under conditions prevailing in bourgeois society, the activity of those serving in state, party and ideological apparatuses of the dominating class is indeed *alienated* from the interests of the working masses. Their activity is *determined* by the system of class antagonism existing

¹ *The CPSU in Figures, 1956-61*, p. 48.

² Rudolf Schlesinger, "The CPSU Programme: the Conception of Communism", *Soviet Studies* No. 4, 1962, pp. 400-01; Alfred G. Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-90.

³ Alfred G. Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

in the society. In Soviet society, on the other hand, the activity of those serving in state, Party and ideological apparatuses is *determined by the unity of the basic interests* of the social groups of the society and, therefore, is inseparable from the interests of the masses.

Bourgeois ideologists try to contrast the Communist Party in the Soviet society to the "popular nature" of bourgeois parties so widely advertised in the West. For example, the leaders of the Christian Democratic Union in West Germany say that their party has supporters in *all* social strata of the society and is open to *all* those who wish to join. The social composition of the CDU is indeed mixed. The Union is composed of industrialists, landowners, artisans and merchants, professional workers, office employees and officials, workers, pensioners, housewives and students. Industrial workers make up from 1 per cent (Wiesbaden) to 25 per cent (in industrial Westphalia).¹ The Christian Democratic parties of Italy, France and Belgium are just as mixed. This, however, does not provide any basis for concluding that these are parties "of the people". The nucleus of these parties is made up of *representatives of the bourgeoisie*. In West Germany, the representatives of the petty and middle bourgeoisie, the high and middle wage-bracket employees, make up from 51.7 per cent to 86.5 per cent of the CDU.² Such parties seek to create the appearance that they are representatives of various classes and strata of the population. These attempts are in line with their policy of the so-called *integration of the masses*—the organised subjection of the masses to bourgeois influence. Side by side with

¹ Y. P. Urias, "Parties and Employer Organisations in the Federal Republic of Germany", *Parties in the System of the Dictatorship of Monopolies*, Nauka Publishers, 1964, p. 345.

² *Ibid.*

integration (often actually on the basis of integration), they employ tactics to disunite the masses and disorganise the working classes. All this serves the goal of increasing the influence of the party's ruling élite.

Bourgeois ideologists also try to contrapose the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people in the ideological sphere.

The ideological unity of the Party and the people in Soviet society manifests itself in the participation of the masses of all social categories in the public life of the society. The Party stimulates the heightening of their political consciousness and improving their organisation.

What do the bourgeois ideologists say about this? Fetscher, to give an example, says: "New teaching is imparted to the proletariat from outside ... by the Communist Party; therefore, it does not have to take the desires of the concrete proletariat into account to accomplish its plans ... it already knows ahead of time its 'true', 'objectively correct' will."¹ Brzezinski asserts that ideological work conducted by the Soviet Communist Party results in the "... masses, in effect, almost anticipating the desires of the leadership".² Referring to Lenin's work, *What Is To Be Done?*, Fetscher writes: "Although Lenin does say that the proletariat already possesses a 'rudimentary form of revolutionary consciousness', teaching is basically imparted to the proletariat from the outside."³ But Lenin's proposition was that "class political consciousness can be brought to the worker only *from without*, that is, only from outside the economic struggle, from outside the sphere of relations between

workers and employers".⁴ The meaning of this proposition is lost in this bourgeois interpretation. Lenin was speaking, of course, of the workers' movement *under capitalism* and urged the *working masses, who are condemned by the bourgeois system to being merely the object of history, to become its subject*, that is, to awaken "to conscious life and conscious struggle", to unite the workers' movement with Social-Democratic theory.²

The ideologists of capitalism continue as they always have in the past to call for worship of spontaneity in the workers' movement. Lenin pointed out that "all worship of the spontaneity of the working-class movement, any belittling of the role of the 'conscious element', of the role of Social-Democracy, means, *quite independently of whether he who belittles that role desires it or not, a strengthening of the influence of bourgeois ideology upon the workers*".³ It does not in any way follow from Lenin's proposition on bringing class political consciousness into the workers' movement that the Communist Party does not have to be guided by the wishes of the concrete proletariat. Lenin speaks about the *alienation* of achievements in science and culture from the working class *in bourgeois society*. "The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophical, historical, and economic theories elaborated by the educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By their social status, the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia."⁴ It is only with the help of this "revolutionary-socialist intelligentsia" that the working class in bourgeois society can overcome

¹ I. Fetscher, *Von Marx zur Sowjetideologie*, Frankfurt am Main, 1959, S. 82.

² Z. K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*, London, 1962, p. 65.

³ I. Fetscher, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 422.

² *Ibid.*, p. 376.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 382-83.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 375.

the alienation we speak of.¹ The revolutionary-socialist intelligentsia, in turn, bases its activity on the "most essential, the 'decisive' interests of the classes".² In addition, "*the role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory*".³ In essence, then, bourgeois criticism amounts to misinterpretation of Lenin's proposition.

In Soviet society, socialist theory *is not only not alienated from the working class, from the working masses, but is actually the product of their creativity. Socialism has been built in Soviet society as a result of the conscious activity of the masses under the leadership of the Communist Party, which unites the progressive, most politically conscious part of the working class, the collective-farm peasantry and the intelligentsia. The working class and the collective-farm peasantry have created a new intelligentsia from their midst. The labour of progressive workers, of workers in industry and agriculture, more and more approaches the work of the intelligentsia. Among the masses we find the process of forming communist consciousness, the elimination of the vestiges of the old system in psychology and morals. Under these conditions, there are no grounds for contraposing the new people's intelligentsia to the working class and the peasantry.*

In connection with the increasing role that the Communist Party plays in Soviet society, bourgeois ideologists try to make it look doubtful that this also increases the possibilities for all-around development and improvement of socialist democracy, the active participation of all citizens in the administration of the state and in the management of economic and cultural construction, improvement in the work of

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 375-76.

² *Ibid.*, p. 390.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 370.

the state apparatus and the strengthening of public control on its activity. They attribute the growing role of the Communist Party to alleged "totalitarian tendencies toward a monopoly position", precluding, as Fetscher says, the possibility of participation by other sectors of the political system "in the determination of policy". He contrasts the Soviet political system to the formal model of bourgeois democracy—the system of "a number of independent groups which control each other".¹ In making such contrasts, the critics rely on falsification of the actual relations between the political parties and the state in capitalist society.

In capitalist society, the bourgeois parties are the instrument by means of which the state is placed *under the control of the monopolies* and by means of which the government apparatus is actually *coalesced with the monopolies*. The objectives of the bourgeois parties are to guarantee that representatives of the monopolies are elected to parliament, to make sure that the actions of those elected correspond to the demands of the monopolies, to maintain contacts between the monopolies and the government itself, and to strengthen the basis of the dictatorship of the monopolies. In many countries of the West, the political system is developing along lines leading to the convergence of all forces supporting the dictatorship of monopoly capital into one party, which becomes the perpetual holder of state power. This trend is evident in such countries with multi-party systems as Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and France, and in countries with two-party systems such as Great Britain, Austria, Australia and others.

In countries where they have stood or stand in power, Right-wing socialist parties limit themselves to *managing* the affairs of capitalism and *stubbornly*

¹ I. Fetscher, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-57.

resist changes demanded by the people. This kind of activity provides the bourgeoisie with most important ideological and political support from within the working-class movement.

Marxist-Leninist parties in capitalist countries struggle to protect *the interests of the working class and the masses*, advocate general democratisation of the economic and social scene and of all administrative, political and cultural organisations and institutions.¹ However, their development is held back in every way possible by the bourgeois state. In a number of countries, for example, in Greece, West Germany, Spain and Portugal, Marxist-Leninist parties are outlawed. In these countries thousands of fighters for the working-class cause, for the interests of the masses, are behind prison bars.

Characteristic of the modern capitalist state are the trends towards authoritarianism, control over the activities of democratic organisations, and attempts to destroy the organisations of the working class and the working masses fighting against exploitation.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the battle-tested vanguard of the Soviet people. It has united, on a voluntary basis, the most *progressive*, most *politically conscious* part of the working class, collective-farm peasantry and intelligentsia. Including, as it does, the best representatives of all social strata in Soviet society, it is a party *of the people both in its goals and in the policies* it pursues in achieving them. The whole Soviet people is interested in the final goal—the building of a classless society with a single public ownership of the means of production and full social equality for all. The Party is *the highest form of socio-political organisation*. As distinct from the Soviet state, it unites the most politically con-

scious and organised part of the Soviet people. It leads by persuasion, whereas the state also uses the methods of coercion and administration.

As distinct from other mass organisations that unite people according to occupation (the trade unions) or according to age (the Komsomol), the Party unites the most politically conscious and most organised part of the whole Soviet people. *The ideological and theoretical level of the Party is higher, and the political and organisational experience much richer, than of any other organisation in the Soviet political system.* It began as the vanguard of the working class and has now gone through the stages of building up its forces, preparing the working class for struggle, overthrowing the dominance of the exploiters, establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat and building socialism—the first phase of communism. Through its efforts to attract to the positions of the working class first the majority and then the whole people, the Party has become the vanguard of the people.

The Party is continually *broadening* its contact with the people. It has introduced the practice of having draft plans for important political, economic and cultural development put up for nation-wide preliminary discussion. On its initiative, a broad body of activists, including non-Party people, has been drawn into the work of Party committees. Non-Party members also take part in the work of the Party press and the system of Party education.

The Party sets *the example and the model* for other sectors of the society's political organisation for the development of the most efficient *forms of public self-government*. Meanwhile, the framework of inner-Party democracy is also being broadened. The 23rd Congress of the Party, for example, adopted the rule that "a decision of a primary Party organisation on the expulsion of a Communist from the Party, takes effect after endorsement by a District Committee or

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969, Prague, 1969, p. 22.*

by a City Committee of the Party".¹ Formerly, the decision of the District or City Committee had to be approved by the Regional Committee of the Party or the Territory Committee of the Party or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic.² Measures are also being taken to improve the *qualitative composition of the Party*. The 22nd Congress of the Party decided that young people up to 20 years of age should join the Party only through the Komsomol.³ The 23rd Congress decided that the age minimum for acceptance of non-Komsomol youth into the Party be raised to 23 years and that the length of Party membership required for eligibility to recommend new candidates to membership be raised from three years to five years.⁴ *The rights of Party members* are being extended and *guarantees that these rights may be freely used* are being strengthened. A rule adopted at the 19th Party Congress, for example, stressed the right of any Party member "to criticise any Party worker at Party meetings".⁵ At the 22nd Party Congress this rule was broadened by adding the words "irrespective of the position he holds", and was reinforced by the provision that "those who commit the offence of suppressing criticism or victimising anyone for criticism are responsible to and will be penalised by the Party, to the point of expulsion from the CPSU".⁶ Before the 22nd Party Congress, membership rights were automatically withdrawn for non-payment of membership dues without sufficient

¹ 23rd Congress of the CPSU, p. 422.

² *The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and CC Plenary Meetings*, Part III, p. 582; 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Stenographic Record, Vol. III, p. 341.

³ 22nd Congress of the CPSU, p. 421.

⁴ 23rd Congress of the CPSU, Stenographic Record, Vol. II, p. 318.

⁵ *The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and CC Plenary Meetings*, Part III, p. 580.

⁶ *The Road to Communism*, p. 600.

reason: "If a Party member or candidate member fails to pay membership dues for three months in succession without sufficient reason," he was considered automatically dropped from the Party.¹ Now, however, before expulsion, it must be established that the member has actually dropped all connection with the Party organisation. In addition, a member may be expelled from the Party only by a vote of not less than two-thirds of the Party members present at a general meeting of the Party organisation.² The principle of *electivity and accountability* is constantly being developed. Compared to former years, the *role of meetings, conferences and congresses has increased* and all the conditions conducive to comradely, free and businesslike discussion at such gatherings have been created.

The Party relies on a *large number of active members*. By the beginning of 1968, more than 2,650,000 Communists, or 22 per cent of all Communists, were elected to Party committees and bureaus of primary and shop Party organisations as secretaries, deputy secretaries and Party group organisers. In 1968, nearly 325,000 Communists were elected to district, city, area, regional and territory Party committees, Communist Party CCs of Union Republics and auditing committees of the corresponding Party organisations. Representatives of all social categories from all branches of the economy are among the members and candidate members in the city and district Party committees.³ In addition, millions of Communists participate in Party work as members of various other committees, as propagandists, agitators, etc.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

² 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Stenographic Record, Vol. III, pp. 340-41.

³ *The CPSU in Figures, 1961-64*, pp. 101-02.

The Party makes every effort to broaden and improve the activities in all sectors of the Soviet political organisation. Its Rules state that the "Party organisations must not act in place of government, trade union, co-operative or other mass organisations of the working people; they must not allow either the merging of the functions of Party and other bodies or undue parallelism in work".

The Party's role in society grows in direct proportion to its efforts in promoting the development and improvement of socialist democracy as a whole, and certainly not as a consequence of some kind of "privileges" it or its members enjoy. The Party's growing role does, however, place greater and greater responsibilities on its members and increases the scope of their activity. The Party relies on moral prestige, on the recognition by the people of the correctness of its policies and leadership. Questions of Party life and the methods of Party leadership are widely publicised in the Soviet press. The Party is categorically opposed to the proposition underlying sheer administration and voluntarism that "politics is the power of command". That the role of the Party is growing does not mean that the role of the people as a whole or of other mass organisations is being reduced. On the contrary, the more successfully the Party plays its leading role, the broader the scope of the people's role in public administration and the deeper the process of democratisation in all areas of social life. In capitalist society, the relative growth of any one party serving the monopolists *always* depends on further *limitations* being placed on the already restricted democratic rights of the people; it is connected with the *tendency* towards establishing an open *oligarchy*.

Bourgeois ideologists speak a great deal about the process, allegedly taking place in the USSR, of incorporating important state institutions into the Communist Party apparatus with the aim of suppressing

the freedom and initiative of the people.¹ As a political organisation, the Communist Party *will not exist forever*; it will no longer be needed once a developed communist society has been built. A resolution at the Second Congress of the Comintern indicated that along the road *to the final victory of communism* it will be possible to see the transformation of all the basic organisations—the Soviets, the trade unions and the parties—into one type of organisation. Of course, the formation of this new kind of organisation is *not a question for the present*, but we nevertheless can already observe new connections which point, if not to the process of formation itself, at least to the beginning of it. Historically, the connection between the Party and the Soviet state, in the area of uniting Party and government agencies, began in the very first years of Soviet power. For example, it was put into practice from the very beginning in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. The fundamental approach to this question was set forth by Lenin in his article "Better Fewer, But Better". Here is what he wrote: "But why, indeed, should we not amalgamate the two if this is in the interests of our work? Do we not all see that such an amalgamation has been very beneficial in the case of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, where it was brought about at the very beginning?... Is not this flexible amalgamation of a Soviet institution with a Party institution a source of great strength in our politics?"² In subsequent years, this kind of connection between the Party and the Soviet state continued to grow,

¹ See H. Zink, *Modern Governments*, New Jersey, 1958, p. 590; John Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government*, Chicago, 1957, pp. 189-91; J. S. Reshetor, *Die Partie. Handbuch des Weltkommunismus*, Freiburg-München, 1958, SS. 143-45; Leonard Schapiro, "The Party and the State", *The Future of Communist Society*, pp. 111-16.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, pp. 495-96.

failing only when amalgamation was made only for the sake of form rather than in the interests of the work at hand.

However, all this does not mean that this is a process of incorporating the most important state agencies into the apparatus of the Communist Party. What we are speaking of here is the growing role of mass organisations in handling state problems, and the formation of social self-government along the lines of those agencies of the state apparatus which are not really the state in the true sense of the word.

Tendenciousness of Theories About Trade Unions in the USSR

Bourgeois ideologists (Friedman, Scott, Zink, Kline, Fetscher and others) try to create the impression that trade unions do not play an essential role in the life of Soviet society. They contend that Soviet trade unions lack independence and initiative, that they do not and cannot protect the interests of the working people. Prof. Friedman asserts that their function is supervision over the workers in the interests of the state.¹ Scott contends that trade unions are an appendage of the state. "Trade unions," he writes, "are ... a means of enlisting aid for the state's purposes and keeping a check on industry."² No matter what nuances one or another of these views may have, they all amount to saying that the specific character of trade unions is manifested in "pressure on the workers", "reinforced when necessary by coercion"³, but not in the protection of the workers' interests.

¹ See *Conditions de Travail en URSS*, Paris, 1961, p. IX.

² Derek J. Scott, *Russian Political Institutions*, London, 1958, pp. 228-30; also see Harold Zink, op. cit., pp. 568-69; George L. Kline, "Philosophy and Practice", *The Future of Communist Society*, pp. 68, 70.

³ I. Fetscher, op. cit., p. 151.

Under capitalism, trade unions are a *school of class struggle and solidarity of the working class*. They strive to improve the material conditions of the workers. The trade unions are *not interested* in the development of capitalist production, connected as it is with impoverishment of the working class, exploitation and unemployment. A completely different organisation of trade unions can exist only after abolishment of the capitalist system. Under capitalism the working class strives to achieve higher, from a Marxist-Leninist point of view, forms of organisation, but it meets opposition from the bourgeois state all along the way. Legislatively, the bourgeois state recognises the freedom of association and even the political activity of the masses. However, in essence, it recognises this freedom only in the event that it "can count ... on the full co-operation of both the employers and the workers".¹

The bourgeois state does everything possible to turn the workers' movement into the track of *trade-unionism*. In the USA, for example, the government interferes with the labour movement "...to maintain a fair balance between employers and unions".² This is the conclusion arrived at by a Mission from the International Labour Office which was in the USA from the middle of March to the beginning of June in 1959 "to carry out a factual survey relating to freedom of association".³ The Mission, it should be noted, appraised the labour movement in the USA from the point of view "that some 18 million Americans are exercising their right to organise".⁴ *The credo of trade-unionism is to limit union activity to economic*

¹ *The Trade Union Situation in the United States*. Report of a Mission from the International Labour Office, Geneva, 1960, p. 136.

² Ibid., p. 120.

³ Ibid., p. 1.

⁴ Ibid., p. 148.

questions and to abstain from participating in the political life of the country. Trade-unionism, practice shows, has become the norm determining the nature of a number of trade unions in capitalist society and sometimes determines the nature of the trade union movement of the whole country. In the USA, for example, "the prime purpose of an American trade union is to obtain a collective agreement ... between the employers and workers ...", and this, where possible, by mutual consent.¹ Thus, the working class experiences not only oppression on the part of employers and the bourgeois state, but also pressure from the trade unions themselves. At the present time, trade-unionism in capitalist countries stands more and more for the protection of the interests of the bourgeoisie.

Trade union activity in Soviet society is of an entirely different nature. Lenin noted that "in this greatest revolution in history, when the proletariat has taken state power into its own hands, all the functions of the trade unions are undergoing a profound change", because "they are becoming the chief builders of the new society", which requires the participation of many millions of people.² Out of an organisation of the oppressed class, they have developed into "an organisation of the ruling, dominant, governing class which has now set up a dictatorship and is exercising coercion through the state. But this is not a state organisation; nor is it one designed for coercion..."³ Lenin viewed Soviet trade unions as a school of administration, social education and economic management, which organisationally embraces nearly the whole of the working class.

¹ *The Trade Union Situation in the United States*, p. 24.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 426.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 32, p. 20.

They are a *school of administration* in that they help prepare workers to be economic organisers instead of merely producers. Worker participation in production management expands through socialist emulation, a new kind of competition which by its very nature reveals the transition from the formal democracy of the bourgeois republic to real participation of the masses of working people in *administration*. Emulation is nation-wide, with over 90 per cent of the workers and other employees participating. As socialist emulation developed, it produced another nation-wide movement—a vast movement for developing the communist attitude toward work, which involves one's striving to become better qualified for production management, and to adhere to new standards of behaviour in production and everyday life.

As a *school of social education*, the trade unions fight political and cultural backwardness and professional egoism. They work to develop awareness and understanding of state tasks and encourage active participation in the building of a new society. In this, the movement for communist attitudes toward work merges with the movement for a communist mode of life in general.

The trade unions are a *school of management* in that they take an active part in the formation of organs of economic administration and factory management. They help promote the best workers and activists to economic jobs, draw millions of people into state and cultural construction, and prepare broad masses of people for social self-government.

Striving for "the universal training of the working people in the art of governing the state",¹ the trade unions exert "coercion" on the workers as they try

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 28, p. 303.

to raise labour productivity and tighten work discipline. But the influence exerted by the trade unions on the workers is by its nature *not opposed* to the interests of the latter, inasmuch as it is primarily directed toward the *protection* of their basic interests and stems from the tasks of their communist education. This kind of influence has nothing in common with the pressure which trade unions in capitalist countries exert on the workers—pressure designed to protect the basis of the bourgeois economic and social system.

In socialist society, the trade unions are a *school of communism* in which the masses of workers steadily rise “to a higher and higher level”,¹ while under capitalism, they are a part of a system which consolidates wage labour and the power of capital.

How are the bourgeois theories about Soviet trade unions received in the “free world”? Even among those who could in no way be suspected of sympathy toward communism or the Soviet Union, nor of having a negative attitude toward bourgeois freedoms, there is a growing tendency to assess the structure, function and rights of Soviet trade unions with the due consideration given to the economic, political and social structure of the Soviet state.² Thus, the Mission from the International Labour Office which visited the Soviet Union, came to the conclusion that “the trade unions have begun to occupy a prominent position in the Soviet state”.³ The same opinion is held by representatives of the National Association of Directors and Personnel Departments Chiefs of France who visited the Soviet Union to study the con-

ditions of work and the role of the trade unions in the USSR.¹ Emily Clark Brown, an American economist famous in the West for her published works on the trade union movement in the USA and her comparative economic analysis of capitalism and socialism, writes that in Soviet trade unions “the trend is toward an industrial relations system combining strong feelings of collective responsibility and common interests with opportunity for individuals to develop their capacities”.² She points out that “the general purposes of the Communist Party and its programme for the future seem to be widely accepted ...”³ and that “. . . Soviet workers are not helpless if their right . . . is violated”.⁴ In working on her book, Emily Clark Brown drew on Soviet literature and on personal impressions she got during her trips to the Soviet Union where she visited more than twenty industrial enterprises in various cities.

As for the trade-unionism, even the bourgeois press is not always pleased with it. *The New York Times*, for instance, which is not at all inclined to condemn this system, writes: “Union membership has been standing still for a decade. White-collar and professional workers show little disposition to join, and automation is hacking away at the traditional centres of union strength in blue-collar fields. The aloofness of the AFL-CIO high command from last week’s March on Washington and the continued exclusion of Negroes from many local unions have caused hostility between labour and the civil rights movement. Stagnant union leadership and bureaucratic internal tendencies breed rank-and-file dissension. All these are among the challenges of change. . . .

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 193.

² *The Trade Union Situation in the USSR*. Report of a Mission from the International Labour Office, Geneva, 1960, p. 12.

³ *Ibid.*

¹ *Conditions de travail en URSS*, p. IV.

² Emily Clark Brown, *Soviet Trade Unions and Labour Relations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1966, p. 328.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 309-10.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

The nation has a responsible labour movement, but it needs one that is dynamic, too."¹

On the whole, however, bourgeois ideologists present the growing role of trade unions in the USSR in a false light, particularly its role in matters relating to state problems. In their opinion, such activity represents a "subordination of the trade unions to the state".² Fetscher, for example, considers it intolerable that "certain functions which formerly were within the sphere of state agencies" have been relegated to the trade unions.³ It is even more intolerable, he feels, "that the trade unions, 'taking over such functions ... are given the corresponding authority of state agencies' and 'the implementation of these functions is reinforced when necessary by coercion' (*Soviet State and Law* No. 3, 1958, p. 10)."⁴ Such measures, in his opinion, do not lead to the "concretisation of 'democracy'".⁵ "This speaks not of a reduction of administrative power, but only of a change in the name of the governing bodies."⁶

The development of the trade unions in the USSR is inseparably linked with the *evolution of socialist statehood into social self-government*. The main direction in the development of socialist statehood is the unfolding of democracy in every possible way, the drawing of the widest strata of the population into the task of managing all the affairs of the country. The trade unions co-operate with the state agencies in drafting and implementing state plans, in deciding questions concerning improvement in working and living conditions and raising the material and cultural

level of the people. They use the right of legislative initiative given them. The trade unions have accumulated considerable experience in *fulfilling state functions*. They handle social insurance, control labour protection and the observance of labour laws, they manage a large network of health centres and cultural and educational institutions, scientific and technological societies and organisations of inventors and innovators and they do work in developing physical education, sports and tourism. The trade unions, thus, take on more and more functions as conditions mature.

This expansion of trade union function in no way signifies that the trade unions are being *subordinated* to the state, that they are being somehow governmentalised. Trade unions may take over certain "state" functions, but they do not take over state *methods of coercion*. In fact, the growth of the trade union role steadily *reduces* the spheres in which *state coercion* is used and *increases* the spheres in which *persuasion and social influence* are used. Nor does all this provide any basis to conclude that the *state is being trade-unionised*. Until such time as *all* citizens have learned to manage, the trade unions will remain a *school* of administration, management and communism and will continue to develop as independent organisations. Their transformation from a school into an apparatus of administration will mean their *fusion with the state*, which is also an apparatus of administration. But this will lead to the *withering away of state* and the *withering away of trade unions* as a school, for with the establishment of a system of self-government, they lose their historical necessity.

There is nothing in Soviet reality, therefore, to substantiate claims that trade unions in the USSR are in the process of being liquidated. The conditions of class antagonism in capitalist countries, however, make it important, for the bourgeois ideologists, to create this impression. They depend on this kind of

¹ *The New York Times*, Sept. 2, 1963, p. 14.

² See, for example, I. Fetscher, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-53; G. L. Kline, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-70.

³ I. Fetscher, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

distortion to convince the workers in capitalist countries that they should value the "freedom enjoyed ... to form trade unions, to bargain collectively and to participate in union activities".¹

About the Komsomol, Fact and Fiction

Bourgeois ideologists cannot but be disturbed by the influence which the Komsomol has on the present-day international youth movement. The Komsomol is an active, creative force in Soviet society of more than 23 million young people. The Komsomol helps the Party to educate the country's youth in the spirit of communism, to draw them into the practical construction of a new society and to prepare a generation of fully developed people. The international prestige of the Komsomol is considerable and is rising from year to year. Suffice it to say that young people from nearly 100 countries came to Leningrad in June 1970 to take part in an international meeting held under the motto: "Leninism and the Struggle of the Youth for Peace, Democracy, National Independence and Social Progress". Democratic youth organisations of foreign countries are eager to learn about Soviet youth and use the experience of Komsomol work. The reactions of bourgeois ideologists to this influence can be found in works by Zink, Scott, Juviler, Hammer, Schwarz and others. First of all, the critics try to contrapose the Komsomol and the youth of the country by contending that the Komsomol has lost touch with the basic mass of youth even though it has a huge membership.² The function of the Komsomol, they say, is to put pressure on young people with the aim

¹ *The Trade Union Situation in the United States*. Report of a Mission from the International Labour Office, p. 6.

² See, for example, Harold Zink, op. cit., p. 590; Peter H. Juviler, "Communist Morality and Soviet Youth", *Problems of Communism* No. 3, 1961, pp. 17-19.

of keeping their real inclinations in check.¹ In speaking of pressure, they have in mind the work done by the Komsomol in the sphere of communist education, its work in drawing in the youth to participate in economic and cultural construction and the political life of the country. The bourgeois ideologists say that what really characterises Soviet youth is indifference, that "it is an indifference to things political ... a vague belief that the official ideology is neither interesting nor relevant to contemporary problems".²

The youth in any society are looked upon as the active bearers of social functions. In Soviet society, the preservation of continuity in communist construction is linked closely with the youth. At the same time, the Komsomol is the kind of organisation that can most fully take into account the interests of the youth and open the way to rational forms of work, rest and political activity.

The attitude of Soviet youth to the Komsomol can be judged first of all by how large and how representative the Komsomol is, and the trends observable along these parameters. The dynamics of Komsomol membership size from 1926 to 1970, in absolute numbers and in percentages, are illustrated by the data in Table 14.³

Komsomol membership increased more than 15-fold between 1926 and 1970, although the number of young people of Komsomol age increased less than twofold.⁴ This tremendous increase in membership

¹ See Derek J. Scott, op. cit., p. 156.

² Darrell P. Hammer, "Among Students in Moscow: An Outsider's Report", *Problems of Communism* No. 4, 1964, p. 12.

³ Table 14 is based on data of the 15th Congress of the Komsomol; "Report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League and the Tasks of the Komsomol in Educating the Youth in the Spirit of Lenin's Behests," *Pravda*, May 27, 1970.

⁴ *The National Economy of the USSR, 1968*, Statistical Yearbook, Statistika Publishers, 1969.

Table 14

Year	Growth in Komsomol Membership	
	Millions of members	Per cent
1926	1.77	100.0
1936	3.91	221.7
1946	7.48	423.0
1956	18.51	1,045.0
1966	23.05	1,302.0
1970	27.00	1,526.0

surely indicates that Soviet young men and women are not indifferent to their organisation and that they see the Komsomol as an organisation concerned with helping them solve their problems—the problems of improving the conditions and organisation of work, of participation in production management, of intellectual growth, of creative daring and search, and the problems of everyday life and leisure, i.e., problems connected with character building and all-around development.

All social categories are reflected in the growth of the Komsomol organisation. In 1961, for example, 23.8 per cent of the new members were workers, 17.6 per cent were collective farmers, 1.6 per cent, employees and 57 per cent, students.¹ The relatively low proportion of employees, including the young intelligentsia among the new members, is explained by the fact that this category of youth as a rule goes into production, the services or scientific institutions having already joined the Komsomol in

¹ "The Komsomol in Figures, 1958-62", *Komsomolskaya Zbiza* No. 3, 1962, p. 16.

school or college. In May 1970, more than half the members of the Komsomol were workers, collective farmers and employees.¹ This means that from 1961 to 1970, the ranks of the Komsomol were significantly augmented by representatives of worker and rural youth, youth in the services and the young intelligentsia.

We can get a good picture of the changes taking place in Komsomol membership in recent years, from the point of view of its representation along demographic and social category lines, from data based on a survey conducted in 1960s in the Vasilostrovsky and Moskovsky districts of Leningrad, which are typical of large Soviet cities with populations of 500,000 or more, as regards youth population, social category distribution and Komsomol membership.

The demographic data (in per cent) provided by Table 15 lead to the following conclusions: women are represented in the Komsomol on an *equal* basis with men. All age categories from 14 to 28 years are represented. The distribution of the age categories reveals the interest of all generations in the Komsomol. The experience of the older generations is *passed on* to the younger people. The Komsomol has *equitable* representation in both indigenous and other nationalities.

The following table (Table 16) gives a breakdown of Komsomol membership in the same Leningrad districts according to social categories. All social categories according to occupation and education are represented in the Komsomol. Workers, other employees and the intelligentsia make up the *major*

¹ *From Congress to Congress*, Molodaya Gvardia Publishers, 1966, p. 19; "Report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League and the Tasks of the Komsomol in Educating the Youth in the Spirit of Lenin's Behests," *Pravda*, May 27, 1970.

Table 15

	Vasileostrovsky District			Moskovsky District		
	1963	1964	1965	1963	1964	1965
Total Komsomol membership	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Men	51.0	50.2	48.7	48.8	42.4	42.4
Women	49.0	49.8	51.3	51.2	57.6	57.6
Age: 14	2.2	2.9	2.9	3.2	3.8	3.8
15-17	23.5	24.6	23.0	28.4	31.8	31.8
18-22	28.9	44.8	42.0	22.3	24.8	34.9
23-25	32.3	44.8	16.5	25.5	19.8	34.9
26-28	13.0	27.6	15.5	20.4	19.6	29.4
Older than 28	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
Indigenous nationality	84.2	85.8	87.7	91.5	87.0	87.0
Other nationality	15.8	14.2	12.3	8.5	13.0	13.0

segment. Almost *half* of the Komsomol members work in material production. More than 50 per cent of the student members are studying in vocational schools, technical colleges and institutes. The proportion of those studying in general education schools is increasing, which indicates that the link of continuity between the major segment of the Komsomol system and the up-and-coming generation is being strengthened. The social composition of the Komsomol reflects the success achieved by Soviet society in eliminating illiteracy and raising the general educational and cultural level of the Soviet people, particularly among the youth. The relative number of Komsomol members with only an elementary educa-

tion is getting smaller. One-third of the members have a secondary, incomplete higher or higher education; one-fifth are specialists in the economy, workers in culture or art, and workers in government and public agencies.

The young people's attitude toward the Komsomol can also be judged by the level of their public service activity. According to a sociological survey conducted by us at a number of enterprises, institutions and colleges in Leningrad¹, the percentage of members engaged in public service work is as follows: in the "worker" category—60.5 per cent, employees—47.4 per cent, intelligentsia—70.3 per cent, and students—69.0 per cent. Of the public service work done, Komsomol work accounted for the following: among workers—64.7 per cent, employees—68.1 per cent, intelligentsia—48.4 per cent and students—38.9 per cent. By Komsomol work we mean participation in the activities of permanent elective Komsomol organisations, lecture and propaganda work, editing of wall newspapers and the fulfilment of temporary Komsomol assignments. If we take into consideration the participation of youth, under Komsomol guidance, in labour, science, politics, sports and other fields, the level of public service activity for all categories would reach 70-80 per cent.

Thus, even this sample of data on the attitude of youth to the Komsomol shows that their interest in the Komsomol, their activity and the connection be-

¹ The sociological survey covered youth from the electric machine-building complex Elektrosila; the Yegorov Railway Carriage Repair Works; the Skorokhod Shoe Factory; the Slutskaya Knitwear Mills; the Kirov Meat-Packing Plant; the Lengiprogaz and the Giprotsement research institutes; the All-Union Aluminium-Magnesium Institute; and three colleges (technology, science and humanities). The statistical data, documentation and questionnaire results were subjected to analysis by unit. The questionnaire was given to a random sample within each district.

Table 16

	Vasileostrovsky District			Moskovsky District		
	1963	1964	1965	1963	1964	1965
Total membership	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
By occupation:						
Workers	25.6	22.6	19.8	43.5	40.4	36.7
Employees	23.1	21.2	20.4	24.6	25.0	22.6
(Including engineers, technicians and other specialists and those working in the fields of culture and art who make up the following percentages of this category)						
Students	60.4	58.0	51.3	60.6	65.2	59.0
(Including those studying in vocational schools, technical schools and institutes, who make up the following percentages of this category)	50.6	55.7	59.4	31.5	34.3	40.3
Housewives	74.8	74.5	71.0	52.1	49.5	51.6
By education:						
Higher	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4
Incomplete higher						
Specialised secondary	10.6	10.7	9.1	8.3	8.3	7.6
General secondary	15.9	14.9	19.3	4.2	4.7	4.3
Incomplete secondary	7.7	8.5	6.0	10.0	9.8	7.8
Elementary	30.9	27.4	26.9	22.2	18.7	19.8
	27.6	31.4	33.6	45.0	44.3	50.4
	7.3	7.1	5.1	10.3	14.2	10.1

tween the youth and the Komsomol are increasing rather than decreasing.

Bourgeois ideologists contend that the desires of the young people are incompatible with the activities conducted by the Komsomol. Let us see what our sociological survey has to say about what Komsomol and non-Komsomol youth are striving for in the spheres of work, morals and personal development. The data of the survey are broken down into three categories: factory workers, office workers and intelligentsia.

In the sphere of work, both Komsomol and non-Komsomol youth have a conscious work ideal. Among Komsomol members, 91.2 per cent have such an ideal; among non-Komsomol members—78.3 per cent. The elements of this ideal consist of the desire of the young people for material and spiritual satisfaction and the desire to engage in socially significant work. When we compare the answers given by Komsomol and non-Komsomol young men and women to ques-

Table 17

Elements of work ideal	Non-Komsomol members		Komsomol members	
	Per cent of those having ideal	Place on 10 point scale	Per cent of those having ideal	Place on 10 point scale
Social significance, material satisfaction	38.6	1	41.6	1
Social significance	24.2	4	24.8	4
Material satisfaction	18.0	6	10.2	8
Material and spiritual satisfaction	8.0	8	11.6	7
Social significance, spiritual satisfaction	6.2	9	7.6	8
Spiritual satisfaction	1.6	10	0.6	10

tions about their conception of the work ideal, we find that, *in essence, they coincide*:

Their answers as to ways of achieving this ideal also coincide. The only thing that differentiates Komsomol members from non-members is the high level of activity among the former in building a communist society. Of all the young non-Komsomol people who are conscious of their work ideal, 31.6 per cent participate in the communist work movement, while 51.5 per cent of all the Komsomol members participate. Of the former, 66.8 per cent are in the process of improving their technical culture; of the latter—68.8 per cent. And the percentages participating in the rationalisation process are 22.8 and 26.0 per cent respectively.

There is also a *close correspondence* between Komsomol and non-Komsomol youth with respect to the level of awareness of a moral ideal and with respect to the means by which it should be achieved; 87.6 per cent of the non-Komsomol youth and 93.6 per cent of the Komsomol youth have a well-developed moral ideal. Of the qualities which both groups value in people, the following ten ranked highest: honesty, sincerity, straightforwardness; persistence in achieving one's goal; simplicity; respect and consideration for people; sense of principle, intolerance of evil; intelligence, independence of thought, sobriety; self-respect; humanism. The question, "Personal qualities which you value mostly in people?", was left open and the traits listed above were filled in by the young people themselves. A high level of consciousness of social duty, collectivism, humanism and of personal worth is characteristic of both groups and applies in equal measure to their work, their home life and their leisure-time activities. In the last four years 300,000 young Komsomol volunteers worked at the country's largest construction sites. They helped build huge new installations for the po-

wer, machine-building and chemical industries and for agriculture, and they laid thousands of kilometres of oil and gas pipelines and railway. Young people in every category indicate that they are acquiring habits of cultured behaviour, that they strive for equal distribution of work in the home, and that they are progressing in their all-round personal development.

Both of the compared groups *strive equally* to develop their personalities to the fullest and both groups *have equal opportunities* for such development (see Table 18).

Table 18

	Involved in art. %	Passi- vely	Acti- vely	Passively and acti- vely*
Non-Komsomol youth	96.6	64.3	2.2	30.1
Komsomol members	98.0	62.1	2.7	33.2

* Passive involvement in art includes going to the cinema, the theatres, listening to music, attending exhibitions, watching television and reading. Active involvement relates to such activities as decorative art, handicrafts, drama, painting, drawing, creative writing, music, singing, sculpture and dancing.

The interests and desires of the youth lie at the basis of *all* Komsomol activity. This is evident from the questions about life, work, study and recreation that are discussed at the plenary sessions and congresses of the Komsomol. The Komsomol studies the interests and requirements of the youth, analyses them and orients the Komsomol organisations to the kind of work with the youth that takes their desires, leanings, age, and character into consideration.

Bourgeois ideologists sometimes contrast the Komsomol with youth groups so widely hailed in

capitalist countries. The apologists of capitalism boast of the non-participation of these groups in politics. The young people, they say, attain full freedom within the framework of these groups and are "unhampered in the expression of their desires".¹ A considerable number of these youth groups are, indeed, far from politics as far as their day-to-day activities are concerned. However, their activity, which is on the whole directed toward distracting young people, especially young workers, from the class struggle, is far from being apolitical. The organisers do everything possible to divert, at least temporarily, large strata of youth from participating in the economic and political struggle of the working class. We can see where and how the energies of the youth in these groups are directed when we read the stories in the press of the same bourgeois world deeply concerned about juvenile crime, egocentrism and sexual laxity.

* * *

The building of a communist society requires the fullest development of individual freedom and civil rights. The mass organisations in Soviet society are one factor contributing to this development. The direction in which these organisations themselves are developing is clear evidence, on the one hand, that the motive force in Soviet society is the *whole people*, the whole politically conscious population of the Soviet Union, and reveals, on the other hand, the bias and distortion in bourgeois criticism.

¹ Harold Zink, op. cit., p. 592.

Chapter 4

A CRITIQUE OF BOURGEOIS THEORIES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM

The development of the Soviet political system is conditioned by the social, political and ideological unity of the Soviet people. The principle, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work" has been implemented in the USSR, and the conditions for the full development of the individual have been established. The social relations in the country are being built on the basis of broad democracy. However, instances of violation of democracy and instances of amorality, as vestiges of the past, still occur in Soviet society. One of the tasks which the Communist Party places before society in the sphere of ideology, education and culture, is to overcome the vestiges of capitalism in the thinking and behaviour of people.

It is these manifestations of the past that bourgeois ideologists (Schlesinger, Juviler, Labedz, Leonhard and others) who consider themselves "specialists on Russian questions", try to speculate on. They interpret instances of private ownership psychology, bureaucracy, violation of Soviet and Party democracy and deviations from communist morality as personal reactions to "communist tyranny". The class essence of phenomena is obscured because events are analysed in isolation, i.e., unrelated to their historical development and the social, political and ideological unity of contemporary Soviet society. The vestiges of the past in the consciousness of certain Soviet people are

turned into absolutes: they, it is claimed, have been observed over a long period and there is nothing to indicate that they will soon be eliminated; they will persist until such time as the individual is free from the "limitations of the Soviet system" and Marxist ideology.¹

A liberal approach is not infrequently substituted for the conservative approach in bourgeois theories; however, liberalism, despite its appearance of objectivity, does not alter the essence of bourgeois criticism. An example of this is the work of American professor Frederick L. Schuman, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect*.² "Are we worried about juvenile delinquency?" he writes. "So are the Russians. Are we concerned with rising rates of crime and divorce? So are the Russians. Are we anxious about graft and influence and shady deals in Big Business, Big Labour and Big Government? So are the Russians. . . . The list of common community problems could be almost indefinitely extended."³

Prof. Schuman says nothing, however, about the fact that such problems and phenomena (not all of which he lists are even applicable to the USSR) are, on the whole, not characteristic of the Soviet system. "The Russian Communists," he continues, "like to believe that these experiences and problems in America are products of decadent capitalism. Some of us like to believe that these experiences and prob-

¹ Rudolf Schlesinger, "Some Problems of Social Organisation Discussed on the Eve of the XXII Party Congress", *Soviet Studies* No. 2, Oxford, 1961, pp. 125-53; Peter H. Juwiler, "Communist Morality and Soviet Youth", *Problems of Communism* No. 3, Washington, 1961, pp. 16-24; George Lichtheim, *The Programme and the Marxist-Leninist Tradition. The USSR and the Future*, New York, 1963, pp. 23-36.

² Frederick L. Schuman, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect*, Louisiana State University Press, 1962.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

lems in Russia are products of Communist tyranny. Both are wrong."¹

Prof. Schuman obscures the class essence of the experiences and problems in question and describes them as features inherent in and characteristic of the development of Soviet society. "These products and experiences," he says, "are products of mass education, mass industrialisation, and mass urbanisation—and it makes little difference to most people whether these inexorable and inevitable processes of community growth, and of what we use to call 'progress', go on within a framework of socialism or a framework of capitalism."²

The conclusion to the above statement speaks for itself: "If we and the Russians have similar problems and anxieties in our time, we also have similar aspirations and similar tasks of building a productive and prosperous society in which individual freedom—hitherto maximised in America and minimised in Russia—can be reconciled with community welfare—hitherto minimised in America and maximised in Russia. We do in truth move toward the same end."³

Thus, bourgeois ideologists hope that by using a new tactics in the struggle with communism they can, on the one hand, conceal the qualitative differences and irreconcilable contradictions between the social relations of bourgeois society and those of socialist society and picture both societies as developing in the same direction—mass industrialisation, urbanisation, etc. This, of course, provides them with an excuse for not examining the basic contradictions of the capitalist "free world". On the other hand, they hope to convince their own people that it does not pay to

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

condemn the so-called dark sides of capitalism, that it is better to reconcile oneself with the status quo and "not undertake any steps in the defence of freedom, lest it be destroyed in the heat of battle".¹

Let us now examine the arguments used by the bourgeois ideologists in their theories about the Soviet political system.

Exaggeration of Anti-social, Private Ownership Manifestations in Soviet Society

The "specialists on Russian questions" contend that "other 'sprouts' than those of communism are flourishing in the USSR".² Bourgeois ideologists perceive these "other sprouts" in private ownership tendencies appearing in individual instances of parasitism, private enterprise activity, speculation, bribery, marriages of convenience, etc. They contend that these phenomena are characteristic of the socialist system and will remain no matter what "drastic approach is used in attempts to liquidate them". According to Schlesinger, parasitism is "...conditioned not only by the economic, but also by the institutional circumstances of present Soviet society".³ He contends that the answers given by Soviet citizens, young people included, to questions as to the causes of parasitic inclinations in some Soviet people, which are published in articles of the magazine *Kommunist* under the heading "He Who Does Not Work Neither Shall He Eat" (1960, No. 14; 1961, No. 3), are "clearly circular", inasmuch as they do not reflect the general opinion of the Soviet public and are printed

¹ Theodor Arnold, *Kommunistische Propaganda und ihre Abwehr*, Flawil, 1961, S. 18.

² Leopold Labedz, "The New CPSU Programme", *The Future of Communist Society*, New York, 1962, p. 26.

³ Rudolf Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 126-28.

in the interests of maintaining "certain moral standards".⁴ Schlesinger tries to show that individual instances of parasitism are something more than vestigial manifestations of bourgeois psychology and morals; he tries to grow them in the soil of the Soviet system, i.e., he tries to blame them on the social structure and the frustration of the individualistic inclinations of the people, etc.² The same approach can be found in the criticism of other "specialists on Russian questions". Juviler, for example, takes the private ownership tendencies found in individual Soviet citizens and expands them into "moral qualities" of the Soviet society, particularly characteristic, he says, of the youth.³ Labedz, in dealing with similar instances, "discerns" the process of a "new embourgeoisment" in Soviet society.⁴

Instances of parasitism can, indeed, be found in Soviet society. And there are also instances of sponging, private enterprise activity, speculation and bribery. However, do instances of this kind give us the right to conclude that parasitism is a social phenomenon inherent in and characteristic of Soviet socialist society, that it is firmly rooted and cannot be eliminated? Can we, basing ourselves on individual instances, conclude, as do the bourgeois ideologists, that parasitism determines the very character and process of the development of political and moral standards in Soviet society? Certain phenomena can exist in a society as a product of the social consciousness of the past; *but as such they are in no way factors which determine the nature of the society and its development.*

Parasitism as a social phenomenon is *alien* to the

¹ Ibid., p. 127.

² Ibid., pp. 125-30.

³ Peter H. Juviler, op. cit., pp. 16-21.

⁴ Leopold Labedz, op. cit., p. 27.

Soviet socialist system. That the bourgeois ideologists' assertions about the prevalence of parasitism in Soviet society are groundless can be fully established by analysing the Soviet social structure. The population structure of the USSR in 1968 is described (in per cent) by the following data (Table 19):¹

Table 19

Social categories	1928	1939	1959	1968
Workers and other employees	17.6	50.2	68.3	77.7
Collective farmers and co-operative handicraftsmen	2.9	47.2	31.4	22.2
Individual peasants and non-co-operative handicraftsmen	74.9	2.6	0.3	0.03
Bourgeoisie, landowners, merchants and kulaks .	4.6	—	—	—

From Table 19 it can be seen that there is *no social base* in the Soviet Union that could nourish the *private ownership tendencies* which certain Soviet people have. There are *no exploiting classes* in Soviet society. The conditions which made exploitation of man by man possible were abolished in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. During that period there still were possibilities for private ownership tendencies to arise and develop; however, they diminished from year to year, and after the victory of socialism, they were fully eliminated.

Individual farmers made up 0.1 per cent of the total population² prior to 1965, and in 1968—0.03 per cent. In absolute numbers, this is less than 80,000

¹ *The National Economy of the USSR, 1968*, p. 35.

² *The USSR in Figures, 1964*. Moscow, 1965, p. 12.

people.¹ But even the individual peasants and *non-co-operative handicraftsmen cannot be related to the parasitic elements* who live on the labour of others. In the first place, they are people who ply some trade at their own home, people who hunt, fish or do other work and are not members of an artel or on the payroll of any enterprise, or people who fill individual orders for private parties (tailors, shoemakers, etc.). In the second place, they are people who are not members of a collective farm and whose main occupation is working on an individual farm.

Capitalist ideologists try to define the parasitic element as a class. Kenneth Colegrove, for example, went so far as to relate those serving prison sentences (speculators, swindlers, embezzlers) to a new class in Soviet society.² The critics find it very helpful to ignore all the fundamental criteria by which classes are divided according to their place in the historically determined system of social production, their relation (for the most part fixed and formalised in law) to the means of production, their role in the social organisation of labour, and, consequently, according to the ways of receiving, and their share of, the common wealth at their disposal. Instead, they put the whole emphasis on differences in the source of the means of livelihood. On the one hand, this gives them the possibility of concealing the class antagonism between the exploiters and the exploited in capitalist society, and, on the other hand, to falsify the nature of social relations in Soviet society. It is common knowledge, however, that *speculators, swindlers, embezzlers* and other parasitic elements *do not and never have made up a class* in any society. As a rule,

¹ *Results of the All-Union Population Census for 1959, USSR (Summary Volume)*, Gosstatizdat, 1962, p. 96.

² Kenneth Colegrove, *Democracy Versus Communism*, New Jersey, 1957, p. 61.

these are declassed elements. In capitalist society, with its constant unemployment and increasing impoverishment of the masses, they make up a "section of corrupt people . . . who are unable to grasp the idea of the proletarian struggle".¹ Marx called them the passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society.² In Soviet society "these elements are the worst that has remained of the old capitalist system and are the vehicles of the old evils".³ Not finding social support in Soviet society, they have disappeared as a "section of corrupt people"; parasitism in the Soviet Union can be spoken of only in terms of *individuals* who continue to manifest certain vestiges of the past.

Table 19 shows that the trend in the changes in social structure has been toward a relative increase in the working-class and other employees category. Taking the total number of workers and other employees in 1928 as 100 per cent, we find that by 1939 it had grown to 285 per cent, by 1959 to 388 per cent and by 1968 to 442 per cent. Since 1939, workers and other employees have been numerically the largest social group in Soviet society.⁴ At the same time, the proportion of collectivised peasantry and co-operated handicraftsmen has increased. Between 1928 and 1968, the collectivised peasantry and co-operated handicraftsmen increased numerically almost 7.7-fold. There was an intensive growth in these two categories during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, a period characterised by a large-scale movement of individual peasants and handicraftsmen into co-operatives. After 1937, when

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 461.

² See K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. I, p. 44.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 468.

⁴ *The National Economy of the USSR, 1961*. Statistical Yearbook, Gosstatizdat, 1962, p. 27.

these two groups made up 48.8 per cent of the population, they began to decline in number, a fact explained by the growth of mechanisation and higher agricultural labour productivity, which allowed many peasants to move into industry, transport and construction, and many to transfer to state farms.¹

The Soviet social system has *not only eliminated the foundations* on which private ownership tendencies grow, but also established a new foundation on which the spiritual life of the society is being transformed in accordance with the principles of communism. Now, "every enterprise, in addition to its production plan, must have a single complex plan for the all-round social development of the collective, which must take into account in every way possible both the social and the personal interests and needs of the working people". This means the transformation of "the social structure of the collective, the gradual reduction in the socio-economic differences between physical and mental labour, between skilled and unskilled labour at every enterprise".²

The characteristic features of *every* social group are undergoing basic changes. This can be seen, for example, in their attitude toward work. The working class, the collective-farm peasantry and intelligentsia have all joined in a movement for *communist labour attitudes*. Participants in the movement, numbering more than 35 million in 1967, set themselves the task of studying, working and living according to communist principles. The movement is widespread in industry and growing rapidly in agriculture.

¹ *Results of the All-Union Population Census for 1959, USSR (Summary Volume)*, p. 92.

² V. S. Tolstikov, Address to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, *The 23rd Congress of the CPSU*. Stenographic Record, Vol. I, Politizdat, 1966, pp. 146-47.

A sociological survey made in the sixties at one of the leading enterprises in Leningrad, the Elektrosila complex, showed that 69.3 per cent of the workers there were participating in the movement for communist labour. *All the categories* are involved; youth from 16 to 30 accounted for 24.9 per cent of those surveyed; women made up 37 per cent; and non-Party people—76.1 per cent. *All social groups* of workers, engineering and technical personnel and other employees were involved; workers with secondary education or vocational training made up the nucleus of the movement.

Participants in this movement set examples of *high labour productivity*, take the lead in accelerating the rate of technological progress, and *compete* for excellent product quality. They spend most of their free time in rationalisation and innovation activity and reading technical literature in their field. The sociological survey also shows that those participating in the movement are developing a qualitatively different attitude toward *leisure* and *general social behaviour*.

Bourgeois ideologists try to picture the movement for communist labour as something that conflicts with the individual interests of working people, something that stifles their initiative and creativity. Peter Wiles, one of the authors of this kind of criticism, asserts that "the Communist Labour Brigades ... show Full Communism's sterner face: the face of effort, productivity, self-improvement ... achieved at great expense and unbalance".¹ He claims that what is basic in this movement is "that members supervise each other's private lives".² For whose benefit are such assertions made? What prompts the

¹ Peter Wiles, "Labour and Wages under Full Communism", *The USSR and the Future*, p. 119.

² Ibid.

sovietologists to make them? It is obvious that it is their way of speculating on the mass dissatisfaction with bureaucracy in the bourgeois world. Bourgeois propaganda does everything possible to channel the existing protest along anti-communist lines, to direct it against collectivism. The bourgeois concoctions, therefore, are designed for those in the West who are frustrated in the realisation of their ideals and their independence.

The movement for communist labour does have its difficulties and yet unsolved problems; but the complexity of the developing movement in no way detracts from the fact that this movement has deep roots in the life of all social groups and is expanding in accordance with their general educational and cultural level and improvements in the organisation of the movement. This movement is one of the ways in which the masses manifest initiative, and showing initiative is the socialist way of asserting one's individuality.

Bourgeois ideologists preach the maxim that human nature cannot be changed, having in mind the individualistic traits nurtured by bourgeois society. In the opinion of George Lichtheim, "the claims made by society upon the individual are resisted by the latter, or at least not spontaneously recognised as being in harmony with one's own personal strivings".¹ Labedz points to "the frequency and intensity of the campaigns against loafers and *stilyagi*, against *beloruchki* and private enterprise"² in the Soviet Union. But the critics invariably examine personality and behaviour abstractly; they speak of "frequency and intensity of campaigns" without showing their relation to the process of classes appearing and developing in Soviet society, without showing their

¹ George Lichtheim, op. cit., p. 30.

² Leopold Labedz, op. cit., p. 26.

relation to the movement for *communist* labour, which, as the beginning of something really new, is characteristic of Soviet society.

Parasitism, despite the assertions of bourgeois ideologists, cannot be considered a stable phenomenon in Soviet society. Its determinative influence on the development of society *disappeared with the building of socialism*.

The fact that private ownership tendencies still persist in some individuals in Soviet society is a phenomenon conditioned by a number of *subjective and objective* factors. The primary tendency in Soviet society is for *practice* in the building of the economy to be *preceded* by progressive *consciousness*. In a study made by the Sociological Research Laboratory at Leningrad State University on workers attitudes toward labour, it was found that one of the primary motives of the Soviet worker is work content: he seeks out the kind of work which can satisfy his interests and be sufficiently pithy and varied; he looks for opportunities to apply his abilities in his work, and it is primarily in terms of these opportunities that he assesses it. The significance of the "work content" motive is approximately 2.5 to 5 times higher for the Soviet worker than it is for the American worker. For work to become an individual's primary vital need, more than just his passive understanding of the social significance of his labour is needed; it also requires changes in the conditions of labour, a raising of the individual's work qualifications, a raising of his general educational level, and a broadening of his total outlook. A sociological survey conducted at 25 leading enterprises in Leningrad and covering 10,792 people, disclosed that the main cause of labour turnover was not "chasing after the ruble, but shortcomings in the organisation of work, rest and living facilities". In many instances (28 per cent of the study population) workers even went for a cut in

wages in order to get a job with better working conditions.

Although the overall tendency is for progressive consciousness to precede actual economic development, the *individual consciousness of part of the population still lags significantly behind its social being*; certain notions, customs, habits and sentiments carried over from the old society (individualism, passivism, etc.) are still evident in the morals and mores of this part of the population. It should be noted, however, that this lag is becoming less significant as its class roots disappear and conditions are created for the development of the whole personality and for raising the individual consciousness of the people to a communist level.

Bourgeois ideology still has a *certain influence on unstable elements* in Soviet society, but even this is not a consequence of antagonistic classes allegedly remaining in Soviet society. A struggle against the bourgeois ideology adhered to by class enemies within the country had to be waged in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism; in the present period, however, the basis for this influence is primarily the absence in some members of society of *permanent ties with production and the social collective*, and these people's *low level of moral responsibility, education and culture*. The influence of bourgeois ideology on these unstable elements can be counteracted to a significant degree by upgrading their labour activity and involving them in social and leisure-time activities which foster the development of the personality. This problem has not yet been wholly solved; there are still shortcomings in the *organisational, educative and cultural work* done by state and public agencies.

Socialist society has not yet reached the point where it can give *everyone* the opportunity to receive from the public fund *according to his needs*, or provide the

best balance between highly developed *mental labour* and *physical labour*. Hence, certain attitudes toward work which are in essence alien to the Soviet way of life have not fully disappeared; there is still a certain degree of contrasting "mine" to "our".

Vestiges of the past in the consciousness of certain people also stem from the difficulties engendered by the consequences of the Great Patriotic War and certain internal phenomena (such as individual instances of violation of socialist principles and of inner Party and Soviet democracy).

Nonetheless, the USSR *has reached* the point where the task of *fully overcoming* the vestiges of the past in the consciousness of people has taken on practical significance. The primary tendency in development now is the actual establishment of the basic *communist working and living conditions* which determine the gradual transformation of socialist consciousness into communist consciousness.

The struggle with private ownership tendencies involves developing a *scientific* world outlook in the people, educating them to *communist* attitudes toward work, strengthening communist morality, and creating the conditions for the *all-round* and *harmonious* development of the individual. And it also involves the use of certain kinds of *compulsion*. The struggle against parasitism is an echo of the political struggle against capitalism, although it is not in itself a struggle against a class. The use of coercion by Soviet agencies (organs of people's control, organs for maintaining public order) and mass organisations in the struggle against parasitic elements reflects the *will of all the people* in the country. Thus, in 1967, people's control organs with a small permanent staff (one person per district) relied wholly on a six-million army of volunteer activists.

The work being done is producing *positive results*. Many enterprises are conducting successful campaigns

against loafing, self-seeking and absenteeism. According to a study of work discipline at the Leningrad Electrosila complex, the number of workers brought before the people's court in connection with violation of work discipline, petty appropriation, etc., made up less than 0.4 per cent of the total work force. The complex makes a systematic study of the reasons for violation of work discipline (absenteeism, tardiness, quitting early, etc.) along basic social and demographic lines, and continually improves the system designed to prevent such violations. As a result, more than 94 per cent of all violators are successfully re-educated at the production site. We come across an analogous situation at the Skorokhod complex, the Yegorov Railway Carriage Repair Works and a number of other enterprises in Leningrad. The enterprises included in our survey also analyse the causes for misdemeanour, and rehabilitation programmes for offenders. As a typical example, educative work at the Electrosila complex is effective (the matter does not go as far as the court) in 85-92 cases out of a hundred.

We are already faced with the need to oust private property tendencies not only from ideological views but also from the *psychological sphere*, although our sentiments fed on "common consciousness" and influenced by traditions, mores and so on, are more stable and relatively independent.

The difficulties involved in liquidating parasitism *can be overcome* within the framework of the socialist system, when the *principles of socialism are consistently put into practice*. This does not mean that the ugly phenomena inherent in the old world automatically disappear once the new system is established. Such phenomena are long-lived and tend to remain in the thinking and behaviour of many people; they can be eliminated only through persistent struggle.

The struggle is against those, for example, who get a job for appearance's sake, but actually live on non-work income, enriching themselves at the expense of the working people and the state. It is considered deplorable and anti-social in this country to engage in private enterprise activity, speculation, begging, to derive profit from the use of private automobiles or exploit hired labour.

Under socialist conditions, and particularly under the conditions of building a communist society, the struggle against the vestiges of the past is a *perfectly natural* phenomenon. The decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic "On Intensifying the Struggle Against Individuals Who Shun Socially Useful Labour and Lead an Anti-Social Parasitic Way of Life," and similar decrees issued in other Union Republics, stem organically from the system of socialist development.

Bourgeois ideologists (Schlesinger, Hazard, Willets and others) try to picture these decrees as part of a pointless "drastic" campaign against private initiative.¹ One of the leading bourgeois sovietologists, John Hazard, who defines these decrees as a "spate of measures ... to strengthen a criminal code...", formulates his credo as follows: "If one is to believe that communism is ever to come, one will have to assume that people can learn to conduct themselves always with constant attention to the good of the community and without regard to personal advantage. In professing to believe that, Soviet philosophers show themselves to be singularly optimistic."² The critics base themselves on the fact that "out of every five Soviet citizens, four were born

¹ Rudolf Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 128; John Hazard, "The Function of Law", *The Future of Communist Society*, pp. 71-79; Harry Willets, "The Wages of Economic Sin", *Problems of Communism* No. 5, Washington, 1962, pp. 27-28.

² John Hazard, op. cit., p. 79.

after 1917".¹ Social consciousness is determined by social being, but it does not follow from this that all of the elements of social consciousness at a given time are derived directly from the given social being. Social consciousness and its ideological forms are relatively independent in their development. Inasmuch as social consciousness is the reflection of social being, and changes in it come only after changes in social being, there may be a lag, an incomplete correspondence between the two. There is continuity between the social ideas of one epoch and those of the epoch preceding it. To assign all the elements making up the social consciousness of Soviet society directly to the socialist system, without taking into account the preceding stages of development, is to misrepresent the connection that actually exists between these elements and the socialist system. As for the severity of the laws adopted, they are severe only for those who have the habit of living at the expense of others' labour.

It must be stressed that in Soviet society only *some* individuals are looked upon as *socially harmful elements*, and these are individuals who direct their activity against the foundations of the socialist system and against law and order, and who undermine the unity of the basic interests of the classes and social groups. Among these are agents of imperialist espionage and other such criminals. Checking their activity can only *strengthen* the existing social unity.

Falsification of the Political Activity of the Soviet People

Bourgeois ideologists claim that socialist and inner-Party democracy in Soviet society amounts to the

¹ René Dumont, *Sovkhoz, kolkhoz ou le problème du communisme*, Paris, 1964, p. 315.

subordination of the society to a ruling élite and the creation of a situation, in which the leadership adopts major reforms only in response to social-economic pressures or political unrest, but rarely actually initiates them.¹ Any form of political activity, such as freedom of discussion, or freedom to defend one's opinion, or freedom to criticise, is characterised as an "empty phrase . . . giving the Party leadership the opportunity to increase its control over the rank-and-file members".² The critics bend every effort to create the illusion that the people in the society as a whole and the rank-and-file members of the Party are doomed to passivity. In support of their contentions, bourgeois ideologists cite instances of violations of socialist and inner-Party democracy. Such violations, they would have us believe, are unavoidable because they are engendered by the ideology of the cult of the leader, inherent in the Soviet system, and subjectivism and voluntarism as built-in factors in leadership. The critics go to great lengths to give the impression of objectivity. They even refer to Marxism-Leninism as a source supporting their conclusions. But does a statement, such as the following by Sidney Hook, have anything in common with Marxism-Leninism? Hook maintains that according to these teachings "the victory of the proletariat depends on the dictatorship of the Communist Party. The dictatorship of the Communist Party can only function through the dictatorship of the leaders. . . ."³ This is just as absurd as the statement that "the practical implications" of development in socialist and inner-Party democracy

¹ Z. K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*, London, 1962, p. 66.

² Wolfgang von Leonhard, "Sowjetideologie Heute", II, *Die Politische Lehren*, Frankfurt am Main u. Hamburg, 1962, S. 49.

³ Sidney Hook, *Political Power and Personal Freedom*, New York, 1959, p. 115.

are "to ensure stability at the top".¹ As far back as 1920, Lenin had already shown that "the mere presentation of the question—'dictatorship of the party or dictatorship of the class; dictatorship (party) of the leaders, or dictatorship (party) of the masses?'—testifies" that "people want to *invent* something quite out of the ordinary, and, in their effort to be clever, make themselves ridiculous". "It is common knowledge," he continued, "that the masses are divided into classes; that the masses can be contrasted with classes only by contrasting the vast majority in general, regardless of division according to status in the social system of production, with categories holding a definite status in the social system of production . . . that political parties, as a general rule, are run by more or less stable groups composed of the most authoritative, influential and experienced members, who are elected to the most responsible positions, and are called leaders."²

Are the cult of the leader and subjectivism and voluntarism as factors in leadership inherent in the Soviet system? Can it be said that the system has given rise to and continues to engender subjectivism and voluntarism in leadership?

The ideology of the cult of the leader is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism as a social theory, as a science of the laws of the development of society and the building of socialism and communism, arose and developed in the struggle against the idealist view of society as the history of great men. It proceeds from the fact that history is made by "social man, who is its only 'factor'".³ The

¹ Walter Laquer and Leopold Labedz, Introduction to *The Future of Communist Society*, p. 8.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 41.

³ G. V. Plekhanov, *Selected Philosophical Works*, Vol. II, Gospolitizdat, 1956, p. 333.

Marxist-Leninist view on the role of the masses and the individual in history is given in the works of G. V. Plekhanov,¹ who, according to Lenin's appraisal, provides one of the best statements on this problem in Marxist literature. "Social man creates his own, that is, social, relations. But if at any given time he creates certain relations and not other, there is naturally some reason for this—it is dependent on the state of the productive forces. No great man can force relations on society that do not *already* correspond to the state of these forces, or do not *yet* correspond to it. In this sense, he really cannot make history, and in this case, he would be resetting his watch in vain: he could neither speed up time nor turn it back. . . . But if I know in what direction social relations are changing because of given changes in the socio-economic process of production, then I also know in what direction the social psyche is changing. . . . Consequently, it turns out that, in a certain sense, I *can make history*, and I have no need to wait for it to 'be made'."²

Subjectivism and voluntarism in leadership, as social, class phenomena, are, *by their very nature, inimical to socialism*. Socialism is characterised by the development of co-operation, mutual assistance and socialist competition. It provides for the systematic development of all sides of social life and the conscious use of social laws in this development. The establishment and consolidation of socialism, as Lenin noted in his work "The Great Beginning", is directly dependent on the creative activity of the whole mass of working people.³ The experience of building socialism in the

¹ Georgi Valentinovich Plekhanov (1856-1918), eminent figure in the Russian and international socialist movement and an outstanding Russian philosopher and propagandist of Marxism.—Ed.

² G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., pp. 333-34.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 39, p. 17.

Soviet Union has confirmed the view that the decisive role in the historical process belongs to the masses; it has shown that steady growth in the activity of the masses is the law of the socialist epoch. The ideology of the cult of the leader and subjectivism and voluntarism in leadership finds its basis in a system where *class antagonism* exists, where the masses are exploited and stripped of their rights. Under these conditions, the dominant class, interested in looking upon the working masses as the *object* of history, and itself as the *creator* of history, grinds out theories which distort the nature of relations between the people as a whole and the individual. Society is viewed by them as the sum of individuals and not as the sum total of social relations.

In Soviet society there is *neither an ideological nor a social basis* for making subjectivism and voluntarism a factor in the establishment and development of the political system. Vestiges of the past in the consciousness of individuals who believe that a leader can change the natural course of events, make it *possible for the will of a bureaucrat to become a prime cause*; they make it possible to find, on the one hand, an incarnate spiritualism where "for the bureaucrat, the world is simply the object of his activity", and, on the other hand, blind faith "in authority, in the mechanism of firmly established formal actions, ready principles, views and traditions", the transformation of the state goal into the personal goal of the bureaucrat, "in the *pursuit of rank* and in *career making*".¹ The *possibility* exists, but it is *not unremovable*. The probability of its turning into reality decreases as the causes promoting the revival of these vestiges are eliminated. A turn in the opposite direction can occur only under certain conditions, among which are:

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, 2nd Russ. ed., Vol. I, pp. 272-73.

violation of the principles of socialist and inner-Party democracy; narrowing the social base of representation in the Soviet and Party agencies; ignoring the criteria which have been developed for selection, placement and evaluation of the leading cadres of Soviet and Party apparatuses on the basis of their political, professional and personal irreproachableness in implementing the interests of the masses. This would lead to the concentration of absolute power in the hands of one man or several people, the violation of socialist law, the abandonment of the educative process in the activity of administrative organs, and the violation of Leninist principles in Party and mass organisation life.

Integral to the development of Soviet society is the observance by its members of the principles of socialist and inner-Party democracy, the widening of the social base of democracy in the system of the Soviets, as well as in the Party. No difficulties can justify subjectivism and voluntarism in leadership.

When the international and internal situation was exceedingly complex, as for example in 1923, preceding the 12th Congress of the Communist Party, Lenin stressed the necessity of not only observing the principles of socialist and inner-Party democracy, but of actually further developing and broadening Soviet democracy. In his article "How We Should Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection", he emphasised the necessity of creating the kind of state apparatus which would gain because its contacts with the masses will be greater. In his opinion, those closer to being rank-and-file workers and peasants should work effectively on the renewal and improvement of the state apparatus, beginning with the higher state institutions and ending with the lower local ones.

In Lenin's view the guarantee of party stability lay in broadening inner-Party democracy. "At the head

of the list I set an increase in the number of Central Committee members to a few dozen or even a hundred. It is my opinion that without this reform our Central Committee would be in great danger if the course of events were not quite favourable for us (and that is something we cannot count on)... it must be done in order to raise the prestige of the Central Committee, to do a thorough job of improving our administrative machinery and to prevent conflicts between small sections of the CC from acquiring excessive importance for the future of the Party."¹

The guarantee of socialist and inner-Party democracy lies in the *principles of selection, placement and evaluation of the leading cadres of Soviet and Party apparatuses*. These principles were developed under the leadership of the Party, with the personal participation of Lenin, and are applied in the course of building the Soviets and the Party. Political leaders are selected and placed by representative Soviet and Party organs on the basis of their *ties with the people*, their political, productive and moral *irreproachableness*, as well as on the basis of their possessing a combination of positive personal traits and varied abilities.

In defining the principles for selecting Soviet and Party personnel, Lenin stressed that new administrators from among the people must first "pass a test for knowledge of our state apparatus", "pass a test in the fundamentals of the theory of our state apparatus, in the fundamentals of management, office routine, etc."² The placement of political leaders is accomplished from the point of view of their practical efficiency. The testing of people and checking on actual work done, "replacement of Communists who don't study the art of management seriously"—this was

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 593.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 33, p. 491.

Lenin's view on the line that should be followed in placing political leaders.¹

Lenin devoted a great deal of attention to the appraisal of the political leader's personal qualities. The guarantee of stability for Soviet democracy, he felt, lay in the correctness of such appraisal. He considered it necessary to take into account *not only* their political and professional irreproachableness, *but also* their personal qualities;² rudeness, inconsideration to others, capriciousness, etc., as well as excessive keenness for the purely administrative aspect, are inadmissible traits in a political leader.

Lenin urged that the criteria for appraising Soviet and Party administrative personnel be applied consistently and continually. He stressed their determinative role in the actual implementation of decisions made by central and local agencies.³ Further, he called attention to the importance of raising the competency level of the person or groups authorised to appraise those entering into or working in the apparatus of Soviet and Party agencies, and the importance of obtaining accurate data on which personal appraisals are based. Careful observance of cadre evaluation procedures are necessary, Lenin felt, to avoid chance indiscrimination and bias from influencing the drawing up of personal profiles.⁴

Lenin emphasised the necessity for a detailed definition of the rights and responsibilities of those working with the cadres. He saw that success in the selection of "the most suitable people for each office and job" depended on "the precisely defined *responsibility of every person* holding any Soviet post for

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 542.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 36, p. 596.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 28, pp. 349-52.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Complete Works*, 5th Russ. ed., Vol. 54, pp. 52-55.

the *performance of definite* and clearly and explicitly specified functions and practical jobs".¹

The measures taken by the Party, on Lenin's initiative, to strengthen and develop socialist and inner-Party democracy, speeded progress in the sphere of the Soviet people's political activity.

Violations of socialist and inner-Party democracy did occur in the development of the Soviet society. However, they can only be regarded as incidental, chance occurrences. To a large extent, such violations occurred because some of the Soviet and Party organs charged with selection and placement failed to heed the demand for unreproachableness in political leadership and underestimated the importance of criteria relating to purely personal traits. The violations that have occurred were cases of *non-adherence to the principles* of collective leadership and democratic centralism in the activity of state and Party agencies, cases of breach of law and failure to carry out the Leninist principles of *selection, preparation and evaluation* of the leading Soviet and Party cadres.²

These violations to a certain extent weakened the effectiveness of a number of principles of socialist and Party democracy, as, for example, the principle of collective leadership and the principle of democratic centralism. But these principles continued to function; the occurrence of violations *did not alter* the general development of Soviet democracy, and problems of developing and improving socialist democracy were given special consideration at Party plenary meetings and congresses. The Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee (June 1-4, 1936) approved the draft Constitution of the USSR, which provided for

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 349.

² *22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Stenographic Record, Vol. I, pp. 279-81, 283-85, 290-92; Vol. II, pp. 402-07; Vol. III, pp. 114-20, 152, 153.

the social and political equality of all categories of citizens, and in which the question of guaranteeing citizens' rights was resolved. The draft Constitution was published for nation-wide discussion, in which more than 50 million people took part (about 55 per cent of the adult population of the country). In the meantime, *inner-Party democracy* was also being *developed and improved*. Thus, the 18th Party Congress of 1939 established a single set of conditions for acceptance to the Party and the same candidacy period for all, regardless of social status; the rights of Party members were broadened; and mass purges were abolished. In 1952, the 19th Party Congress adopted a resolution providing for regular discussions at Party congresses on the basic problems of Party life.

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party in February 1956 marked an important stage in the life of the Party and the country. Important work was done at that Congress toward *eliminating* existing instances of violation of socialist and inner-Party democracy, toward *strengthening the principles* and broadening the social basis of Soviet democracy. An important step strengthening socialist law was the adoption in 1958 of Fundamentals of the Judicial System of the USSR and the Union Republics, Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics and Fundamentals of Criminal Procedure of the USSR and the Union Republics. Another important stage in the life of the Party and the country was reached at the October Plenary Meeting of the CC CPSU (1964), which provided for the correction of shortcomings in economic and Party construction, and elimination of errors that had been committed in connection with unjustified reorganisation of Party, Soviet and economic organs. At the November Plenary Meeting of that same year, Leninist principles of Party construction were re-

established, and serious errors that had been permitted to occur in this area were also eliminated.

Wide possibilities opened up for creative initiative and active participation by all Soviet people in the construction of communism. As a result, the political foundations of Soviet society—the alliance between the working class and the collective-farm peasantry, the friendship between the peoples of the multi-national Soviet Union, the rallying of all working people round the Party—were further strengthened.

Important work was also done under the leadership of the Party to *strengthen the guarantees* of socialist and inner-Party *democracy*. The principles of selection, placement and evaluation of leading cadres were fully re-established and amended to conform with contemporary conditions. People who know their work well, who are in constant touch with the masses and who know how to organise them to fulfil current tasks were moved up into leadership posts in the Soviet political system. Requirements were placed before the leading cadres to master the methods of economic management, to struggle against formal administration, to use the newest findings in the science of administration, and to apply modern computer technology. To study and understand the needs and requirements of the masses, the political leaders are called upon to master the fundamentals of social psychology and sociology. The October and November plenary meetings of the CC CPSU (1964) adopted guarantees against the appearance of subjectivist and voluntaristic tendencies in political leadership. The 23rd Congress of the Party in 1966 reinforced these guarantees. The Directives of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU on the Five-Year Plan state: "It is necessary to struggle decisively against any appearance of conceit, complacency and indifference, to be intolerant to departmental or local self-interest, to develop bold criticism of shortcomings, and to root

out bureaucracy wherever and in whatever form it may appear."

Even the bourgeois ideologists cannot remain silent about the progress achieved in the development of Soviet democracy. Thus, one of the leading bourgeois sovietologists, Leonard Schapiro, in speaking about the CPSU Rules adopted at the 22nd Party Congress, was forced to admit that "they suggest determination to keep the pressures for greater democracy and firm control..."¹

Bourgeois ideologists distort the nature of subjectivist and voluntaristic manifestations in leadership and ignore the causes contributing to their appearance and then proceed to argue that existing violations of socialist and inner-Party democracy are a stable factor in the development of Soviet society. Inkeles and Bauer, for example, say that nothing, except perhaps "succession crises" or "public indignation", can guarantee Soviet society from violations of this kind. "The Soviet system," these authors write, "is in some important degree less 'total' than it was. . . . But we submit that it is a serious error to assume that departure from the Stalinist model means movement toward the democratic constitutional model. . . . Such a society is perhaps less totalitarian, less absolutist, even less dictatorial. It is no less autocratic and certainly not more democratic. . . ."²

Robert C. Tucker feels that one may speak of individuals and their removability, but not the removability of the nature of their leadership, i.e., the subjectivist and voluntaristic basis, about the permanence of which there can be no doubt.³ But here again

¹ Leonard Schapiro, "The New Rules of the CPSU", *The USSR and the Future*, p. 194.

² Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, pp. 396-97.

³ Robert C. Tucker, "The CPSU Draft Programme: A Credo of Conservatism", *Problems of Communism* No. 5, 1961, p. 4.

the criticism of the bourgeois ideologists has no actual grounds. Any statement about how stable this or that social phenomenon is, must be based on an analysis of the historical process of its appearance and development: without this, any talk about stability in social development loses all common sense. The ideologists of the West obviously prefer a metaphysical approach in their criticism.

A number of bourgeois ideologists (Fetscher, Reshetor, Laquer and Labedz) try to prove the stability of subjectivist, voluntaristic phenomena in Soviet leadership by identifying the concept "cult of the leader", with the concept "authority of the leader". Some try to obscure the contradiction between these two concepts by quoting "Marxism-Leninism"; others do this by contending that authority is incompatible with power.¹

The following statement by Iring Fetscher is characteristic of critics who make references to "Marxism-Leninism": "The job of the Party [he has in mind the Communist Party in Soviet society-M.P.] consists of leading the masses and not to drag along behind them or ask them what their wishes are. But inasmuch as the Party leadership consists of the 'best Marxists', it has essentially little need of advice from the rank-and-file Party members; moreover, it assumes the task of educating and teaching them. . . . The Party leadership can advertise its successes without difficulty and just as easily suppress any public criticism. . . ."² Yes, the job of the Communist Party is indeed to lead the masses. But what do such statements as "does not ask them what their wishes are", and "can advertise

¹ Iring Fetscher, *Von Marx zur Sowjetideologie*, Bonn, 1959, SS. 129-34; J. S. Reshetor, "Die Partei", *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus*, Freiburg-München, 1958, SS. 117, 126-29; W. Laquer and L. Labedz, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

² Iring Fetscher, op. cit., p. 131.

its successes without difficulty and just as easily suppress any public criticism", which Fetscher uses to define the concept of "Party leadership", have in common with Marxism-Leninism? He tries to characterise the activities of Party leaders in the society by referring to positions alien to the Marxist-Leninist definition of Party leadership and alien to the actual practice of the Party leadership. The criticism is thus nothing other than falsification of Marxism-Leninism. If Fetscher wishes to cite Marxism-Leninism, it would behoove him to know its real position on the question. Here is what Lenin had to say on the matter: "The working class, which all over the world is waging a hard and persistent struggle for complete emancipation, needs authorities, but, of course, only in the way that young workers need the experience of veteran fighters against oppression and exploitation, of those who have organised many strikes, have taken part in a number of revolutions, who are wise in revolutionary traditions, and have a broad political outlook." Lenin warned that the authority which the fighters need to broaden their political outlook "has nothing in common with the official authorities in bourgeois science and police politics". It is inconsistent with claims to resolve practical and concrete political problems from the side. "The collective spirit of the progressive class-conscious workers immediately engaged in the struggle in each country will always remain the highest authority on all such question."¹

If a leader *isolates* himself from the masses, or puts himself *above* them, or *abuses* their trust, his authority is destroyed. History gives many examples of such a drop in authority. When, however, a leader actually reflects the *opinion* of the people and protects their interests, his authority is unquestioned. In the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, pp. 412-13.

international communist movement, Marx, Engels and Lenin were such leaders.

Wherein lay the power of their authority? Engels, in speaking of Marx, answered this question as follows: "Marx was before all else a revolutionist. His real mission in life was to contribute, in one way or another, to the overthrow of capitalist society and of the state institutions which it had brought into being, to contribute to the liberation of the modern proletariat, which *he* was the first to make conscious of its own position and its needs, conscious of the conditions of its emancipation. Fighting was his element. And he fought with a passion, a tenacity and a success such as few could rival."¹

An elementary truth in Marxism-Leninism is that the authority of a leader *cannot be absolute*. Gifted leaders appear where and when there are social conditions requiring their talent. This means that the authority of the leader, when it is actualised, is the fruit of social relations. "Talented people can ... change only the individual physiognomy, and not the general direction of events; *they themselves exist only due to such direction; without it they would never have crossed the threshold separating possibility from reality.*"² In other words, no matter what abilities an official may have, no matter how much effort he expends, he cannot achieve stable results without the support of the collective.

The argument that authority is inconsistent with power³ is, in essence, nothing more than a play on words borrowed from the archives of the anti-authoritarians. The unsoundness of contrasting authority and power was fully established by Engels, who wrote that no matter what the social organisation, the need for

¹ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Works* in one volume, Moscow, 1968, p. 436.

² G. V. Plekhanov, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

³ Walter Laquer and Leopold Labedz, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

authority, powerful authority, is obvious. This need stems from the material conditions of the society, from factors of co-operation, etc. Engels pointed out that as the system of production, goods circulation, the system of social relations, etc., become more complex, an extension of the sphere of authority follows naturally. To assert the opposite, in his opinion, means to be blind "to all the facts which make authority necessary".¹ Laquer and Labedz absolutise such phenomena as misuse of power. Such an interpretation of authority has nothing in common with a Marxist-Leninist understanding of the "authority of a leader".

Bourgeois ideologists (Zink, Fetscher, Brzezinski, Lapenna and others)² persistently pursue the idea that subjectivism and voluntarism in the leadership of Soviet society are unavoidable, and they classify measures taken in the Soviet Union to eliminate these manifestations and to liquidate their consequences as attempts to give new form to policy pursued without changing it in essence.³ The reasons behind this line of criticism are revealed in the Resolution of the CC CPSU, "On Overcoming the Cult of the Individual and Its Consequences". Imperialist circles, the Resolution reads, "found the presence of negative phenomena connected with the cult of the individual useful in their struggle against socialism. Now, when our Party is boldly overcoming the consequences of the cult of the individual, the imperialists see in this a factor which accelerates our country's forward movement toward communism and weakens the positions of capitalism."

¹ K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Works*, 2nd Russ. ed., Vol. 18, pp. 302-05.

² Harold Zink, *Modern Governments*, New Jersey, 1958, p. 557; Iring Fetscher, op. cit., pp. 119-22; Z. K. Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 71-82; Ivo Lapenna, "Party and State in the Programme", *The USSR and the Future*, pp. 159-60.

³ *The New York Times*, January 7, 1962.

Manifestations of subjectivism and voluntarism have not and could not have changed the *socialist nature* of the system. No sober-thinking individual would say that due to these phenomena private capitalist ownership has been introduced in the USSR, or that the landowning and bourgeois classes have been returned to power, etc. On the contrary, the socialist basis is being broadened and strengthened year by year. Throughout the history of the Soviet system, its productive forces have been growing and socialist production relations have been improving.

Manifestations of subjectivism and voluntarism have not led Soviet society away from the *progressive movement toward communism*. They have neither abolished the democratic process in the development of the Soviet political organisation and methods of collective leadership nor changed the democratic direction of their development. Democratic principles have continued to function in republic, territory, regional and local Party organisations, which form the basis of the Party and its everyday work in the very midst of the masses. Regular Party meetings and conferences, reports and elections took place locally. Soviets of Working People's Deputies, trade unions and the Komsomol have been doing important and comprehensive work, also locally.

Elimination of the causes for violations of socialist and inner-Party democracy has helped the development of *creative forces* in Soviet society, accelerated its movement toward *communism*, and further strengthened the political unity of Soviet society, as seen, for example, in the growth in the Communist Party ranks, especially after the 20th-23rd Party congresses, the increased role of the Soviets, and the upswing in mass organisation activity.

The bourgeois interpretation of the policy pursued in the USSR to eliminate manifestations of subjectivism

ism and voluntarism in leadership, boils down to pure demagoguery. Brzezinski and Huntington make a comparative analysis of the political structures of the USSR and the USA and point out that "the American system operates through bargaining and compromise".¹ "The underlying values and long-range goals ... are seldom connected with immediate actions of policy. Since the goals remain blurry in the distance, each policy issue is treated discretely, and top priority is given to achieving agreement on that particular issue. Agreement almost becomes an end in itself quite apart from the substance of what is agreed upon."² Under "free world" conditions (so the ideologists of capitalism inform us), the politician's "occupational function, devoted to compromise, thus makes the politician view ideology with suspicion".³ But it is well known—and this is no secret even to the sovietologists—that the political forms of the bourgeois West completely lose their meaning under conditions of Soviet democracy. Fetscher asserts, and we cannot disagree with him in this, that a transference of this kind "turns simply into an empty façade".⁴ The essence of the bourgeois interpretation of Soviet policy is to direct the dissatisfaction that the masses in the West feel toward their specifically bourgeois forms of social organisation onto the track of anti-sovietism.

Distortions in Characterising the Moral Make-up of Soviet Man

Considerable amount of space in bourgeois criticism is devoted to the question of the moral make-up of Soviet man. The attempt is to put the moral unity of

¹ Z. Brzezinski and S. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR*, New York, 1964, p. 42.

² Z. Brzezinski and S. Huntington, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

³ Ibid., p. 43.

⁴ Iring Fetscher, op. cit., p. 151.

Soviet society to question. In pursuing this aim, the critics seek out what are actually atypical examples of amorality found in the USSR, generalise on them, absolutise them and conclude that norms of communist morality have no social foundations in Soviet society and do not reflect the real aspirations of the Soviet people. They speak of amorality as inherent in the system of relations within Soviet society, and make every effort to convince the reader that this phenomenon is firmly entrenched in the USSR and that it is impossible to eliminate it. From this come the theories about a conflict between the society and the creators of communist morality.¹

The future belongs to the youth; consequently, the bourgeois ideologists write about instances of amorality among Soviet youth. The data that they collect are offered as corroboration of their contention that the aspirations of young men and women are incompatible with the standards of communist morality being established. This is characteristic of the approach used by Juviler, Schlesinger and Hammer.²

What, according to these critics, are the ideals and values of Soviet youth? Juviler, who specialises in this area, divided the younger generation of the USSR into the following "types, depending on how they reacted or lived up to the ideal" of communist morality. First, he says, is the group of "political activists" (the "overseers", "schoolmen", and "populists"). This is "a small but zealous core of Party-line youths who will probably feed into the future political élite". Then there are the "ambitious careerists—a large group of

¹ George L. Kline, "Philosophy and Practice", *The Future of Communist Society*, pp. 68-69.

² Peter H. Juviler, op. cit., pp. 16-19; Rudolf Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 125-28; Darrell P. Hammer, "Among Students in Moscow: An Outsider's Report", *Problems of Communism* No. 4, 1964, pp. 11-18.

people for whom the wish to 'get ahead' outweighs any possible ideological qualms". His other "types" are the "explorers", who are not politically-minded and engage in their professions within the framework of what is permitted; the "westerners", who are interested "in foreign jazz records ... foreign clothes"; the "drifters"; and, finally, the "rejectors ... including playboys, prostitutes, speculators and 'hooligans'".¹ We have presented this view because it is typical of bourgeois criticism. Moreover, the author refers to the "personal impressions" he received during his stay of several years in the Soviet Union.²

Juviler assesses the morality of Soviet youth from the point of view of what is inherent in the behaviour of the individual in bourgeois society; namely, the traits of individualism, striving for personal success, etc. On this basis, he comes to the conclusion that the deviations from the standards of communist morality which he finds reflect the actual aspirations of Soviet youth. His approach, however, is scientifically unsound: he uses a measuring stick made to fit bourgeois society. In the "free world", the possibility for, and inevitability of, amorality, crime, manifestations of "anomie" and the personality disorders connected with them, are determined not only by the socio-economic conditions of bourgeois society, but also by the very principles of bourgeois morality, their inner essence, and the contradictions of this essence. In Soviet society, however, the motives and goals of individual behaviour are quite different and are determined by conditions which exclude the development of such traits as *individualism, striving for private gain, etc.* And they are determined by a different set of moral principles, principles which preclude the development of "anomie".

¹ Peter H. Juviler, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

² Ibid., p. 16.

The methodological unsoundness of the criticism is compounded by its factual unsoundness. We do not claim that the "types" referred to do not actually exist to one degree or another in Soviet society. But it does not follow that we should place a sign of equality between these types and Soviet youth. To do so would require facts. But facts are just what the critics do not have. The impressions given by Juviler, for example, are wholly unreliable even from the point of view of bourgeois empirical sociology, inasmuch as the investigator in this case was not a member of the group whose behaviour he was observing (a so-called isolated, non-participatory observation is highly subjective).

Juviler states that "the degree of adherence or non-adherence to this code [communist morality.—Ed.] is ... a ... touchstone of youth's outlook ... their attitude toward communist morality...".¹ We would like to give a more precise indication of this degree. Let us look at the data of a survey conducted in 1961 by the Institute of Public Opinion of the newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* among the young men and women of the Soviet Union. The sample was 17,466 young people, of which 13,085 were men and 4,361 were women. The sample broken down by age categories was as follows: under 17 years of age—1,466; 18 to 22—8,973; 23 to 30—7,007. The survey data were processed by employees in the editorial offices of the *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, scientific workers from the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences, students, workers from the Central Computer Station of the USSR Central Statistical Board. To the question, "What do you think about your generation, are you pleased with it, are you pleased with what it is doing?", 83.4 per cent answered Yes, 11.1 per cent answered No, and 5.5 per cent gave no

¹ Ibid.

Table 20

Traits compared	Number of votes	Place on 10 point scale according to number of votes
Patriotism and love of socialist motherland	5,592	1
High moral qualities of builders of communism (will power, responsiveness to people, truthfulness, etc.)	5,411	1
Devotion to the Party and the ideas of communism	3,865	3
Striving for knowledge	3,548	4
Diligence	3,460	4
Collectivism	2,598	6
Vitality, enthusiasm	2,103	7
Striving toward the new	1,089	9
Love of peace	1,042	9
Internationalism	535	10

definite answer. The majority of those who answered "no", conditioned their answer by saying that a more detailed analysis of the pluses and minuses of the generation was needed.

What traits of the generation do Soviet youth admire? Table 20 indicates the top ten traits given in the answers, listed according to the number of votes received and according to the degree of importance, as indicated on a ten-point rating scale.

Reading down this list of traits, we see the portrait that the young people in the survey painted of their contemporary. They gave top ratings to traits which determine the direction in which the young generation is developing. The questionnaire did not provide possible answers, but asked that each subject write

in what he considered to be the most important traits of his contemporary.

The opinions of the subjects about Soviet youth coincide with their own self-judgement. In defining their own goals in life, they proceed from their desire to bring benefit to their country. To the question, "What are your goals in life?", they answered (in per cent): to become a first-class specialist, to master my profession, to serve my country (66.6); to become a harmoniously developed person with high moral qualities, being active in literature and art (21.4); to make a discovery, to do something outstanding, to become a famous athlete, to participate directly in the space exploration, to accomplish a distant journey (5.4); to have a good family, to bring up worthy children (4.2); to marry for advantage (2.2); to have a lot of money, to spend life in pleasure and entertainment (0.1). The higher the educational and cultural level of the youth, the more important become professional mastery and all-round development, while striving for money, the desire to spend life in pleasure and entertainment is reduced almost to naught as a goal. The latter goal was listed by 0.17 per cent of those with an incomplete secondary education, by 0.14 per cent of those with secondary education and by 0.0 per cent of those with a higher education. The goal of marrying for advantage also dropped almost to naught, the data indicating that the young people want to raise their education, professional and cultural level, have families based on mutual love and friendship and concern for bringing up children. Of those surveyed, 81.9 per cent feel that they will achieve their goal and tie it in with the standards of communist morality. The youth have confidence in their own powers and rely on the help of friends and the collective.

The results of this survey were corroborated by data from our survey conducted at a number of en-

terprises and institutions and colleges in Leningrad.¹ This sample included 852 workers, other employees and members of the intelligentsia; 463 were day students. *The workers were young men and women from 16 to 30 years of age, engaged primarily in physical, productive labour, and were without special secondary or higher education.* The other employees were primarily youths working in a service capacity and had varied educational backgrounds. The category of intelligentsia included people up to 30 years of age, engaged in administrative or research work in enterprises and research institutes, and with specialised secondary or higher education.

The youth generally had a good opinion of their generation. Expressing a low opinion were only 4.3 per cent of the workers surveyed, 12.2 per cent of the other employees, 9.3 per cent of the intelligentsia and 11.1 per cent of the students.

Young people want their age-mate to behave always according to the demands of communist morality. Condemning instances of amorality among youth were 93.8 per cent of the workers, 98.2 per cent of the other employees, 94.7 per cent of the intelligentsia and 97.6 per cent of the students. Giving no evaluation of instances of amorality were, respectively, 4.9

¹ The list of institutions covered by the survey is given in Chapter 3 of this work.

In processing the questionnaire data the following calculations were made: per cent relative to the number of people questioned; position of compared elements on a 10- or 15-point scale. The former figure gives an idea of the relative weight of the elements in the structure of phenomena being investigated; the latter gives an idea of the degree of significance that the elements had for the subject. The place scale shows what level of importance the subjects assign to the elements in question. Together, the indices characterise the attitude of the subjects to the elements in question from an objective and subjective point of view. The rank order scale corresponds to the number of ranked elements.

per cent, 1.7 per cent, 4.2 per cent and 2.1 per cent. Not condemning amorality were, respectively, 1.3 per cent, 0.1 per cent, 1.1 per cent and 0.3 per cent. The kinds of behaviour considered repugnant were: drunkenness, dissoluteness, unmannerliness, crudeness, sponging, mendacity, dishonesty, egoism, careerism, greed, money-grubbing, passivism and narrowness. The subjects expressed the desire to see in their age-mate high moral qualities meeting the standards of communist morality, humanism, a striving for the new, purposefulness, internationalism. They see his calling in the service to the people, devotion to the Party and the ideas of communism. To the question, "What traits do you like in your contemporary?", out of every 100 workers asked, 67 answered "high moral qualities"; 40 said "humanism"; 38—"striving for the new"; 32—"purposefulness"; 19—"internationalism". The answers given by the other employees, the intelligentsia and the students were essentially the same—indicating the high moral unity of these groups. The subjects not only named the traits that they would like to see in their contemporaries, but indicated the most effective ways of forming them. Development of cultured behaviour, universal secondary education, work education, development of organised work habits, and all-round development were indicated as some of the ways leading to the formation of these traits.

The high moral qualities of the youth are reflected in their ideals. To the question, "What, in your opinion, can bring happiness?", the subjects answered: to love and be loved, interesting work, a rich spiritual life, being respected by others, financial security, contributing to the people's welfare, a good home atmosphere, physiological pleasure. Eighty-two per cent of the subjects had a conscious happiness ideal. Table 21 gives an idea of Soviet youth's conception of happiness.

Most young people, as we see from the table, do not conceive of happiness without work contributing to society, respect and comradely mutual help in the collective and the family, an awareness of their social duty to be of benefit to people, and all-round development. Workers, compared to the intelligentsia, were more likely to stress traits such as being of benefit to people, to love and be loved, etc. The young intelligentsia stress richness of spiritual life, being respected, and financial security. Love, a pleasant home atmosphere, and financial security are mostly connected, in all categories of youth, with the desire to do interesting work, richness of spiritual life and the desire to be of benefit to others.

Table 21

Traits compared	Per cent of those with conscious ideals	Per cent of opinions expressed	Place on 10 point scale
To love and be loved	82.2	18.9	1
Interesting work	68.9	15.1	3
Rich spiritual life	62.0	13.8	3
Being respected by others . .	59.5	13.2	4
Financial security	58.1	13.2	4
Being of benefit to others .	51.9	10.8	5
Pleasant home atmosphere .	48.6	10.1	6
Physiological pleasure . .	19.3	3.8	10

Of the surveyed youth, 93.7 per cent had no doubt that they would achieve their ideals. The young men

and women are confident in their powers (50.3 per cent) and in the help of the collective and friends (29.0 per cent). Some of them are counting on some lucky break (13.8 per cent). Only a few count on useful connections (3.8 per cent) or think in terms of the principle that "ends justify the means" (3.0 per cent). Among the things that they associate with achievement of their ideals are: study in general or specialised educational institutions, raising their qualifications, broadening and acquiring a related speciality, improved living quarters, higher salary, marriage, raising children, and participation in public activities.

The high moral qualities of the youth are seen not only in their stated ideals and the ways indicated to achieve them, but also in their *everyday life, in work* and in the way they spend their *leisure time*.

Young people work, and work for them is the basic source for their means of existence. Just how the youth work can be judged, for example, from the data of an investigation made by the Social Research Laboratory of Leningrad State University. The study was made on 2,665 young workers at 25 Leningrad enterprises.

The data show that 86.7 per cent of the young workers fulfil and overfulfil their production quotas; 61.7 per cent do work of good quality: about 71 per cent can be entrusted with responsible work; and 25.6 per cent can be counted on to help in improving labour organisation. One out of every five of the young workers at these enterprises participates in progressive initiatives, and one out of every eight participates in the rationalisation movement.

According to our investigation, about one-third of the young workers, other employees and young intelligentsia pay serious attention to improving their work qualifications. Among the worker youth, 24.3 per cent read technical literature, as do 46.5 per cent

of the young intelligentsia. The young people engage in rationalisation activity both on the job and in their leisure time, leisure-time rationalisation work being done by 30.4 per cent of the workers and 69.2 per cent of the intelligentsia. Each of the categories evaluated work from the point of view of its social significance and the satisfaction of necessary material needs.

Soviet youth strive for spiritual richness, moral purity, and physical perfection. The survey showed that leisure time is spent mostly in activities aimed at developing the personality, then entertainment, and finally rest. The concept of "developing the personality" includes *activities connected with raising one's general and special educational level* (attending lectures and courses), *receiving information* through the mass media, *social work, artistic and creative activity, sports and hobbies. Passing the time with friends, with children and the family, and going on outings* are classified as entertainment. On the whole, development of the personality takes up 72.7 per cent of the subjects' leisure time, entertainment—23.9 per cent, and rest takes up 3.4 per cent of the time. The overall distribution of leisure time is characterised by the data in Table 22.

The results of the survey indicate that 97 per cent of those asked go to the cinema; 94 per cent to the theatre, concerts, exhibitions, participate in amateur art groups; 91 per cent meet with friends no less than once a month; 86 per cent read literature (fiction, science, political material); 84 per cent watch television; 63 per cent engage in physical education and sport; and 61 per cent participate in social work. The most popular forms of leisure time are those connected with raising cultural, educational and professional levels. A large part of the leisure time is devoted to activities connected with receiving information, aesthetic and physical development and public activ-

Table 22

Leisure-time activity	Per cent to those surveyed	Per cent to opinions expressed	Place on 15 point scale
Cinema	72.5	13.6	1
Art (active and/or passive)	71.4	13.4	1
Books and/or magazines . .	70.2	13.2	1
Television, radio, and/or newspapers	61.5	11.6	3
Visiting friends	57.0	10.8	4
Outings	50.5	9.5	6
Activities supplementing education (lectures and/or courses)	47.0	8.8	7
Sport	29.7	5.5	11
Social work (elective and/or permanent non-elective) .	20.2	3.8	14
Activities with children . .	19.6	3.6	14
Passive rest	18.2	3.4	14
Hobby	14.9	2.8	15

ities. Thus, there is a clearly evident tendency among Soviet youth toward all-round development, at the basis of which lies an affirmation of communist morality.

The youth pass their leisure time in places of entertainment, at home, at stadiums, in parks, in the country, and in restaurants and cafes. Among the most popular pastimes for all categories are the cinema, sports, and get-togethers with friends at home. Playing dominos and cards and drinking also take place. The survey data indicates that the higher the cultural, educational and professional level of the subject, the more selective is the choice of the place and way of passing the time with friends.

The attempts of the bourgeois ideologists to interpret instances of amorality seen in socialist society as

phenomena characteristic of the whole system of social relations in the USSR are just as fruitless when related to the older generation. The best representatives of the older generation—the participants in and contemporaries of the October Revolution, the builders of first five-year plan projects—counterposed communist morality to the egoistic views and mores of the old world, established it in the system of social relations of Soviet society, and raised a generation of worthy successors. Darrell P. Hammer, however, alleges that the older generation sees that “their creation must fall into the hands of an ungrateful and uninspired younger generation”.¹ As a basis for his view he, as did Juviler, cites his “experience”: Mr. Hammer did his research at Leningrad University over a period of two years, from 1959 to 1961. However, he uses essentially the same basic premises as did his colleague.

Assertions that amorality in Soviet society is exceedingly stable are absurd. The critics who make such assertions fail to grasp the very essence of the question; they fail to examine the moral basis of Soviet life and the factors (work, the daily round, leisure) which condition this moral basis. Instances of amorality can only be understood when they are studied in relation to this basis and these factors. More than this, the critics ignore the historical approach and go no further than to cite instances of amorality in Soviet society. Examples of this can be seen in the criticism of Schlesinger, Labedz, Lichtheim and others.² Such an approach provides no grounds whatsoever for speaking of general trends of laws.

The contradictions between individual instances of

¹ Darrell P. Hammer, op. cit., p. 13.

² Rudolf Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 125; Leopold Labedz, op. cit., pp. 26-28; George Lichtheim, op. cit., pp. 29-31.

amorality, on the one hand, and the Soviet society with its communist morality, on the other, can in no way be considered as unresolvable. There are *no* classes or social groups in the USSR which adhere to the morality of *exploitation* and which consciously undermine the foundations of the Soviet system. The society is confronted with *violations* of the rules of socialist community life not by any social groups, but by *individuals*. Such instances do not break down the overall socio-political and ideological *unity* of Soviet society. Bourgeois ideologists absolutise existing contradictions, treat them apart from their historical development, and create in this way the appearance of an insoluble conflict. But if contradictory sides are examined outside their unity, then no sense whatsoever can be made of the struggle between them. Further, if a contradiction is examined outside its historical development, that is, outside the genesis of the unity of, and the struggle between, its sides, then there is no basis for speculating about the nature of its resolution.

* * *

Thus, bourgeois theories about the factors in the development of the socialist political system have, in essence, nothing in common with Soviet reality. Even authors who in no way could be suspected of being sympathetic to communism have come to this conclusion. For example, participants in a trip organised by the French National Association of Directors and Personnel Department Chiefs, who visited the Soviet Union from September 18 to October 20, 1960, declared that Soviet institutions can be understood only if conceptions characteristic of Western countries are cast aside.¹ What were their conclusions? “One of the characteristic traits that amazed us,” they wrote, “is the striving toward physical and moral

¹ *Conditions de travail en URSS*, Paris, 1961, p. 10.

purity.... We were convinced, first hand, in the striving for moral and physical perfection inherent not only in administrative personnel, but in the overwhelming majority of the population.... We saw before us morally and physically healthy people with strict principles, clearly satisfied with the conditions of their life and as a whole striving toward a definite ideal-toward 'communist morality'."¹

The fact that the bourgeois ideologists attempt to make a *prognosis* of the *development* of the Soviet political system, while *ignoring the factors* in the system's *development*, reveals the *crisis* in bourgeois criticism.

CONCLUSION

The persistent line of criticism seen in current works by bourgeois ideologists on the nature and principles of the Soviet political system is that the system is *ideological*. Critics Brzezinski and Huntington, for example, make attempts to substantiate the thesis that "to be ideologically motivated is to be unrealistic, irrational, dogmatic and fanatical".¹ "Power delutes ideology," they say, and "ideology undermines power".² They define the Soviet political system's being ideologically determined as an indication of idea transformed into reality. "Instead of reflecting society, the system is used by political leaders to create a new society along the lines of their own beliefs and aspirations".³

What do the nature and principles of organisation of a society's political system depend on? The bourgeois ideologists proceed from the idea that political institutions are created by leaders, following their own beliefs and aspirations. Political institutions are, indeed, created by people, political leaders included. Nevertheless, the belief that political institutions are the product of free human activity is an "illusion of a being who is conscious of himself *as cause*, but not

¹ *Conditions de travail en URSS*, p. 177.

¹ Z. Brzezinski and S. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR*, New York, 1964, p. 17.

² *Ibid.*, p. 42.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

conscious of himself *as effect*":¹ People's wills are directed towards the creation of a system by causes that are independent of the people involved. The bourgeois ideologists prefer not to discuss these causes; yet the task of sociology as a science consists first of all of understanding what it is that conditions social man's will in the direction of supporting or creating a given set of political institutions. The nature and principles of organisation of a political system "reflect economic relations. But for these economically prompted political institutions to come to life, they must first pass through the minds of people as *concepts*".² The ideological nature of a political system is a lawful phenomenon. Political ideology, being conditioned by socio-economic relations, *determines* the institutions that correspond to it. An ideology becomes unrealistic, irrational, dogmatic and fanatical in relation to its corresponding political system *if its concepts falsely reflect existing socio-economic relations*. In such a case, the bourgeois interpretation of the relation between ideology and the political system is on firm ground: power delutes ideology, and ideology undermines power. A crisis in ideology is an indication of a crisis situation in its corresponding political system, and the politically dominant class, in whose interest it is to conceal this crisis in the system, favours deideologising it.

What are the causes that prompt the bourgeois ideologists to take their particular line of criticism of the Soviet political system? The causes lie in the crisis that has gripped bourgeois ideology and its corresponding political system. In the USA, according to Brzezinski and Huntington, "power and ideology seldom meet".³ Americans, they say, "often view politics

and politicians as unprincipled and even corrupt ... the general principles of the American political beliefs are usually thought to be inoperative in day-to-day political action".⁴ The bourgeois ideologists seek to divert the discontent of the working masses away from the political system of capitalism. They seek to deideologise this system. They try to pawn off their own *special interest as universal*. And they try to spread to all ideology the repugnance and hostility that is felt among the working masses towards bourgeois ideals of democracy, freedom, etc.

"The question whether objective [*gegenständliche*] truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a *practical* question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness [*Diessseitigkeit*] of his thinking."² The fact that contemporary bourgeois political consciousness is pseudo-scientific does not mean that *all* ideology is pseudo-scientific. An ideology may offer a distorted and unscientific or an accurate and scientific reflection of reality, even though both possibilities are conditioned materially. In the former instance, ideology is a factor of the regression of the political system—an indication of the distorted reflection of social being in the consciousness of certain classes and their theoreticians. This is characteristic of contemporary bourgeois political consciousness. In the latter instance, ideology is a factor in the progress of the political system—an indication of the unity of the ideology of the class, the people and the science of society. This is characteristic of Marxism-Leninism. Bourgeois ideology and Marxism-Leninism are totally incompatible in their origin, nature, development and forms of manifestation. When the bourgeois ideologists down-

¹ G. V. Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 207.

² Ibid., p. 216.

³ Z. Brzezinski and S. Huntington, op. cit., p. 42.

⁴ Z. Brzezinski and S. Huntington, op. cit., p. 22.

² K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Moscow, 1969, Vol. I, p. 13.

grade all ideology, they are essentially trying to use the mistrust of bourgeois ideology felt in the capitalist countries, as a weapon against Marxism-Leninism. They do this because a significant part of the working masses have long since lost faith in bourgeois ideology.

The trend in the West towards deideologising any and all political systems is dictated by the bourgeois ideologists' desire, on the one hand, to export to the socialist countries the criteria and aims engendered by the crisis in bourgeois social consciousness, and, on the other hand, to conceal the crisis in bourgeois political ideology and its corresponding system—the crisis of bourgeois power without a future.

Trends towards liberalising bourgeois criticism of the Soviet political system, as we have seen, in no way mean that the sovietologists have turned to an *objective* description of Soviet reality, to a *scientific* analysis of the factual data on the Soviet political system, etc. Bourgeois ideologists continue to ply their criticism so as to implant in the consciousness of the reader a view of the Soviet political system that will serve to the advantage of the *bourgeoisie*; they continue to conceal the essence and the future potential of the Soviet political system. Analysis of bourgeois theories shows that the sovietologists' conceptions—no matter how they are presented—fail to form a whole that would in any way help the reader gain an understanding of the nature and continuous evolution of the Soviet political system. Some seemingly objective reports appearing in the bourgeois press on certain aspects of the Soviet political system and shortcomings in its development are, *in essence, falsifications*. Such reports simply represent new forms of political influence—more flexible, more acceptable to the reader—that the bourgeois ideologists are now using while still standing on their initial class positions. Such reports are characteristically couched in reservations and authors' or editors' explanatory notes

and remarks that reduce all the seeming objectivity to naught.

In our critique of bourgeois theories of the Soviet political system, we noted that the Western ideologists are losing the confidence of even their "own" readers. A certain nervousness is felt in their writings when it comes to discussing the factors, nature and principles of organisation of the Soviet political system, or the dynamic nature of Marxism-Leninism, or the growing number of Communist and Workers' Parties in the capitalist countries, or the size of their membership, or the successes scored by the national liberation movement. However, there is no denying that the bourgeois ideologists have a certain market for their product in the West, and they are constantly struggling to broaden their sphere of influence. The sovietologists even produce school textbooks to protect, as they say, school children from the influence of communist promises of a better life and to bring them up in the spirit of hatred towards communism and the USSR.

The basic content of the modern epoch consists of the transition from capitalism to socialism; the struggle of the two opposing social systems; socialist and national liberation revolutions; the collapse of imperialism; the liquidation of the colonial system; the adoption of the socialist path by an ever growing number of new countries; and the triumph of socialism and communism on a world scale. Unmasking bourgeois ideology and bourgeois theories on the Soviet political system is *one of the factors in the acceleration of historical progress*.